*1 Merrillville, contracts from P.C., purchased land installment Sayers, Compton & paid agreed upon price an UCC. Midland appellants. contracts, retained a set for the but Meyer, & Jeffery Dywan, Chudom J. price use centage purchase as a Schererville, appellee. fund, contingency contingency fund. The account, belonged reserve the holdback HOFFMAN, Judge. UCC, to Midland’s subject Company Midland-Guardian Appellants contracts accord- charge uncollectible back Indiana, Company of and Midland-Guardian ing pre-arranged formula. to a rehearing. The (Midland) petition for Inc. were, effect, are discussed history of this case specific facts and funds en- These v. United Con Midland-Guardian Co. separately trusted to Midland (1986), Ind.App., 499 N.E.2d Club sumers for. The holdback reserve and accounted raises its issues Midland 792. The obligation agreements did not create rehearing already have lengthy petition debt, they placed Midland repay a instead original opin in our fully addressed been responsibility to return the position in a petition ion; supplemental in its ac- separately of these identified remainder deci that our rehearing Midland claims It is the appropriate time. counts at the another re case conflicts with sion in this trust, knowingly exercis- breach of this Appeals. the Court of cent decision of prop- over UCC’s control unauthorized ephemeral nature of Analysis reveals the being Midland’s found erty, led to conflict, discus supposed but brief this criminal conversion. liable for harmony help solidify the essential sion will denied. rehearing is therefore the two cases. Rehearing denied. (1986), Ind.App., 498 Kopis Savage In Kopis, received appellant, J., P.J., STATON, GARRARD, purchase $40,000.00 deposit towards concur. Kopis comingled the property. of certain accounts and deposit other unrelated with money the sale when
refused to refund reversing the trial court’s through. In
fell Kopis committed criminal
finding that Dis- Appeals, Fourth the Court of
version
trict, comingled funds had specifically identi- separate,
ceased to be a longer Savage no chattel and that fiable CRANK, Eugene William specific property interest (Petitioner), Appellant to re- the refusal deposited. Thus funds pay $40,000.00 a failure turn support a debt, generally not will Indiana, Appellee STATE finding of conversion. (Respondent). complete- holding Kopis, supra, No. 79A02-8603-PC-92. original holding in ly consistent Indiana, Appeals of Court attempts create a Midland this case. Second District. to re- characterizing its refusal conflict as a accounts reserve turn the holdback Jan. debt; however, Midland pay a differences the fundamental fails to note situa- its own distinguish Kopis from
tion. engaged were
Midland and UCC Mid- relationship in which
ongoing business *2 Trueblood, Lafayette,
J. Michael for pellant.
Linley Pearson, Atty. Gen., E. Louis E. Ransdell, Gen., Deputy Atty. Office of Gen., Atty. Indianapolis, appellee. BUCHANAN, Judge.
CASE SUMMARY Petitioner-appellant Eugene William (Crank) appeals Crank from the denial of relief,1 petition claiming that the trial court in order- to be tried and absentia, holding to a direct jurisdiction. of his absence from the Procedure, Ind.Rules of Post-Conviction Rule 24, 1984, court for correc- he filed his post-con- remand to the trial upon the ha- contending viction relief tion of the that because he improperly offender count. tried bitual and sentenced in ab- sentia, the trial court erred in determining Otherwise, judgment is affirmed. that he waived his to file a motion to *3 error, precluding appel- thus direct FACTS alleged late review of errors which oc- 30, 1980, Crank was September On Following curred at trial.5 evidentiary battery deadly weap- a charged with hearing, peti- the trial court denied Crank’s on, battery causing felony,2 a class and C August tion on 1985. bodily injury, felony.3 a class C serious alleged was also to be an habitual Crank appeals. now Crank offender.4 in court on appeared Crank November ISSUES 17, 1980, and the trial court set an omnibus following We need address is- 19, 1981, jury and a trial date for sues: in date on March 1981. Crank was also trying 1. Did the trial court err in day, date. On that court on the omnibus in absentia? Crank
the trial court denied Crank’s motion for a
2. Did the trial court err in
continuance,
again
and it
ordered
Crank
Crank in absentia?
appear on March 9
trial. Crank failed
determining
3. Did the trial court err in
in court on March 9. After the
right
that Crank waived his
to effect
knowingly
trial court found that Crank had
precluding
di-
voluntarily
and
fled
rect
review of
trial
trial,
avoid
Crank was tried in absentia.
errors?
12, 1981,
jury
On March
found Crank
battery
4. Did the trial court err in
guilty on both
counts. The follow-
ing day,
jury
determined
when it failed to
Crank
be
Crank
an habitual offender.
conviction was to
enhanced
as a result
the habitual
29, 1981, the trial
sen-
On June
determination?
finding
in
tenced Crank
absentia
knowingly
voluntarily
and
right
present
sentencing.
Crank
DECISION
eight-year terms
received two concurrent
the trial court err in
ISSUE ONE—Did
battery
imprisonment
on the
counts and
trying
in
absentia?
thirty-year
sentence on the habitual crimi-
as-
consecutively
nal count which was to run
serts that the trial
absentia violated
battery
for the
sentences
statutory right
to be
common law and
The trial court determined that
victions.
contends there
present at trial. Crank also
to file a motion
Crank had waived
support
evidence to
was insufficient
to correct error and effect a direct
volun-
finding that Crank had
trial court’s
due to his
and continued absence
himself from trial.
tarily absented
jurisdiction.
