*1 484 limit amount the defendant’s equal
has
out an
paid
I
insurer,
statutory cap.
less than the
but
insolvent
believe, however,
is the appropriate
this case
do
Rather, I
that before
addressing
this issue.
believe
vehicle
language governing
statutory
can review the
this Court
regard,
must
a
Guaranty
engage
in this
we
Association
in Hall
decision
v.
analysis
Superior
Court’s
predicate
(1987)
Brown,
(holding
Therefore, have not this Court to parties because Hall, which, in pursuant my opinion, matter is review the Guaranty necessary we can determine whether before I delay concur with the may damages, be liable for Association of the Commonwealth Court. majority’s curiam affirmance per A.2d Jayneann CRALEY, of the Estate of M. P. Administrator Randall Craley, Craley, P. Parent and Natural Guardian Randall Craley, Minor, Craley, In His and Randall P. Own Keith P. Craley, Right, Craley M. W. Husband and Gloria Lawrence Wife, Appellants COMPANY, Appellee. FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY STATE Supreme Pennsylvania. Court May
Argued 2005. April Decided *3 Cohen, Prussia, Lee Robert Kelly, S. G. for King Penn- Institute sylvania PA, Defense and the Ins. Federation amici curiae. Bausher,
Daniel Woodcock, E.P. Samuel Reading, for Cra- al., ley et appellants. Ronca,
Scott B. Cooper, James Richard for PA Harrisburg, Ass’n, Trial Lawyers appellee amicus curiae. Sachs,
Teresa Ficken Philadelphia, State Farm Fire and Co., appellee. Cas. CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO,
Before: NEWMAN, SAYLOR, BAER, EAKIN and JJ.
OPINION Justice BAER. granted
We allowance of in appeal this matter address the interplay between coverage exclusions motor vehicle policies, including insurance vehicle exclusion household previously Court,1 found enforceable the statutory Motor provision Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) providing “named ability insureds” to waive household vehicle exclusion one of types is several of exclusion- ary clauses policies included motor vehicle providing insurance coverage. uninsured Specifically, motorist the household vehicle exclu- exempts sion uninsured coverage any coverage from bodily motorist injury sured, occupying sustained while a vehicle owned named in- see spouse, note the named insured’s or a resident infra insured, relative of the named but not insured under the question. Colbert, Prop. See Prudential & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 572 Pa. (2002); Co., 751-52 Eichelman v. N’wide Ins. *4 (1998). (Definitions) Section separates of the MVFRL "named insureds” 2. types from other of insureds: Any following: "Insured.” the of (1) An policy individual identified name as an in a insured of liability motor vehicle insurance. (2) residing If the household of the named insured: (i) insured; spouse a other or relative of named or the (ii) custody a the minor in of either the named or insured relative of the named insured. § 75 Pa.C.S. coverage, motorist “stacked” uninsured to inter- inapplicable has found the Court provided by of or the benefits two policy stacking, statutory relevant provi- After the policies.3 more review 1702; 1705(f)- § § Under the section at issue see Pa.C.S. 75 Pa.C.S. case, MVFRL, a named insured’s as well as other sections in this See, policy. e.g., 75 binding insured the are on others under choices 1731(b) (waiver 1705(b) (election options), tort of unin- Pa.C.S. 1738(b) (waiver coverage), stacking). motorist sured option Stacking benefits §3. of uninsured underinsured waive (a) is more than one vehicle insured Limit for each vehicle.—When policies providing one more uninsured or underinsured under or coverage, limit or underinsured the stated for uninsured motorist coverage apply separately to vehicle so insured. The limits shall each coverages subchapter for be this an insured shall available under injured motor vehicle as which sum of the limits each for person is an insured. (a), (b) Notwithstanding provisions of subsection Waiver.— coverage may providing of uninsured named insured waive coverage coverages in case the limits of underinsured or policy shall be the stated limits for available under injured person which the is an insured. motor vehicle (c) purchasing one vehicle.—Each named insured unin- More than coverage for than one vehicle or underinsured motorist more sured provided opportunity be to waive stacked under a shall purchase coverage coverage and as described limits of instead (b). premiums for an insured who exercises such subsection coverage. reduced to reflect the different cost of such waiver shall be (d) Forms.