203 Pa. 525 | Pa. | 1902
Opinion by
On July 3, 1896, the plaintiff purchased, at a reduced rate, from the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, a ticket, designated an “ employee’s excursion ticket.” It was for a passage from Wilkes-Barre to New York-and return. Upon it there was the following, among other conditions : “ The person accepting and using this ticket, thereby assumes all risk of accident and damage to person or property.” There was nothing on the ticket requiring that it be signed by the passenger to make the conditions upon which it was issued binding upon him ; but it was accepted by him with the indorsement plainly stamped on it that all of the conditions imposed by the company were “ fully understood and agreed to.” The evidence of the assent of the
By the purchase and acceptance of the ticket at a reduced rate, with the condition indorsed on it that the appellant, in using it, would assume all risks of accident and damage to his person, there was an agreement between him and the railroad company that the common-law rule, making the common carrier an insurer of his safety, should be set aside, and that he would be bound by the agreement between them as the law defining the duty and liability of the appellee in carrying him to New York and bringing him back : Farnham v. Camden & Amboy Railroad Co., 55 Pa. 53. That such an agreement may be made has long since been settled: Atwood v. Reliance Transportation Co., 9 Watts, 87; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479; Powell v. Penna. R. R. Co., 32 Pa. 414; American Express Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140; Adams Express Co. v. Sharpless, 77 Pa. 517; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 87 Pa. 395; Clyde v. Hubbard, 88 Pa. 358; Buck v. Penna. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 170. But it is equally well settled that, by such an agreement, the common carrier cannot relieve itself from liability for its negligence. “ The reason for this qualification of the power to limit liability rests on public policy. At common law if property was lost or iirjured while in the hands of the carrier, the burden of proof was on the carrier to show the existence of such circumstances as were sufficient to excuse him from liability. Such is still the general rule, but when a special contract is entered into between the shipper and the carrier, the contract takes the place of the common-law rule and fixes the liability of the carrier: ” Penna. R. R. Co. v. Raiordon, 119 Pa. 577. The liability of the common carrier being, by such an agreement, confined to its negligence, there is no reason why the ordinary rule, that negligence is not to be presumed, but must be proved, should not apply. The agreement of the parties is, that there shall be no liability at all by the common carrier for injury to the passenger; but, on grounds of public policy the law says to the passenger that he cannot contract to relieve the carrier from
We are not to be understood as holding that there may not be cases in which the proof of the accident carries with it the presumption of the common carrier’s negligence. Such, by way of illustration, was the case of Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co. v. Bausch, 7 Atl. Repr. 731, where the plaintiff was seriously injured while riding on a train of the defendant company, in consequence of-a collision between that train and another moving in the opposite direction upon the same track. Another illustration can be found in Buffalo, Pittsburg & Western Railroad Co. v. O’Hara, 3 Pennypaeker, 190, where the train on
Judgment affirmed.