History
  • No items yet
midpage
Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Service, Inc.
206 S.W.3d 842
Ark.
2005
Check Treatment

*1 with Ark. Ct. R. record has compliance 4-3(h), Sup. been examined for adverse Hall but not rulings objected and no error is found. argued appeal, prejudicial Affirmed. SERVICE, INC.,

Lance R. CRAVEN v. FULTON SANITATION Services, Inc., Arkansas, d/b/a Sun Inc., d/b/a USA Ray Waste of

and Kendale Lloyd Toney 04-791 206 S.W.3d 842 Court of Arkansas

Supreme 14, 2005 delivered Opinion April *3 Nolan, P.A., Caddell, Caddell & Fred L. Reynolds, by: for appellant.

Ledbetter, Harrison, L.L.P., Arnold & Diane E. Cogbill, by: Graham, for appellees. L. Lance R. Craven filed a Appellant Corbin, Justice.

Don al d suit the Sebastian negligence Circuit County Court Service, Inc., Fulton Sanitation against Appellees Sun d/b/a Services, Inc., Arkansas, Ray d/b/a Waste USA of Inc. (“Fulton”), and Kendale The trial court Lloyd Toney. granted summary judg ment to on that an adverse Appellees decision from the ground Workers’ Commission barred suit under Appellant’s the doctrine of collateral contends that the trial estoppel. Appellant court’s it ruling erroneous because violates his constitutional to right a trial and his to suit by jury Ark. bring under party Code Ann. The ll-9-410(a)(l)(A) 2002). Arkansas of (Repl. Court certified this case to Appeals us issue first presenting impres sion as to whether a an administrative judgment by bemay agency given effect such caseswhere the preclusive has the to litigant trial. Our is thus to jurisdiction Ct. R. pursuant Sup. We l-2(b) (1). reverse the order of and remand for summary judgment further in this matter. proceedings The relevant facts are not and the dispute, parties agree

that law, this appeal which this court presents only questions Home, de v. Pine Nursing reviews novo.SeeBrown Bluff McCastlain, Holt 199 S.W.3d 45 (2004); involved in to was Suffice it that say Appellant S.W.3d vehicle wherein the March an automobile accident on one of Fulton’s trucks struck from behind he was by driving at the job Because was on that was driven Appellant by Toney. accident, his he filed claim against employer, time of the Concrete, that he sustained inju- Cockram alleging compensable neck, back, back. His and lower ries his upper his neck and injuries; upper-back accepted compensability however, his had been whether lower-back questioned Administrative Law the accident. The Commission’s caused by failed causal concluded that had Judge (ALJ) Appellant prove and the automobile between his lower-back injuries relationship decision was affirmed the Commission. accident. ALJ’s however, he aban- to the court of appeals; Appellant appealed the record with the doned the when he failed to lodge appeal court. appellate filed the instant suit August

Appellant against Appellees his for lower-back injuries.1 Appellees damages seeking on that the moved summary ground judgment ALJ’s from determination of issue causation precluded effect it. that argued giving preclusive relitigating Appellant the issue causation would Commission’s deprive his to have that factual issue determined him of constitutional right 1 l-9-410(a)(1)(A) specifi- He also section jury. argued of a claim for workers’ compensa- cally provides making *4 in to maintain an action shall not affect the tion employee’s right The trial court summary court a against party. granted and judgment, Appellant appealed. res is whether the doctrine of judicata

The sole issue appeal be to a final of the Workers’ Compensation may judgment applied so as to bar the constitutional Commission employee’s trial tortfeasor. concept third-party against and two facets: claim issue doctrine of res preclusion judicata Waters, 386, 91 Ark. 182 S.W.3d See v. 357 Barclay preclusion. 307, 100 711 (2003); 352 Ark. S.W.3d v. (2004); Searcy Davenport, 632, Pinson, Ark. 855 Inc. v. 313 S.W.2d Cheeseman Trucking, John further on a forecloses (1993). litigation 941 Claim preclusion 1 neck and sought damages for the to his Although upper Appellant initially in he withdrew claim. back, in addition to those his lower later back, action,

cause of while issue forecloses further preclusion litigation with a issue. Id. connection certain Issue is the preclusion type of res case. involved this judicata