— (1) may be that he exercise the The named insured shall informed coverage sign- waiver of the stacked limits of uninsured motorist ing following rejection written form: UNINSURED COVERAGELIMITS rejecting By signing I am stacked limits of uninsured this myself my coverage and members motorist under the would which the limits available household under policy. motor vehicle insured under the sum of limits for each Instead, I purchasing shall be reduced the limits of am knowingly voluntarily reject policy. I stated limits coverage. my premiums I will limits of understand that the stacked coverage. reject be reduced if I Signature Insured of First Named Date (2) [Providing language in identical relation underinsurance bene- provided above for uninsurance benefits.] fits as *5 issue, sions, insurance at and our policies precedent, we inter-policy stacking hold the named insured’s waiver of en case, addressing forceable under the facts of this without exclusion, enforceability upon of the household vehicle which Nevertheless, affirm the Supe Court relied. we the trial court’s of relief holding reversing grant rior Court’s remanding entry declaratory judg to the insureds and ment in company. Donnelly favor insurance See Bauer, (1998) that this (holding basis). may Court affirm on any case, although tragic, facts of this are straightforward
and uncontested. her driving by While own car insured (State Farm), Farm Insurance Appellee Company Jay- State Craley neann M. killed in an was accident attributed to the negligence of an on July uninsured drunk driver 1993. son, mother-in-law, tier infant Craley, Keith and her Gloria Craley, who resided with Keith and Jayneann, passen- were gers injured the car and were the accident. Following accident, husband, Jayneann’s Randall as Craley, adminis- Jayneann’s behalf, trator of estate and on Keith’s and Gloria Craley on her own behalf sought and collected uninsured motorist benefits from State Farm to a pursuant policy Jayneann was the named provided $15,000 $30,000 coverage of per person per occurrence.4 claims, however, The Craleys’ exceeded the limits of the provided benefits under Jayneann’s policy. Accordingly, Craleys sought uninsured motorist benefits under Randall motor Craley’s vehicle insurance policy.5 policy Randall’s had (e) Signature and date.—The forms described in subsection must signed by Any first named insured and dated to be valid. rejection comply form that does not with this section is void. 75 Pa.C.S. 1738. throughout opinion collectively 4. We will refer this to the claimants as "Craleys.” According Craleys, to the Randall’s claim on behalf of Keith is no longer Additionally, sought coverage at issue. Gloria under her own Property Casualty insurance issued Prudential Insurance Therefore, Company. That claim is not at issue before this Court. and also was underwritten Jayneann’s the same limits that are and its exclusions It is Randall’s Farm. State in this case. State presented issues legal to the relevant Keith, all fit and Gloria Jayneann, contest that Farm does not *6 of language the of “insureds” under the definition within relatives all resident they because were policy Randall’s (“In- Randall, the named insured. See 75 Pa.C.S. sureds”). in the Berks judgment action declaratory filed a Farm
State Pleas, a determination seeking of Common County Court Randall’s Craleys’ claims under to obligation pay it no had excluded that the claims were believed company The policy. household and the stacking to Randall’s waiver pursuant to endorsement related policy in the exclusion included vehicle coverage.6 uninsured motorist non-stacked form stacking waiver Farm maintained State stack- “inter-policy to applied valid and signed was Randall separate or more on two of limits available ing,” stacking “Inter- policies. and Randall’s Jayneann’s such as policies, “intra-policy stacking,” to is in contrast policy stacking” more than one applicable of limits stacking entail would signed The waiver single policy. a insured under vehicle uninsured motorist Randall, “Rejection of stacked entitled 1738(d) MVFRL, and benefits,” conforms Section provides: thus limits of waiver, rejecting I stacked this am
By signing myself and policy coverage motorist under uninsured of cover under the limits household my members for each motor of limits sum age available would Instead, the limits of the policy. insured under vehicle to the limits shall be reduced purchasing that I am voluntarily reject knowingly I policy. stated Randall's Gloria's claim under appeal the estate’s and concerns with State Farm. exclusion the same household Jayneann’s also contained stacking waiver. coverage. my stacked I premiums limits understand that reject I coverage.[7] will be if reduced parties stipulated premi- Randall received a reduced as signing um a result of waiver. signing
Due Randall’s Randall’s policy included Endorsement 6997AG Uninsured Motor Vehi- Coverage U3 Underinsured Motor Vehicle—Cover- cle— (Non-Stacking W3 age Options). The household vehicle ex- clusion set forth at provides Endorsement 6997AG follows:
There is bodily no insured injury under Coverage U3:8
(1) occupying While motor vehicle you, your owned spouse, or relative if any it is for this coverage under this policy.... asserting
In addition to the enforceability of the stacking, State Farm maintained that it obligated was not pay Craleys’ pursuant claims to the household vehicle *7 exclusion injured because insureds occupying were while vehicle, Jayneann’s which was not under insured Randall’s policy. policy only truck, Randall’s listed his pick-up not in the was involved accident.
