33 N.J.L. 513 | N.J. | 1869
Upon the argument, one of the grounds in favor of a reversal in this case, which was pressed upon -our attention, was, that the measure of damage which,
Nor can I perceive how this rule sought to be established, can properly be received for the purpose of establishing the ultimate limit to which damages are to extend. There appears no reason for circumscribing the damages of a vendee of property to the difference between the actual and represented cost price of the properly. It is obvious, that often Ills loss will exceed such bound. If the fraudulent representation has been the sufficient cause of the purchase, the actual loss sustained would seem to be the proper and usual
But the present case has peculiar characteristics, which seem to require a modification of the ordinary rule by which «damages are measured in cases of fraudulent sales. The plaintiff, in this instance, by reason of the fault of this defendant, became something more than a mere purchaser of real estate. By the fraudulent practice of the defendant, the plaintiff was induced to embark in a speculation. He did not take title to the land: that was placed in the defendant, in trust for the plaintiff and the other associates. The original understanding was, that the land was to be held and improved, and a company was to be formed. The land was retained, except a small portion sold with the assent of all the parties, officers appointed, and expenses incurred. These steps were all taken in conformity with the scheme of proceeding adopted by the parties, in the inception of the business. Starting, then, from the position, that the jury, on the trial of this cause, have found the fact that the plaintiff was induced to enter into this speculation by the falsehood of the defendant, it seems to me clear that in conformity to well settled legal rules, we must hold the defendant answerable for the loss of the moneys which the plaintiff, without fault on his part, lost in this speculation.
The rule which these authorities recommend is one of much practical importance, for, as it seems to me, it will, if adopted, materially aid in the application of the abstract principles of the law on this subject to the facts of ordinary litigations. For example, Mr. Greenleaf says: “ The damage to be recovered must always be the natural and proximate conse
Regarding, then, this as the correct principle, I think the judge’s charge upon this topic, in the present case, was, in
But upon the argument another point was taken by the plaintiff in error. It was insisted, that the value of the interest of the plaintiff in the lands which remain unsold, should have entered into the estimate of damages made by the jury. I am inclined to think this matter was not mooted at the trial, for the probability is that this land is possessed of a mere nominal value, and it thus escaped the attention of the counsel, jury, and court. There was no proof as to its value at the time of the trial, but as it cost, originally, at least ten thousand dollars, we cannot, in the absence of all
In my opinion, the value of the plaintiff’s interest in the land referred to, was an essential element in a legal ascertainment of the damages in this case, and, as such interest was not included in the scheme for the estimation of damages given by the court to the jury, on this account I think there was error, and, consequently, the judgment should be reversed.
The action was for damages sustained by the false and fraudulent representations made by Binninger, the defendant below, to Crater, as to certain lands, upon the sale of an interest in them to Crater. The false representation relied on was as to the cost. The lands contained petroleum wells, and Binninger proposed to Crater to sell him one-eighth interest in the purchase, at twenty-eight thousand dollars, the value of the lands, and four thousand dollars for improvements to be put upon them; he represented that twenty-eight thousand dollars was the original cost of 'the lands to him, and that he was willing, as a favor to Crater, who was an old friend, to let him in the undertaking at the cost price. Crater who knew nothing of the lands, but had confidence in the integrity and judgment of Binnin
On the trial at the circuit, the judge charged the jury that they must assess the damages of the plaintiff below, at the whole loss which he sustained in the transaction into which he had been inveigled by the fraud of the defendant. Anti that the basis of their verdict must be the four thousand dollars originally paid by him, deducting two thousand dollars his share of the price of the part sold, and adding the five hundred dollars paid by him as an assessment, with interest properly calculated on these amounts.
Exceptions were taken to this charge as to the damages.
Upon these principles adopted by the circuit judge, the directions were wrong. If the true rule was the whole damages sustained by the plaintiff below, he should have directed allowance to have been made for the value of the property yet remaining in the hands of the trustees for the benefit of Crater.
The verdict or judgment in this ease will not deprive him of the right to his share of the proceeds of that part, whatever they may be.
But I think the rule laid down, although the proper rule
If a vendor represents that the assessments on lots sold are all paid, and the representation is false, the purchaser can recover if the assessments are but five hundred dollars, and he makes a-profit of five thousand dollars on the transaction. But can only recover five hundred dollars if he loses five thousand dollars on the transaction. The true rule is the loss occasioned by the fraud and falsehood. This is the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of New York, in an able opinion by Justice Cowen, in Cary v. Cruman, 4 Hill 627, and in the opinion of Justice Bronson, in Van Epps v. Harrison, 5 Hill 63. And by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Medbury v. Watson, 6 Metc. 257.
The rule laid down in many cases of sale, that the damages should be the difference in the value of the thing sold, as it was represented to be, and the value as it really was at the sale, is upon this principle. Stiles v. White, 11 Metc. 358. But that rule will not apply here, nor in many other cases. In this case the lands were just as valuable if Binninger only paid for them the price he did pay, as if he had paid the price he alleged he had paid. The principle is the same in all cases, but the rule or manner of applying it must differ with the circumstances of each case.
In this case Crater was willing to go in with Binninger at the cost price. Had Binninger told him truly that the cost price was eighteen thousand dollars, he would no doubt have been willing to go in at that price; and would have paid at that rate, and if any subsequent loss was sustained, would have had.no claim against Binninger; and the true
For these reasons the judgment should be reversed, and the record remitted that a venire de novo may issue.
For reversal — The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Bedle, Dalrimple, Scudder, Van Syckel, Woodhull, Clement, Ogden, Olden, Wales. 11.
For affirmance — Kennedy. 1.
Cited in Wolcott, Johnson & Co. v. Mount, 7 Vr. 269; S. C., 9 Vr. 501.