74 N.Y.S. 261 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff slipped and fell upon the sidewalk on the north side ■of One Hundred and Fourth street, west of Columbus avenue, and was injured, and this action is to recover from the defendant the damages thereby sustained. The complaint alleges that on or about the 1st day of December, 1898, and for upwards of a week prior thereto, as well as thereafter, the defendant carelessly and negligently permitted and allowed the sidewalk or pavement in front of the vacant lots between Nos. 109 and 119, on the north side of said One Hundred and Fourth street, and at and about 160 feet west of the northwesterly intersection of said One Hundred and Fourth street and Columbus avenue, to become, be and remain in an unlawful, slippery, unsafe and dangerous condition, covered with ice and snow, whereof the defendant had notice, actual and constructive.
Hpon the trial the plaintiff testified that it began to snow on Friday, the day after Thanksgiving, and continued during the following day, upon which day several inches of snow fell; that on the following Thursday, December first, she started to walk to Columbus avenue on One Hundred and Fourth street; that when she got on the sidewalk in front of these vacant lots she fell and broke her wrist; that the whole sidewalk in front of these vacant lots was covered with snow and ice, extending all the way from the •curb to the fence in front of these lots, and that the street in front of these lots was at that time impassable from the snow. She further testified that the vacant lots were surrounded by a high fence; tiat in the center of thé sidewalk there Was a single row of flagstones, the outer and inner edge of the sidewalk being dirt; that she walked •close to the fence when she fell; that the flagstones were all covered ' with snow; that it snowed on the day before she fell, and the snow was there packed down; that it was not snowing on December first; that the snow that fell on Friday and Saturday had not been cleaned from this sidewalk at the time of the accident, and it remained augmented by the snow that fell on the subsequent days; that the surface of the sidewalk was icy and rough; that there was much traffic upon this street, and a great many people passed; that the witness had passed over the sidewalk between the previous Saturday and the day of the accident, and that there was the same condition of ice during all that period from the preceding Saturday until the
On behalf of the defendant it was proved that on the 25th of February, 1896, there were in the city of Hew York, including the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx, 1,158 linear miles of sidewalk and 27,256,043 square yards of sidewalk; that in that year the first snow fell on the 24th of Hovember, 1898, when three inches; fell; that the next fall was on Saturday the twenty-sixth, when five inches fell; that on the following day (Sunday), the twenty-seventh? five inches fell, and on the twenty-ninth and thirtieth six inches fell; that there was no snow on the first of December; the snow storm of the thirtieth ceased at nine a. m. on that day; that on the twenty-fourth of Hovember the temperature ranged between forty-one and thirty-two degrees, on the twenty-fifth from thirty-four to twenty-six degrees, on the twenty-sixth from thirty-four to twenty-five degrees, on the twenty-seventh from twenty-eight to twenty-five degrees, on the twenty-eighth • from thirty-seven to twenty-seven degrees, On the twentyminth from forty-one to thirty degrees, on the thirtieth from thirty-nine to twenty-eight degrees and on the first of December from thirty^seven to thirty-one degrees; that snow and ice will melt at forty degrees and freeze at thirty-two-degrees.
Upon this evidence the case was submitted to the jury, who found a verdict for the defendant, and from that verdict the plaintiff appeals. The plaintiff complains of several errors of the charge of the court, and of its refusal to charge, as- requested by the plaintiff.
The first question presented, however, is whether upon this evidence a verdict for the plaintiff. could have been sustained. If a. finding that the defendant was negligent could not be sustained, then it would not be necessary to examine the questions presented by the exceptions to the charge. The general rule applicable to-claims against municipal corporations for negligence occasioned by
In O’Keeffe v. Mayor (29 App. Div. 524) we held that under the cases of Taylor v. City of Yonkers (105 N. Y. 206); Harrington v. City of Buffalo (121 id. 149), and Ayres v. Village of Hammondsport (130 id. 665), a municipal corporation is not liable because ice and snow form upon a sidewalk and a person sustains injury therefrom. Something more than that is necessary. What the plaintiff must prove is that the municipal corporation neglected a duty that it owed to him in seeing that this sidewalk was clear and free from ice and snow on the day in question. In Staley v. Mayor (37 App. Div. 598) the plaintiff was injured on, the
Applying this rule, there is no evidence here that would justify a finding that the city was negligent. It appears in this case that the snow fell almost continuously from the 24th day of November to the 30th day of November, 1898 ; it fell on November twenty-fourth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, twenty-ninth and thirtieth, in all nineteen inches of snow ; and the plaintiff was injured on the 1st day of December, 1898. During all this period the temperature rose but little above freezing, and at no time, considering the amount ■of snow that fell, was it possible for the city to clean the sidewalks where the owners of the abutting property had neglected to perform that duty. As was said in Hawkins v. Mayor (supra): The city may require the occupants of houses abutting on the sidewalk in front of which the snow has fallen to remove it within a reasonable time and is not guilty of negligence if, observing that the work is being generally done, it waits for a reasonable period the action of the citizens.” There is evidence in the record that the officers of the city attended to this duty. The janitor of the building opposite to the sidewalk on which the accident occurred testified that after the snow had fallen a policeman came through the street and ordered all the janitors to clean their sidewalks and gutters which were not cleaned. He further, testified that he called the attention of the policeman to the lots across the street and asked “ why not have some one clean off the lots as well as us janitors ■clean the sidewalks and gutters.” The policeman then asked the janitor if he knew who owned the lots or had charge of them; that no one was there whom the policeman could tell to remove the ■snow, and that the owner of the lots was a resident of Washington, D. 0.