The trial court viewed this case an issue of presenting impression first prior because relating caselaw waivers had not addressed involving a situation individual under separate vehicles insured policies, inter- implicating policy stacking. Invoking the construction, rules statutory the court that concluded waiver provisions in 1738 Section did apply not to inter-policy stacking, and Randall’s waiver of therefore, stacking, did not duty obviate State to pay Farm’s the Craleys’ claims.
The trial next court turned to the applicability of the household exclusion vehicle in Randall’s The policy. court concluded that case was controlled this Court’s deci- 1738(d) We note that Section supply also directs insurers an relating identical form to the waiver of of underinsured motor- coverage. ist Coverage. 8. Uninsured Motorist Co., 551 Pa. v. Nationwide Insurance
sions in Eichelman
Co.,
(1998), and
Insurance
Paylor
A.2d 1006
Hartford
(1994),
characterizing
those deci-
that
clauses
setting
general
exclusionary
forth a
rule
sions as
finding
but
enforce-
public policy,
excepting
are against
attempting
an
from
to recover
able clauses that “deter
not to
for.”
voluntarily chooses
pay
the insured
benefits which
39 Pa. D. & 4th
Craley,
Fire &
Co. v.
C.
State Farm
Cas.
(1998)
I).
(Craley
in
Eichelman we
Notwithstanding
acknowledgment
its
one
held
a household vehicle exclusion similar
court
not
trial
public policy,
Randall’s
did
violate
Eichelman,
suggesting
applied
it
holding
limited the
motorist
only
voluntarily
to insureds
waived uninsured
who
in the
covering
under
vehicle involved
coverage
claim
attempted
uninsured motorist
accident
then
Similarly, the court noted
separate policy.
under a
coverage
car
“family
that a
exclusion”9 could be
that in
we held
Paylor
attempted
inexpensive
a claimant
to convert
enforced where
one
auto-
policy covering
motorist
on
underinsured
liability coverage
a motor
expensive
mobiles into more
accident and insured under
separate
home
involved
coverage.
motorist
policy without underinsured
did
fit the
Craleys’
court found that
situation
not
not
Craleys
because the
Paylor
exceptions
or Eichelman
were
they
into
for which
something
to convert their
trying
collect
trying
had
but rather
uninsured
paid,
were
they had paid
benefits for which the court concluded
motorist
Jayneann’s
Randall’s insurance policies.10
under both
"family
category
exclusionary
is
clause
9. A
car exclusion”
another
*8
or
which an
cannot obtain uninsured
underinsured
under
claiming
by
by
that a car owned
an insured is itself
motorist benefits
Paylor,
See
In making the the trial court erroneously believed the available coverage limit of Randall’s was $90,000. Accordingly, April following filing of post-trial Craleys Farm, motions and State the trial court amended the $30,000, verdict the Craleys award pursuant to the parties’ stipulation policy provided $30,000 accident, a maximum benefit of per but denied State post-trial alia, Farm’s motion asserting, inter trial court error in refusing to enforce the stacking waiver and the household vehicle exclusion. The verdict was to judgment reduced 2000, after May Farm State to the appealed Superior Court.
An en panel banc initially Court dismissed State Farm’s appeal as untimely, based on the majority’s conclusion that the appeal had not been filed within the requisite thirty days following decision, the December 1998 pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. though even State Farm filed its appeal within thirty days of the April 2000 order deciding post-trial motions. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Craley, 784 II"). A.2d (Pa.Super.2001) (“Craley This granted Court petition State Farm’s appeal, the Craleys did oppose, it consolidated with three other decisions of the
Superior Court quashing appeals as untimely based on the
appellants’
post-trial
decisions to file
motions rather
than
appeal the trial court’s declaratory judgment order within
thirty days. In
Pinkerton,
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Pa.
