118 S.W.2d 257 | Ark. | 1938
A. D. Maxey was a former sheriff and collector of Crawford county. He filed with the county court of that county from time to time from May 4, 1931, to December 10, 1932, claims for the statutory fees allowed by law for services rendered as sheriff to the county. These claims accumulated without action by the county court until they amounted to $8,214.37. On October 1, 1934, the county court made an order disallowing all these claims for the reason that they were in excess of the revenues of the county ford the years in which they had accrued.
No appeal was prosecuted from the order of the county court disallowing these claims, but on July 31, 1935, Maxey filed in the Crawford circuit court a petition for a writ of certiorari, asserting that this order of the county court was void, and that the right of appeal had been lost through no fault on his part.
On June 3, 1935, the county court made an order citing the sheriff to readjust and correct errors made in his settlement filed December 27, 1934, which had been approved December 31, 1934. Upon final hearing of this citation on June 28, 1935, it was found by the county *363 court that Maxey, as sheriff and collector, owed a balance from the collection of the county general taxes of 1933, collected in 1934, of $85.82, also a balance from license fees collected for the year 1934 of $50, and a balance upon fines and forfeitures collected in 1934 of $531.40. The effect of this finding and of the judgment of the county court pronounced thereon is that the sheriff and collector owed a balance on revenues collected for the county in the year 1934 of $667.22. The accuracy of this finding as to the amounts collected does not appear to be questioned, but an appeal was duly prosecuted from the direction of the judgment that Maxey pay this sum into the county treasury.
These two proceedings were consolidated and heard together after the circuit court had refused to dismiss the certiorari proceeding. The court treated this proceeding as an extension of time for appeal from the order of disallowance, for the reason that a showing was made, although disputed, that the county judge had agreed to notify the sheriff when he passed upon these claims, but had failed to do so, and the sheriff was unaware of the action taken until six months had expired.
The case of Smith Shoptaw v. Stanton,
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the circuit court in entertaining jurisdiction as upon appeal from the judgment of the county court in disallowing Maxey's claims, nor was it improper to consolidate that case with the appeal from the order of the county court restating the 1934 settlement. *364
The circuit court found that the claims of the sheriff had been disallowed only because they exceeded the revenues of the county for the years in which they had accrued, and affirmed the order of the county court finding that Maxey owed a balance on account of the 1934 revenues collected of $667.22, but ordered "that he be allowed to recoup such amount out of the money admitted to be owing to him from the general revenue fund of said county."
The state of the record before us is, therefore, as follows: Maxey performed official duties in the years 1931 and 1932 for which he should have been paid out of the revenues of those years respectively, but was not paid because payment could not be made without exceeding the revenues of those years. He is indebted to the county for revenues collected in 1934 in the suit of $667.22, and was allowed recoupment of that amount of his claims for the years 1931 and 1932 against this demand.
Under numerous decisions of this court this was error. Maxey should, of course, have been paid in 1931 and 1932 for the official services rendered by him in those years. We have many times defined the duties of county courts in paying these claims.
In the case of Miller County v. Blocker,
Maxey did not enforce his right to have his statutory claims paid until the revenues had been consumed in paying other claims. But as the revenues have been consumed he cannot now be paid at all.
We have had two cases before us involving claims against Crawford county incurred in the years 1931 and 1932. The first of these cases is that of Skinner Kennedy Stationery Co. v. Crawford County,
In this Skinner case it was insisted that the collection of certain delinquent taxes had, to the amount of such collection, increased the revenue for 1931 so that the claim might be paid in full; but it was held that the delinquent taxes which were collected in subsequent years were revenues for the year in which they were collected and not for the year for which the taxes became due, as respects the application of such revenues to claims against the county.
The second case was that of Democrat Printing
Lithographing Co. v. Crawford County,
These cases are decisive of this appeal. We have before us the identical showing as to the expenditures and revenues of Crawford county for the years 1931 and 1932. It is not contended that Crawford county has any unexpended revenue for either 1931 or 1932 out of which any part of the claims for the official services rendered in those years could be paid. On the contrary, payment out of the 1934 revenue is asked by way of recoupment, and this was the relief granted by the circuit court. But the services were not rendered in 1934. Unfortunately for appellee they were rendered in the years 1931 and 1932, when they could not be paid without exceeding the revenues of those years, and cannot, therefore, be paid at all.
The case of Cook v. Shackleford,
So, here, the 1934 revenues with which Maxey now stands charged cannot be used to pay his claims for services rendered in 1931 and 1932, and the judgment awarding, the right of recoupment — which in effect, is a payment, pro tanto, — of those claims, will be reversed, and the judgment of the county court for $667.22 revenues collected in 1934 is ordered to stand as being in full force and effect.