The city was thus by its officer endeavoring to have the duty of ■cleaning these sidewalks performed by the abutting owners, and under these conditions it certainly was not negligence on .the part ■of the city to wait a reasonable time to see whether the owners of these vacant lots would clean them before undertaking to do it, and there is nothing to show that there was any negligence on the part
The plaintiff objected to the evidence as to the number of miles of streets in the city of Hew York, but we think that this was clearly competent on the question of the defendant’s negligence. Upon that question it was certainly competent to show the condition that existed in the city at the time of the accident. It is the negligence in the performance of a duty imposed upon the munici- . pal corporation which must he the basis of the plaintiff’s right toi recover. The time within' which the municipal, corporation must perform this particular ■ duty depends largely upon the amount of work that is required; and when the duty extends to many miles of sidewalks, streets and . avenues, the situation requires that a longer time be given to perform that duty than is given to a more limited-area. The testimony was relevant as to the time within which the municipal corporation was required to act. This evidence has always been admitted in cases of this kind, and the burden imposed upon a municipality which included the number of miles of streets, it has to care for has been commented upon in almost all the-decisions of the courts bearing upon this subject. The fact that the plaintiff was not permitted to prove that the snow was removed from the sidewalks in front of other premises than these vacant lots-does not seem to be a reversible error, -as that fact would not have-helped the plaintiff. The evidence would tend to show that the-city was doing its duty in making the abutting owners clean the-front of their houses rather than predicate negligence on the part of the city in noteitself cleaning the sidewalks in front of these vacant: lots. There was no error in excluding the testimony that in former-years the city had been negligent in allowing the sidewalks in front of these vacant lots to become incumbered by snow and ice." The-city was certainly not responsible in this case from the fact that in former years its agents had been negligent in removing snow and-ice.in this particular locality.
Upon the whole case, we think that the evidence was not sufficient to justify a finding of negligence against the defendant and
Patterson, J., concurred; Hatch and Laughlin, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) :
I am of the opinion that the evidence in this case was sufficient to authorize a finding that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to remove the snow and ice from the walk, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury which the plaintiff sustained. Such view seems to have been shared by the trial court and the defendant. The latter made no motion for a dismissal of the complaint at thé close of the plaintiff’s proof, nor for the direction of a verdict in his favor upon the whole case. It has long been the settled rule that the omission to move for a nonsuit or for the direction of a verdict amounts to a concession upon the part of the defendant that there is a question of fact for the determination of the jury. This concession is to be regarded as binding upon the defendant, as it cannot thereafter be heard to say that the verdict is without evidence to support it. (Steinau v. Scheuer, 15 App. Div. 5) Ho basis exists, therefore, in this case from which it can be said that the evidence did not authorize this recovery.
The court charged the jury that if the fall of snow on the twenty-ninth and thirtieth of Hóvember concurred with the fall of snow on the twenty-sixth no recovery coidd be had. It assumes that if the actual condition of the walk prior to the thirtieth of Hovember was such that negligence of the defendant could be predicated thereon and that such condition was the cause of the accident, that no lia
The judgment • should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I concur in the result of Hr. Justice Ingraham’s opinion, but not in the opinion. It is not the established law that a city is bound to remove snow and ice from its streets. .It is bound to use reasonable diligence in keeping the streets passable; it is not bound to prevent their becoming slippery. It is under an obligation to keep its-streets passable where they are obstructed by a great fall of snow, but when they are simply rendered slippery and uneven because of the action of the elements, it has no more duty to the passer-by on the sidewalk than to the horses in the street.