(2003),
On remand
the merits of State Farm’s
Superior
the
Court addressed
“cases address
the court asserted
the
appeal.
Initially,
inter-
and
of the household vehicle exclusion
ing
interplay
the
can and cannot be waived
stacking and what
intra-policy
and
clarity.”
Farm Fire &
logic
are far from models of
and
State
573,
(“Craley
(Pa.Super.2004)
v.
844 A.2d
574
Craley,
Co.
Cas.
III”).
exclusion,
majority
the
addressing
In
the household
rule, rejecting
amounts to a
se
the
per
established what
vio
argument
that the household vehicle exclusion
Craleys’
“if
there is a household
concluding
lates
and
public policy
clause,
ease,
is no
as in the instant
there
exclusion
vehicle
other than
any
by
car owned
a resident relative
upon
in the
Id. The
relied
the one
accident.”
court
involved
in
Mutual
Co.
prior decision Nationwide
Insurance
v.
its own
Harris,
in
it conclud
(Pa.Super.2003),
826 A.2d
885
[v.
that “our
court’s
case law Burstein
supreme
ed
recent
[in
Co.,
&
570 Pa.
Prudential
Cas. Ins.
Property
Casualty
Insurance Co. v.
Property
Prudential
204]
Colbert,
(2002),]
A.2d
little doubt
leaves
Holding
of household
exclusions.”
validity
vehicle
enforceable,
court re
exclusion
instant household vehicle
entry of
the trial court’s order and remanded for
versed
in
Farm.
declaratory
favor of State
judgment
the issue
the court addressed
waiver
Additionally,
validity
its
on the
inter-policy stacking, despite basing
decision
court did not
Although
of the household vehicle exclusion.
exclu-
validity
of the household
consider whether
vehicle
validity
invalidity
could
or
sion
be affected
stacking,
III did call
panel
Craley
Randall’s waiver
question
Superior
into
Court’s decisions
State Farm
Rizzo,
(Pa.Su-
We share the Court’s discomfort this anoma- lous proposition product Superior and find it to be the of the Court’s of analysis Litigation. flawed Section 1738 in Stacking below, As reject discussed the premise we that Section 1738 permit does not inter-policy stacking waiver.
The parties’ arguments ably con- develop competing structions of Craleys’ Section 1738 here at issue.12 The argu- ment to the Superior conforms Court’s inter- caselaw First, policy stacking is not waivable. as in the relevant decisions, Superior Court Craleys assert that Section 1738(a) provides for inter- intra-policy stacking: and “When more than vehicle one is insured under policies one or more providing or uninsured underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for uninsured or underinsured shall apply separately each so vehicle insured.” 75 Pa.C.S. 1738(a) added); Rizzo, (emphasis 363; see at A.2d Stacking Litigation, 754 708. A.2d at More controversially, the Craleys rely on the Superior Court’s reasoning those cases, below, as discussed support conclusion that the (b), (c), waiver reflected subsections applies only intra-policy stacking.
