94 N.Y.S. 1122 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1905
The strict rule of the common law has declared for centuries and still declares that an innkeeper is the insurer of the property of his guest and liable for its loss for any cause whatever unless such loss occurs from the neglect of the guest, the act of God or the public enemy. Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172; Hulett v. Swift, 33 id. 571.
This rigorous rule had its origin in the feudal conditions which were the outgrowth of the middle ages. In those days there was little safety outside of castles and fortified towns for the wayfaring traveler who, exposed on his journey to the depredations of bandits and brigands, had little protection when he sought at night temporary refuge at the wayside inns established and conducted for his entertainment and convenience. Exposed as he was to robbery and violence he was compelled to repose confidence when stopping on his pilgrimages over night in landlords who were not exempt from temptation, and hence there grew up the salutary principle that a host owed to his guest the duty not only of hospitality but also of protection. With the march of civilization and the progress of commercial development the conditions in which the common-law liability of the innkeeper to his guest originated have passed away, but other conditions exist which render it wise and expedient that the modem hotel-keeper should respond for the loss of his guest’s property while he is extending to the latter, for compensation, his hospitality, and there has consequently been no relaxation in the rule of his common-law liability, except as such liability has been modified by statute, which modifications do not apply to this case.
While there is no doubt about the existence of the above rule, a question arises as to its application to the facts of this case. It is urged by the defendants that the plaintiff was
The facts in this case fail to show that when the plaintiff sustained the loss for which she seeks to make the defendants responsible the relationship of innkeeper and guest existed. She went to Albany in September, 1902, having just prior thereto married John M. Crapo, a business man of that city.
Great stress is placed by the plaintiff on the case of Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1. That ease was decided by a bare majority of the court, and while of course it is controlling in reference to a similar state of facts, nevertheless it is manifest that the doctrine of innkeeper’s liability was there carried to the limit. But there is a wide distinction between that case and this. In that case plaintiff was an inmate of the hotel in question for seven months and had been there four months when her property was taken. In this case plaintiff was at the Annex about seventeen months. But the controlling feature in that case was that plaintiff was
I have not overlooked the fact that no definite time was fixed, and that the parties were at liberty on either side to terminate the agreement at any time. While such fact might be an important or even a controlling circumstance in some cases it cannot have much significance where a party lives in a hotel for as long a period as the plaintiff did in this case. It is not possible to regard her in the light of a transient guest. I believe that no case can be found which goes to that extent. “An innkeeper is subject to extraordinary liability, and a person claiming to enforce such liability must show a case clear, beyond all reasonable doubt.” Ingalsbee v. Wood, 36 Barb. 455.
As it appears from the plaintiff’s testimony that the relationship of innkeeper and guest did not exist between the defendants and herself, it follows that the complaint must be dismissed.
Complaint dismissed, with costs.