101 P. 985 | Utah | 1909
(after stating the facts as above.)
It is not claimed, nor does the evidence show, that the respondents, or any of them, were induced to take stock in the Zenoli Silver-Copper Mining Company (which proved to be a profitable investment for each of them) because of any misrepresentation or false statement made by McAlister. Cran-ney, plaintiffs’ principal witness, testified, “Finally we got double what we contemplated for our money.” And the trial court found, which finding is supported by the undisputed evidence, that the stock which cost Cranney only twenty cents per share, and the balance of the plaintiffs not to exceed forty cents per share, was, at the time of the trial, “of the value of eighty cents per share.” The theory upon which respondents base their alleged right to recover is set forth in their printed brief as follows: “The facts in this ease . . . constituted appellant the constructive trustee of respondents, . . . and that he became charged as trustee for the whole amount of the bonus stock (twelve thousand shares) and was accountable to respondents therefor, regardless of whether such stock was retained by him or delivered over to Wilson, or to anybody else.” Again they say: “He had constituted himself the agent of his associates in the deal by taking their money into his possession.” The respondents have not appealed from the judgment, nor have they filed an assignment of cross-errors. Therefore the only stock involved in this appeal is the block of five thousand shares of the bonus stock that was issued to appellant.
We are decidedly of the opinion that the record in this •case does not uphold the contention of respondents that ap
The promoters of the Zenoli Silver-Copper Mining Company had the right to give Wilson the twelve thousand shares of the stock, or, for that matter, any amount that they might feel disposed to give him, in settlement of his
The case as presented by this appeal, may be summarized as follows: Plaintiffs, under their original contract with Wilson, were to receive for each one thousand dollars paid in by them a one-hundredth interest in the mining claims upon which he claimed to have an option of purchase. The purchase price, under the Wilson option, was seventy-five thousand dollars, of which fifteen thousand dollars was to be raised within a short time. A corporation was to be organized with a capital stock of one hundred thousand shares of the par value of one dollar per share, and Wilson was to receive twenty-five thousand shares for his services in promoting the corporation. Furthermore, the record shows that Wilson was a transient, a man without means and financially irresponsible. Cranney, in explanation as to why the five hundred dollars he paid Wilson was not turned over to appellant with the balance of the fund, testified: “He (Wilson) said he had turned it over to McAllister except five hundred dollars of mine, and that, if I would let the matter stand that way, he would give me stock for it in a while. . . . To tell the truth, I believe that he had squandered the money.” Whereas, under the arrangement made by Wilson through appellant with the promoters of the Zenoli Silver-Copper Mining Company, the respondents were to receive, and did receive, the same interest in the identical mining claims covered by Wilson’s oral option, and, instead of paying seventy-five thousand dollars for these' claims, it became necessary to pay only fifteen thousand dollars for such claims and additional mining claims, and Wilson was to receive, through appellant, twelve thousand, instead of twenty-five thousand shares of the capital stock for his services. That is, Wilson, under the last arrangement, was to receive for his services a little less than one-twentieth interest in the corporation, instead of the fourth interest provided for in his original contract with respondents.
Respondents were duly advised that Wilson was to
We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment should be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below, with directions to dismiss it. Costs to appellant.