In Stacking Litigation, insureds asserted class action claims sounding in various causes of action based on the insureds’ Judge concurring dissenting Bender filed a opinion in which he agreed with the determination that the household vehicle exclusion was case, dispositive but dissented from what he considered to be an unnecessary validity inter-policy stacking discussion of the of waiver. parties 12. The understandably portions devote substantial their briefs validity to the household exclusion that was the basis for the However, unnecessary Court’s decision. we find it to summa- arguments rize regard, they their in this are not relevant to our analysis of Section 1738. charged increased insurance wrongly that companies assertion policies on the based premiums single-vehicle holders coverage, insureds claimed was provision stacked covering multiple vehicles. only applicable policies Insur- question Pennsylvania to the trial court transferred ance Commissioner. declaratory opin- entered her
The Insurance Commissioner Co., Donegal in Leed v. Mutual Insurance ion and order MS96-10-055, 23, 1998, set forth February Number on Docket opinion, A the Brief. In her Appellee’s at Appendix law- stacking premium concluded that the was Commissioner could single-vehicle policy ful she found holders because from the in at least provision obtain a real benefit (1) injured the insured is his own two situations: where motorist and is also vehicle insured with uninsured unin- policy providing as an under another covered (2) benefits, injured motorist where the individual is sured his in a than insured vehicle and is vehicle other own *11 which also has policy, insured under the non-owned vehicle’s vehicle). (such coverage employer’s as an uninsured motorist 1738(a) noted that did additionally Section Commissioner in of underinsured motorist benefits stacking exclude single-vehicle policies. declined to decide the nominally periph-
The Commissioner stacking and inter-policy eral issue of whether how could issue, waived, id. at 4 n. 1. She nonetheless addressed the see 1738(b) not is option qualified Section noting applies it and type as to the allows waiver single-vehicle policies: “Notwithstanding and multiple both (a), may of subsection a named insured waive provisions stacking of uninsured or underinsured coverage providing ” 1738(b). § Pa.C.S. While subsec- coverages.... finding (b) multiple- single-vehicle policies, and she applicable tion (c) ad- specifically that subsections acknowledged (c) that subsection multiple-vehicle policies, observing dressed required only multiple-vehicle policies provide insurers option provision to waive with insureds 1738(c) (d). § See Pa.C.S. form subsection specified (“Each named insured uninsured or underinsured purchasing motorist for more than one vehicle under a policy shall be provided opportunity waive stacked limits 1788(d) § coverage”), (“By signing reject- am limits ing stacked of uninsured motorist under the policy myself and members of my household under which the limits of be the coverage available would sum limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy.”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Commission addressed a booklet issued 68.604, the Department and codified at 31 Pa.Code some litigants read as evidence of the Department’s policy to limit waiver to multiple-vehicle policies. Contrarily, the Com- missioner found the booklet did not limit waiver under subsec- (b) tion policies vehicles, individual addressing or more two but rather merely addressed the application the waiver (c) (d). form as related to subsection The Commissioner suggested that the Department would “evaluate whether to issue a pre-approved waiver form for single-vehicle policies addition to the present Department practice of approving forms and each Thus, rates of insurer.” Id. at 14 n. 9. concluded, Commissioner “Section 1738 permits single vehicle policy stacking requires insureds the opportuni- have ty to coverage. waive this Rates commensurate risks assumed have been approved by the Department.” Id. at 15.
Upon receipt
decision,
of the Commissioner’s
the trial court
dismissed the insureds’ complaint based on the Commission-
er’s conclusion that
premiums
proper.
were
appeal,
On
Court
acknowledged
deference due the In-
Commissioner,
surance
in light of her agency’s role in adminis-
*12
tering and
the
enforcing MVFRL in
regard
insurers’ prac-
tices
premiums.
and
Stacking Litigation,
The Court addressed issue waiver. 1738(a) that court concurred with Commissioner Section for as The court intra-policy stacking. inter- as well provides 1738(b) that the in additionally provision noted waiver Section distinguishing of between speaks generally waiver without Diverging and from the Commis- intra-policy stacking. inter- silentio, however, sub the court found conclusions sioner’s (a) (b), and ambiguity construing when subsections materia pari in subsections generally stacking, speak (c) (d), only address specifically multiple-vehicle and (b)’s provision subsection Evidently ignoring policies. (a) stacking required by subsection without fo- the court intra-policy stacking, inter- and distinguishing (c)’s (d)’s application. restricted upon cused subsections and court that it not hold that the-notice set The concluded could in inter- provided in must be both forth subsection situations, so conflict with stacking as to do would intra-policy (c)’s only. application multiple-vehicle policies subsection notice otherwise be contemplating Without whether could instead constru- ambiguity by the court resolved provided, (b) (c) “only provide ing together subsections for more than one purchase coverage named insureds who be entitled notice and the single policy under a vehicle will that, finding legisla- opportunity stacking,” to waive “[h]ad stacking, all named insureds to permit] ture intended waive [to (d).” in language different subsection it would utilized have Id. at 708.13 Hams, analysis binding in