Issue better known in state as this collateral preclusion, bars of issues of law or fact estoppel, relitigation previously that the whom earlier litigated, is decision provided party against asserted had a full fair and being issue opportunity litigate and the issue was essential question to the judgment. Beaver Q. Hotels, 359, Hammons 138 S.W.3d 664 (2003); v. John Terrell, 423, v. 336 Ark. 985 S.W.2d 737 To Zinger collateral (1999). apply be estoppel, elements must following (1) the present: issue to be must be the same as that sought precluded involved in the issue must have prior (2) been litigation; actually litigated; must (3) issue have been determined valid and final by (4) determination must have been judgment; essential to Id. Collateral judgment. be asserted estoppel may by stranger to the first but the judgment, whom is asserted must party have been a to the earlier action and have must had a full party fair the issue in opportunity that first litigate State proceeding. Willis, 6, Child v. 347 Ark. Support S.W.3d Officeof Enforcem’t Ctr., FDIC, 438 (2001); 275, Coleman’sServ. Inc. v. 55 Ark. App. 935 S.W.2d 289 (1996). doctrine res

Ordinarily, either the form judicata, claim or issue preclusion based on a preclusion, final applied Flowever, issued judgment court. doctrine has been in this state applied to issues determined final decree of an administrative both agency. this court Significantly, and the court have held that the doctrine is appeals applicable decisions of the Workers’ Beaver, Commission. See 359, 138 664; 355 Ark. Brider, S.W.3d Mohawk Tire & Co. Rubber v. 259 Ark. 536 S.W.2d 126 (1976); Andrewsv. Gross Tie & Janes Co., 214 Ark. 216 S.W.2d 386 v. Leisure (1948); Perry Lodges, Inc., 19 Ark. 718 S.W.2d 114 App. Tuberville (1986); Co., International Paper 711 S.W.2d App. 840 (1986); Co., Gwin v. R.D. Hall Tank 660 S.W.2d 947 App. Andrews, this court explained: court,

While the commissionis not it exercises functionsin its gwijji-judicial investigations and determinationsand itsawardsarein the natureof The doctrine judgments. of res judicata which forbidsthe of matters reopening oncejudicially determined *5 aswell by competent to decisionsof a authorityapplies commission or board workmen’s administering acts as to judg-

395 50 C.J.S.,Judg- courts having general judicial powers. merits of ments, in C.J., is 71 p. The rule followed stated generally 690. 1195, in has follows: “The award compensationproceedings nature a in the effect of the verdict of a jury. Being force and of the determines the rights and conclusively judgment, finally acts set asidein a unless under workmen’s parties manner, of a court and is as as a binding and proper See,also, faith and credit as such judgment.” entitled to the same 122 Anno. A.L.R. 550. 214-15, at S.W.2d 388.

214 Ark. at 216 issue of the involved the

None of the cases foregoing cases. trial in civil Notwithstanding, constitutional right jury in Andrews that the award contend that the statement Appellees of a verdict has the force and effect jury compensation proceedings to the the issue has been decided. also that Appellees point implies doctrine of of the statement the court of application appeals to bar actions “is res to administrative judicata especially appropriate conducted a new when an trial-type proceedings agency v. the law.” Brandon Arkansas made hearing, applied findings, 210-11, 193, Co., 201, 61 200 76 Ark. S.W.3d Western Gas App. Moore, 1999)). 589 902 We (N.D. Fuchs v. N.W.2d (2001) (citing hand, of the issue at do not view these as being holdings dispositive not be to bar an we that the doctrine conclude may applied factual in an action from determine issues employee having jury at law party. 2, 7, of the Arkansas Constitution

