Aрpellant William T. Crawford appeals from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to appellees Charles L. Spencer, M.D., Charles L. Spencer, M.D., P.C., Alma F. Jenkins, M.D., and Alma F. Jenkins, M.D., P.C.
Apрellee Dr. Spencer was appellant’s primary care physician. Dr. Spencer is alleged to have repetitively prescribed a non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory drug, Feldene, for appellant who was being treated for diabetes, hypertension and arthritis. Feldene commonly is used to treat patients with arthritis, but medical indicators apparently exist that it should not be prescribed for patients with peptic ulcers.
Medical records entries by an associate of appellee Spencer make reference to appellant’s taking Feldene as early as May 18, 1990, and reflect that a refill for Feldene was prescribed for appellant on August 22, 1990. Although the evidence is in confliсt whether appellee Spencer or an associate ordered a change in appellant’s medication from Motrin to Feldene, appellant nonethеless was continued on the drug after Dr. Spencer became aware appellant was taking that medication. Evidence of record shows that appellee Spencer became aware of appellant’s taking of Feldene in November or early December 1990; at that time, appellant complained of heartburn relieved by Mylanta or Pepto Bismol. On January 31, 1991, appellant complained to Dr. Spencer that he had developed a burning in his chest and stomach; Dr. Spencer suspected the еxistence of an ulcer and ordered x-rays. The x-rays confirmed the existence of an ulcer, and Dr. Spencer referred appellant to appellee Dr. Jenkins who рractices in the area of gastroenterology. On February 18, 1991, Dr. Jenkins examined appellant and confirmed the existence of the ulcer; appellant was advised he had an ulcer on that date. After being informed that appel *447 lant was taking medication, which included Feldene, Dr. Jenkins prescribed Carafate and Zantac for the treatment of appellant’s ulcer. Appellant resumed his regular scheduled appointments with Dr. Spencer; Dr. Jenkins remained associated as a case consultant. Although appellаnt continued to complain to Dr. Spencer regarding the stomach pain, he was not told to cease taking Feldene. On or about July 18, 1991, about one month after appellant began to suffer from both stomach pain, nausea, and sleep loss; being unable to contact Dr. Spencer, he transported himself to a local medical emergency center. The physician on duty advised appellant immediately to discontinue use of Feldene as that drug should not be taken with a peptic ulcer. On July 22, 1991, appellant consultеd an internal medicine physician who immediately admitted appellant into the hospital and informed him to discontinue his use of Feldene. Apparently, following release from the hospital and until February 1992, appellant received treatment and care from Dr. Jenkins. Appellant filed suit, on July 16, 1993, for various causes of action, including malpractice, negligеnt infliction of emotional distress and abandonment.
Appellant enumerates the following errors: “The trial court erred in not properly classifying this medical malpractice сase as a continuing tort and concluding that the date of injury was as early as February, 1991 and as late as June 18, 1991, as opposed to the date of [appellant/plaintiff’s] discоvery of injury upon his hospitalization on July 18, 1991” and “in finding that [appellant/plaintiff] failed to file his lawsuit within the statute of limitations pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-71 (a).” Held:
1. Appellee Spencer’s motion to dismiss the aрpeal for failure of appellant to comply with Court of Appeals Rule 27 (c) (3) (i) is denied. This court has accepted appellant’s supplemental brief which cоntains citations to the record. Compare
Petkas v. Grizzard,
2. The applicable summary judgment standard is that of
Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins,
3. OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this article, an action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”
Appellant correctly contends that this is not an action for medical malpractice based on a misdiagnosis. However, an action for medical malpractice, within the meaning of OCGA § 9-3-71 (a), includes
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any claim from damages arising from the death of or injury to any person arising out of “[h]ealth, medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription, treatment, or care rendered by a person authorized by law to perform such service or by any person acting under the supervision and control of the lawfully authorized personf.]” OCGA § 9-3-70 (1). “ ‘A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of medicine for compensation must bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of care and skill. Any injury resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be a tort for which a recovery may be had.’ [Cits.]”
Frazier v. Davis,
We reject аppellant’s contention that the continuing tort theory applies in this case so as, in essence, to extend the date when the statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) commenced tо run; application of such a theory would appear to thwart the intent of the legislature in amending OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) in 1985.
Everhart v. Rich’s, Inc.,
Appellant’s various contentions in support of his enumerations of error are without merit. Further, by failing to enumerate and brief the issues concerning the grant of summary judgment as to appellant’s claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and abandonment, appellant has not preserved those issues for appellate review. See generally
Krebsbach v. State,
Judgment affirmed.