13. The
Court considered this
Rizzo,
363-64,
judice,
and in
In construing any our goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of Assembly.”14 the General 1921(a). In so, Pa.C.S. doing must to all give we effect provisions. id. See While must not disregard we clear unambiguous words of an statute under the pretext pursu- joined In colleagues, Judge a vehement dissent three Ford-Elliot analysis asserted even if first that in Stacking was dictum Litigation, binding precedent it Superior became with the Court's Secondly, decision in applicability she contested the Rizzo. provisions plaintiff to a where situation was not an "insured” under issue, policies merely one of at passenger. argued but was She hinge priority resolution should instead on appropriate recovery pursuant to Section 1733. We need prior precedent not determine whether the Court’s binding the area constitutes dictum as it would not be on this Court any event. law, questions 14. As with all our de standard of review is novo and Jones, scope plenary. our Township of review is See Buffalo (2002). 664 n. 4 beyond look the language its nevertheless must ing spirit, we consider, of a statute are not inter explicit when the words statute, alia, the circum- necessity occasion enacted, it the mischief to be under remed- stances which was (c). 1921(b), §§ ied, object to be attained. 1 Pa.C.S. *14 Moreover, effect to liberally give we must construe statutes to 1928(c). justice. § promote Pa.C.S. purposes their that, in to ex acknowledge we contrast Initially, plicit provisions multiple-vehicle policies, for waiver Section or how inter- designate specifically 1738 does not whether can be when individual vehicles are policy stacking waived 1738(a), single-vehicle polices. Section how through insured ever, provides for inter- as well as unambiguously intra-policy intention stacking, expressing thus clear General stacking coverage to insurers to Assembly compel provide 1738(a) (“When than absent a valid waiver. 75 Pa.C.S. more one more providing one vehicle is insured under or policies coverage, or limit uninsured underinsured motorist stated apply separately for uninsured or underinsured shall added)). to (emphasis each vehicle so insured.” (b), named insureds the to provides option Subsection which however, coverage, application stacked is silent as to its waive single-vehicle multiple-vehicle policies. Pa.C.S. 1738(b) (a), a (“Notwithstanding provisions of subsection may coverage providing stacking named insured waive or case limits coverages uninsured underinsured which under the for an insured shall be available injured motor vehicle as to the stated limits insured.”). person is an This contrasts the explicit with (c) vehicle,” limitation subsection entitled “more than one requires provide only insuring insurers to insureds than one a policy” opportunity “more vehicle under with the to the set forth in stacking pursuant waive form subsection (d).15 specifically applies policies multiple-vehicle as
15. Subsection also coverage as it refers to the stacked "the sum of the limits for each (a) policy,” motor vehicle under the whereas refers subsection (b) To the extent that subsection manifests ambiguity, we look to the legislative purposes underlying statute. See 1 Pa.C.S.1921(c) (providing for ascertainment of in legislative tent looking purpose the statute and the mischief remedied). to be To prohibit in single-vehicle policies, the Craleys’ (b) reading of subsection do, would have us would conflict cost-containment purpose of the MVFRL because it prevent would class insureds from taking advantage of a method to reduce their premiums. Conversely, to all allow insureds the opportunity to waive stacking would accord with this Court’s view of the MVFRL and its amendments as a “scheme for motorist insurance adjusted which has been preserve the core remedial aspects also while promoting, with increasingly greater emphasis, the containment of insurance Exch., costs.” Lewis v. Erie Ins. (2002). As we have previously noted, “While cost containment is not the only objective of the [MVFRL], it has become one, an increasingly significant and it *15 is apparent that the General Assembly has been employing the vehicle of free consumer choice greater with in frequency furtherance of this objective.” Thus, Id. at 154. we resolve any ambiguity present (b) in subsection in favor of allowing consumers the choice to coverage waive the and thereby reduce their premiums. (b)
This construction of subsection provide to inter-policy stacking it bears noting, harmonizes with the Insur- ance Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute in her 1998 Leed, in decision discussed supra. Winslow-Quattlebaum See v. Maryland Ins. Group, 878, (2000) 881 (“It is well settled that when courts of this Commonwealth are faced with interpreting statutory language, they afford great deference to the interpretation rendered administrative agency overseeing the implementation of such legislation.”). We refuse to provision limit the (b) in waiver subsection merely because the legislature set forth a specified method of waiver in regard to a (c) subset of policies under subsections
lo stacked as "the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as injured person to is an insured.” 502 1921(a) (d). § shall be (“Every 1 statute See Pa.C.S.
construed, provisions”). to all its possible, give if to effect multiple fit to out legislature single that Indeed saw (c) a infirmity imputing policies suggests in subsection legisla- to subsections in which the regard similar intent with we refuse specification. Accordingly, ture made no such (c), (b), construe the between subsections interplay and thus single-vehicle polices, ban the waiver inter-policy stacking.
