Crawford-Dunk v. MV Transportation, Inc.Crawford-Dunk v. MV Transportation, Inc.
Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]).
Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
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[921 NYS2d 268]--```htmlBay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```xmlBay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]).
Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1998]). Since the appellants failed to meet their initial burden, it is not necessary to review the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). Florio, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.
```Of course! Here is the clean, semantic HTML version of the provided legal document, formatted according to your specifications.Bay Shore “when suddenly, and without warning, [his] vehicle was struck from behind . . . by” the defendant‘s vehicle (see Hauser v Adamov, 74 AD3d 1024 [2010]).
In opposition, the defendant failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. The defendant‘s allegation that he did not recall seeing brake lights or any other illumination on the plaintiff‘s vehicle before the collision did not adequately rebut the inference of negligence (see Macauley v ELRAC, Inc., 6 AD3d 584, 585 [2004]; Gross v Marc, 2 AD3d 681 [2003]; Waters v City of New York, 278 AD2d 408, 409 [2000]; Barile v Lazzarini, 222 AD2d 635 [1995]). Similarly, the defendant‘s statement that, upon turning left off the exit ramp he “almost immediately came into contact with the rear of the vehicle . . . operated by the plaintiff,” does not rebut the inference of negligence. Indeed, the statement indicates that the defendant failed to control his vehicle and to see that which, under the circumstances, he should have seen by the proper use of his senses (see generally Canfield v Beach, 305 AD2d 440 [2003]; Santanastasio v Doe, 301 AD2d 511 [2003]; Bournazos v Malfitano, 275 AD2d 437 [2000]; Demenagas v Yan Hok Lai, 275 AD2d 759 [2000]; Marsella v Sound Distrib. Corp., 248 AD2d 683, 684 [1998]).
The defendant‘s contention that the plaintiff‘s motion was premature is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]). The defendant‘s contention that only the plaintiff has knowledge of what occurred between the plaintiff‘s vehicle and the leading vehicle, which was owned and operated by one or more nonparties, fails to establish what information the defendant hopes to discover that would relieve him of liability. “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).
The defendant‘s remaining contentions are without merit.
Covello, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated March 18, 2010, which denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“Under the emergency doctrine, when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d 1020, 1021 [2010]; see Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322, 327 [1991]; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d 567, 567 [2008]; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d 58, 60 [2004]). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of an actor‘s response to it will ordinarily present questions of fact (see Tsai v Zong-Ling Duh, 79 AD3d at 1021; Koenig v Lee, 53 AD3d at 567; Bello v Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 AD3d at 60).
Here, the defendants MV Transportation, Inc., and Maurice M. Pugh (hereinafter together the appellants) failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In support of that branch of their motion, the appellants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Pugh was faced with an emergency situation not of his own making and, if so, whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in that context (see Takle v New York City Tr. Auth., 14 AD3d 608 [2005]; Gildersleeve v Leo, 274 AD2d 547 [2000]; Raposo v Raposo, 250 AD2d 420 [1