Article Section provides trial shall remain by jury pertinent part “[t]he law, inviolate, to the to all cases at without regard and shall extend under trial this amount jury controversy[.]” Bank, v. First a fundamental Walker Commercial right. provision 617, N.A., v. Bank (1994); Ark. 880 S.W.2d 316 Bussey 317 Malvern, It extends (Ark. 1980). Ark. 603 S.W.2d 426 App. 270 v. were at common law. Hopper to all cases that triable by jury Garner, McClanahan v. 944 S.W.2d 540 (1997); words, Gibson, other (1988). 756 S.W.2d 889 to the trial issues to trial extends only constitutional right Reed, 267 Ark. fact in civil and criminal causes. Jones cases, such as the suit negligence present S.W.2d 6 Tort case, were at common law. this are civil cases that triable by juries McClanahan, S.W.2d 889. See

396 Act, our

Under current Workers’ an em- the trial in an the action gives up ployee against That for unintentional work-related employer injuries. with the of Amendment to the Arkansas 26

vanquished passage 32, Constitution, now found Article which Section the gave means, method, the and forum for legislature power provide claims under the workers’ law. arising adjudicating compensation Grimmett v. 267 See 589 S.W.2d 579 (1979) Digby, statute other In (superseded grounds). exchange giving a certain and up right, gains resolution employee quick his or her claim Arkansas Code Annotated against employer. 11-9-101 of the (b) 2002) one (Repl. provides primary § of workers’ laws “to purposes compensation pay timely tempo- and benefits to all rary permanent disability legitimately injured workers who suffer an or disease out of and in the injury arising course of their employment^]”

The and remedies under the Act rights granted employees of all are exclusive other and remedies of the from rights employee Ark. Code Ann. employer. ll-9-105(a) (Repl. 2002). reason for such is found in the behind exclusivity general purpose laws, our workers’ which was to com- compensation change mon law the burden of all work-related from by shifting individual and to the employers employees consuming public, with the of fault concept immaterial.2 Brown v. being virtually 932 Finney, S.W.2d 769 Simmons Nat’l (1996); First Bank v. 285 Ark. 686 S.W.2d 415 With the Thompson, (1985). statutes, of such passage employers gave common-law up servant, defenses of fellow contributory negligence, assump- risk, of the tion while the chance of employees gave up recovering unlimited in tort actions in return damages for certain recovery Thus, all work-related cases. Id. been has held that the exclusiv- of our workers’ laws favors ity both employer Brown, employee. S.W.2d 769. contrast, an does not forfeit employee any right unlimited in a civil trial damages against party, regardless whether the made a employee claim for previously compen- our workers’ filing However, laws do not an from preclude employee action an tort for the injuries. e.g., infliction of intentional or willful See, 333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56 (1998); Crossett Sch., Hill Gourley v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, Pub. 855 S.W.2d 297 11—9— section On the contrary, sation against employer. 410(a)(1)(A) provides: specifically any employer of a claimfor compensation against

The making shallnot for the or death injury employee carrier affect *7 claimor her to makea the or his or dependents, right employee, of but the injury, court the any party maintainan actionin against be to reasonable carrier shall entitled or the employer’s in the action. join [Emphasis notice and to opportunity added.] in at bar are third that the case parties There no Appellees dispute a to maintain the right under Act. Accordingly, Appellant court, he has the fact that already them in action against despite claim his employer. pursued compensation against con- with the section ll-9-410(a)(l)(A) along Construing the in civil cases and trial considering stitutional right jury Act, the we conclude that of the Workers’ Compensation purpose in effect to the Commission’s trial court erred preclusive giving of of causation. this issue is one on the issue Although Arkansas, in case from in we find a similar guidance first impression Minnesota. Simon, 2004), 674 N.W.2d Ct. (Minn. App. Heine did of held that collateral

the Minnesota Court Appeals estoppel where bar the claim tortfeasor not against third-party plaintiffs that the determination concluded the workers’ compensation the not the accident with were caused plaintiffs by There, state, it held that in this had been defendant. previously to deci- the of res workers’ principles judicata apply compensation However, the Heine court concluded sions certain instances. did civil suit because that collateral not bar estoppel employee’s available the workers’ compensation proceed- procedures in a civil suit. As were different from those available markedly ings such, full the court held that deprived plaintiff to the issue of causation before fair agency. opportunity litigate The court explained: not by are bound common hearings Workers’ compensation evidence, or pleading

