Crawford v. Results Oriented, Inc.
548 S.E.2d 342
Ga.
2001
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CRAWFORD v. RESULTS ORIENTED, INC.; CRAWFORD v. GREEN TREE FINANCIAL SERVICING CORPORATION; CRAWFORD v. CAVALIER HOMES OF ALABAMA, INC. et al.

S00G1817, S00G1820, S00G1992

Supreme Court of Georgia

DECIDED JUNE 11, 2001.

273 Ga. 884 | 548 SE2d 342

THOMPSON, Justice.

only the language in the enumeration,

, or demonstrated by a lack of interest that the enumeration possesses no merit.
. Accordingly, we do not find that appellees abandoned this enumerated error in the Court of Appeals.

However, in the interest of judicial economy, we will not remand the matter to the Court of Appeals as our ruling in Division 1, supra, obviates the core argument appellees asserted in support of this enumeration. Specifically, appellees contended that in situations where an insured is not the mortgagor of the insured property, a mortgagee is not obligated under the standard mortgage clause to transfer and assign the debt to the insurer in exchange for the insurer‘s payment of the principal and all accrued interest. However, based on our finding in Division 1, supra, that the standard mortgage clause is a separate contract binding both the insurer and the mortgagee regardless of the status of the insured, appellees’ argument necessarily fails. Because the record reveals that Citizens Bank received the principal and all accrued interest from American Central and transferred and assigned the security deed and notes to American Central “[f]or value received,” no genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the sufficiency of the consideration. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of American Central.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JUNE 11, 2001.

Mozley, Finlayson & Loggins, Robert M. Finlayson II, Edward C. Bresee, for appellant.

Smith & Harrington, Wilton D. Harrington, Robert S. Slocumb, for appellees.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Ray Crawford purchased a mobile home from Results Oriented, Inc. for $76,000. The mobile home was manufactured by Cavalier Homes of Alabama. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corporation financed Crawford‘s purchase of the mobile home.

At the time of sale, Crawford signed documents that required him to arbitrate any claim against the manufacturer, dealer, or lender in Alabama. The dealer presented these documents to Crawford as “standard” for mobile home sales. Though the dealer did not advise Crawford to read or review the documents prior to signing, Crawford was not prevented from doing so.

The arbitration clause was set out in all capital letters and clearly indicated that Crawford would waive his right to a jury trial over any dispute regarding his purchase. However, the clause failed to indicate that Crawford would be responsible for at least portions of the arbitration costs.

Later, when Crawford alleged defects in design and construction of his mobile home, he brought suit in state court against the manufacturer, the dealer and the lender. All three defendants moved for a stay in proceedings and to compel arbitration. The state court denied the motions, finding the arbitration clause procedurally and substantively unconscionable under the two-pronged analysis outlined in

. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that undisclosed arbitration fees could not be the basis for unconscionability.
.

We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the arbitration clause is not unconscionable. We find the Court of Appeals’ opinion to be correct and consistent with the United States Supreme Court‘s recent holding in

(mere silence of arbitration agreement on subject of costs is insufficient to render agreement unenforceable). See also
(arbitration clause is not unconscionable as an adhesion contract);
(arbitration provision is not unconscionable because it lacks mutuality of remedy). It follows that Crawford must arbitrate any claim against defendants, including the validity of the arbitration clause itself.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., who dissents.

HUNSTEIN, Justice, concurring.

I agree with the majority that the United States Supreme Court‘s holding in

resolves this case adversely to appellant. However, a review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion reveals that in addressing the merits of appellant‘s claim regarding the unconscionability of the Installment Contract under Georgia law, the Court of Appeals failed to apply the appropriate analysis as set forth in
, despite the trial court‘s example in properly applying this case to appellant‘s claim.
. Thus, while the result reached by the Court of Appeals may be “correct and consistent with the United States Supreme Court‘s recent holding,” as the majority notes, I would not apply that endorsement to all of the language employed in the lower court‘s opinion.

DECIDED JUNE 11, 2001.

T. Michael Flinn, for appellant.

Phears & Moldovan, Victor L. Moldovan, for appellee (case no. S00G1817).

Kenney & Solomon, Thomas S. Kenney, Robert J. Solomon, Debbie W. Flesch, for appellee (case no. S00G1820).

Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, Rex D. Smith, Ian R. Rapaport, Beth S. Reeves, for appellees (case no. S00G1992).

Mills, Moraitakis, Kushel & Pearson, Albert M. Pearson III, David A. Webster, Ashley Carraway, Mary C. Ball, Linda J. Krisher, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, John T. Marshall, amici curiae.