Crank was
maintains that the
prehended
February,
in Arizona in
1982.
State
ordering and,
its discretion in
April
returned to Indiana
on
acted within
He was
(1986).
denying Crank’s
trial court erred in
Ind.Code
35-42-2-1
2.
continuance,
that the use of
motion for a
"mug"
(1986).
IC 35-42-2-1
improper,
that the trial
shot
failing
grant
a mistrial
court erred
(1980) (amended
presently
IC 35-50-2-8
phase
argument
at the habitual offender
final
(1986)).
codified at IC 35-50-2-8
the trial.
5. Crank contended there was insufficient evi-
finding,
support
dence to
the habitual offender
proceed
responds
trial to
because Crank
proper
that it was
knowingly
to be
trial
to sentence Crank in absen-
present.
tia because he waived his
to be
present
absence.
not err
CONCLUSION—The
court did
conducting
trial Crank’s absence.
CONCLUSION—Thetrial court committed
in sentencing
no error
absentia.
Although a criminal
has a
defendant
trial,
present
Fennell v.
Our
eourt has held that a de-
U.S.
present
fendant has the
at sen-
VI;
I,
Ind.
Const. amend.
Const. art.
tencing. Royal v.
Ind.
solely
trial dates are not scheduled
for the
390. When Crank was
Fennell,
29, 1981,
convenience of
defendant.
June
IC 35-4.1-4-
supra.
4(a)
When
defendant fails to
provided as follows:
trial,
conclude
*4
punishable by
“Unless the offense is one
knowing
the defendant’s absence is
and
only,
a
per-
fine
defendant shall be
proceed
and
with the trial when
sonally present at the time sentence is
that the
knew
is evidence
defendant
If
pronounced.
the defendant is not
of his
trial date.
scheduled
Blatz
sonally present when sentence is to be
N.E.2d
486
Bullock v.
pronounced,
may
the court
issue a war-
(1983),
present. Therefore, the trial court’s refus-
hanced
virtue of the habitual offender
permit
al to
Crank to file a motion to
sentencing,
At
determination.
correct error
his continued absence
a thirty-year sentence on the
proper.
Skolnick,
See
supra. When
habitual criminal count which was ordered
Crank was apprehended
February, 1982,
to run consecutively to the concurrent sen
bringing
the time limits
appeal
a direct
tences Crank received for both class C felo
expired;
he raised several
ny battery convictions.
alleged trial
post-
errors
relief,
conviction
contending that these er-
Our supreme
has
rors
grounds
constituted
for relief.
habitual offender determination is not a
separate
Rather,
conviction of a
crime.
It
remedy
is clear that
habitual offender finding results
in an
post-conviction relief is not a
substitute
enhanced sentence for
underlying
felo
appeal.
a direct
Bailey v. State
ny.
Carter
1260;
1(b).
P.C.R.
Edwards
assigned
Errors
at the trial level or
Ind.,
sentencing Crank when it failed to of correction the sentences. I agree conviction was to that the trial court did not err be enhanced as a result of the habitual denying Crank’s Petition for Post Convic- offender determination? tion Relief.
1361 period Post entire regard during to the merits of the isdiction With Petition, enti- appeal, the trial court was of a he fection direct has waived Conviction that might to conclude from evidence to tled assert matters which from voluntarily absented himself presented in timely have been upon jurisdiction knowing date not, agree. I peal. agree I do appear for I there- he trial. which was voluntary that from the trial and absence conduct agree it was not error to fore constitutes waiver of the the trial his absence. If appeal. of direct defendant Crank had returned to this and had not, however, that, agree as stated I do timely filed a motion correct errors and may majority, a defendant’s absence I believe perfected we could voluntary merely be held properly hold I am aware the trial date. Neither (1984) Ind., v. been waived. Prater agree knowledge of trial date able Because, in N.E.2d 39. the case 459 before coupled failure to constitutes with us, the defendant was absent knowing waiver perfection the entire of a correctly I set trial. the law is believe timely appeal, properly applied. waiver was (1983) forth v. State Bullock Supreme our Court N.E.2d wherein cou- knowledge of the trial date voluntary choice
pled with defendant’s effective appear, constitutes an missing from The crucial factor
waiver. equation majority postulated by of the de-
here is the absence numerous
fendant. Because absence, a defend- Cynthia causes a defendant’s Bobby Wil CRAWFORD (Defendants making a Below), should foreclosed from burn, ant not be Appellants if he can upon his belated attack conviction v. As explain held Hudson absence. Indiana, Appellee STATE (1984) Ind.App., Dist. 4th Below). (Plaintiff 1077; (1983) Dist. Ind. 4th Walton App., 454 v. State N.E.2d Gilbert No. 49A04-8604-CR-102. Dist., Ind.App. 2d Indiana, Appeals Court of may proceed District. Fourth if of a defendant the circumstanc- absence es are consistent Jan. opportuni- appear. earliest When *7 Rehearings April Mar. Denied appears, ty the defendant permitted that his must be to demonstrate voluntary.
absence was not
Here, as in Ramos permitted the evidence the defendant
reasonable inference in order to avoid
fled sentencing. It was Crank’s burden hearing prove to
the Post Conviction agree that
contrary. not do I He did so. denied properly was
post conviction relief respect.
in this that because majority also holds jur- absent from