law rules of nor are rules statutory Additionally, is admissible. hearsay Reliable procedure applicable. trial a workers’ is no jury there right the recordbefore the nature of the proceedings claim. Basedon us, not did hearing conclude that workers’ we a full and fair

provide to be heard for opportunity purpose the doctrine of collateral in Heine’s applying estoppel negligence action tortfeasor. third-party at Id. 423 (citations omitted). before our Workers’

Proceedings Commission and its officers are informal hearing Commission is not bound technical or rules statutory evidence or technical or formal rules of conduct procedure Ark. Code Ann. ing (a) 11-9-705 More hearing. 2002). (Repl. before the Commission importantly, do not proceedings for the to have a determine provide jury factual issues. Given trial, the nature of these the lack of a proceedings, especially jury we conclude the Commission’s decision give preclusive effect would of a full and deprive fair opportunity the issue. litigate Article Section our constitution makes law, i.e., clear that the ato in all trial cases at civil and *8 cases, criminal is inviolate it is unless waived It is litigant. due to the of constitutional stature this with the right, along right to redress of found in Article Section that wrongs made to amend our constitution necessary before could legislature laws, establish our workers’ as those laws compensation effectively of strip these employees claims their rights against employers. Grimmett, 589 S.W.2d 579. Moreover, section our ll-9-410(a)(l)(A) of Workers’ Act Compensation that specifically provides employee’s pursuit a claim his her or shall not against effect the to maintain an employee’s right action in court a against tortfeasor. While an third-party gives employee up right trial jury against employer, does not that employee give up a third we against Were to hold that party. the Commission’s determination precluded suit we Appellant’s against Appellees, would be him to choose effectively between requiring enforcing his under the workers’ rights laws and his constitu tional ato trial jury tortfeasor. third-party Workers’ Act does not Compensation to make require Appellant choice, a such and nor do we. sum,

In under our state constitution and the Workers’ Act, an of a employee injured by negligence the issue of determine to have jury is entitled party causation, Ark. Code factual issues. See also well as other any as in an that issues of fact (1987) Ann. 16-64-103(b) (providing be shall tried by jury at law for the recovery money action that the trial We therefore conclude trial is waived). unless deter- the Commission’s effect to court erred in giving preclusive causation, we reverse order mination on the issue for further and remand proceedings. summary judgment and remanded. Reversed

Imber, J., concurs. the majority As concurring. Imber, Justice,

Clinton out, collateral four to apply estoppel, points Annabelle to be must elements must be satisfied: the issue (1) sought precluded must that involved in the the issue (2) be the same as prior litigation; the issue must have been determined (3) have been actually litigated; the determination must have (4) a valid and final judgment; Hotels, Q. been essential to the Beaver Hammons judgment. John in the case before the 664 (2003). 138 S.W.3d for his lumbar Commission damages Workers’ Compensation sought herniated disc the Workers’ Compensation strain and injuries. Case, made the findings:1 following ALJ he any “compens-

The claimanthas failedto sustained prove his lumbar either the form of spine, able lower back or injury” discs, in (sic) or a two herniated the specific lumbar strain He has (MVA) related incident of March 1999. employment strainis based lumbar medicallydiagnosedinjury prove failed Ark. CodeAnn. supportedby objectivefindings, requiredby upon any *9 medicallydiagnosed He has to the prove ll-9-102(5)(D).2 § failed discs or twoherniatedlumbar and documented objectively injury defectof relatedincident were relatedto the any causally specificemployment in way he has failed on March 1999. Therefore (MVA) prove the out and occurred in course such an or defect arose injury (Repl. 2002). These The cited findings statutory provision by ALJ were now thereafter appears adopted by at Code the Full Ann. Commission. § ll-9-102(4)(D) incident,

his was due to a employment, by and identifiable specific occurrence, place time and Ark. Code Ann. 11—9—§ 102(5)(A)(i).3 order, As demonstrated added.) concluded (Emphasis by ALJ

that the of two herniated lumbar discs was not injury related causally 10,1999. to the vehicle motor accident March With to the regard strain, however, lumbar concluded that faded ALJ that the of a lumbar strain was prove injury based medically-diagnosed section upon supported by any objective findings, required by Unlike the 11-9-102(4) (D). to the herniated finding pertaining ALJ’s discs, the the lumbar strain does not address the finding concerning Indeed, issue of causation. that “the medical acknowledged ALJ evidence have established that the may [Appellant] experienced 10,1999 lumbar strain in the motor vehicle accident of March . . ..” Therefore, the issue of whether lumbar-strain Appellant’s injury caused the automobde accident has by be determined. yet

In the filed lawsuit subsequent against Appellee, Appellant in his second amended that “as alleges a direct result and complaint of the acts proximate consequence negligent [Appellee], sustained serious both [Appellant] injuries, temporary perma- nent . to his lumbar . . .” added). As noted spine (Emphasis to the injuries lumbar included ALJ, in form of a spine injuries Here, lumbar strain and two herniated discs. made ALJ of no causal specific between the finding herniated- relationship accident, disc and the motor vehicle but he explicitly declined to make similar with the connection lumbar- finding strain In the absence of such injury. collateral any finding, estoppel does not on whether the lumbar- preclude subsequent litigation strain was caused the automobile injury accident.

Moreover, workers’ cases which damages are each are not adjudicated separately type bodily injury Simon, actions at iaw. In preclusive subsequent Heine v. N.W.2d 411 (Minn. Ct. the Minnesota Court of 2004), App. held that the elements of collateral were Appeals not estoppel satisfied due to the distinction between how claims are adjudicated in workers’ how causes of action proceedings are courts litigated of law. so the court said: holding, 3 Similarly, statutory provision the cited now appears at Ark. Ann. 11-9- Code 102(4)(A)(i) (Repl.2002).

401 not litigated aslost is wages, such damages, The issueofliability Doeren, v. SeeKatzenmaier proceedings. workers’compensation 938, 521, 522-23, 938 Workers’ 185 N.W. Minn. 150 the amount workers’ determine generally actions when an is liable for which benefits Minn. See injured during scope employment. employee 176.021, 1 (2002). subd. Stat.§ “in that the issuesadjudicated Id. 422. The Heine court concluded at from those dissimilar action were factually workers’ compensation reason, the collateral estoppel in district court.” For that litigated litigation. doctrine did not subsequent preclude be made in this case. The Workers’ A similar distinction can Commission made “compensability” separate sustained determination for each alleged injury by Appellant; is, whether sustained determined the Commission Appellant back back or lower neck injury, injury, upper “compensable” be deter- the circuit court would not The issues before injury. rather, the would be jury mined on the basis each alleged injury; whether sustained damages; asked to determine (1) whether such (3) (2) negli- whether negligent; Appellee See, AMI cause of damages. e.g., was proximate Appellant’s gence words, circuit would instruct In other court Civil 203. if what were caused by to determine injuries, any, jury Thus, in this claims accident. injury adjudicated automobile are dissimilar to those factually workers’ compensation proceeding at law be action that would presented Appellant’s Appellee. reasons, we reverse I should agree

For the above stated and remand for further of summary proceed the order issue However, resolving I decline majority join ings. constitu court’s order violates of whether circuit Appellant’s 7 of the Arkansas trial under Article Section tional that we will a well-settled This court has principle Constitution. essential issue if it is not a constitutional avoid resolving Ark. 132 S.W.3d v. the case. Landers deciding Jameson, 470 (1990); 788 S.W.2d Virdenv. 741 (2003); Roper, Center, Hills Board Evelyn Shopping Equal. 211 (1972). S.W.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Service, Inc.
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Apr 14, 2005
Citation: 206 S.W.3d 842
Docket Number: 04-791
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.