However, be inter-policy stacking may that conclusion it how analysis. does end our We must determine waived (d), provides necessary may be waived. Subsection multiple-vehicle policyholders, form for indicates waiver require it insurers to necessary provide felt legislature form ensure specific language written insureds with Moreover, ample notice the benefits to be waived. imposed significant sanction on insurance legislature form, voiding any “rejection from the company deviates this comply form that does not section.” Pa.C.S. 1738(e). (d), the form subsection required Given the (e), imperative lan- provided sanction subsection (a), to all insureds in subsection it is guage granting stacking must knowing that some form of readily apparent of an inter-policy occur before we allow enforcement commented, has Cappy previously waiver. As Chief Justice Assembly sought “It is that the ensure evident General given regarding full information avail- policyholders would or not to deciding of stacked before whether ability Co., Ins. Pa. reject Rupert Liberty Mut. it.” (2001).16 A.2d requirements Rupert, of stack- In Court considered the technical *16 ing panel A of Court waiver under Section 1738. six-member this evenly question on certified from the United Court of divided a States whether, (e), Appeals for the Third Circuit under subsection as signed by must a the current first named insured insurer secure waiver by merely signed or waiver the first the time secure a named at (now Chief) justices Cappy policy inception only. joined Two of Justice ensuring concluding legislative goal it would the of "violate[] knowledgeable rejection coverage” provision of to hold the waiver
503 Farm Randall’s of the form signing State claims that (d) inter-policy set forth in subsection constitutes waiver of stacking. provides The form as follows: waiver, rejecting this I limits of
By signing am stacked myself uninsured motorist the under my members of under which the limits of household cover- age available would be the sum of limits for each motor Instead, policy. vehicle insured under the the limits I am shall be to the purchasing reduced limits I voluntarily reject stated in the the policy. knowingly of coverage. my stacked limits I premiums understand that if I reject will be reduced coverage. this language While the is unambiguous regard subsection waiver of sufficiency intra-policy speaks as it “the sum of stacking as the limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy,” language not clearly does address an inter-policy stacking involve would the limits for each motor policies. vehicle insured under the 1738(d) added). § 75 Therefore, (emphasis Pa.C.S. we must whether, case, determine under the circumstances this form put on clear Randall notice that he waiving was inter- policy stacking.17
could be requiring subsequent any satisfied without new Rupert, first named insured. at A.2d 135-136. ambiguous contract, construing In language in an insurance we generally language against company construe the insurance as the drafter of the Co., Harleysville contract. Madison Constr. Co. v. Mut. Ins. 100, (1999) (“Where 557 Pa. provision of a ambiguous, policy provision is is to be construed in favor of insurer, against agreement.”). insured and the drafter of the However, case, language in this at issue was not drafted Indeed, declared, Assembly. insurer but the General legislature “[a]ny rejection comply form that does not with this section is void.” 1738(e). although § Additionally, Pa.C.S. we have times at asserted that the MVFRL must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the insured, Troncelliti, see 839 A.2d Hoffman (2003), statutory based on the rule statutory provi construction that liberally sions "shall objects promote construed effect their and to 1928(c), justice,” noted, 1 Pa.C.S. also previously we have dis opinion, cussed in primary purpose that the of the MVFRL and amendments, especially achieved, object the 1990 and thus the to be is higher percentage control costs of insurance such that a of drivers may be able to afford insurance. *17 his Randall had sufficient notice and that
We conclude that knowing. signed Randall inter-policy stacking was waiver stating, my “I understand that will premiums the form could have reject I Randall coverage.” reduced if waiving receiving premium he a reduced was thought no intra-policy because there could be stacking intra-policy “the policy.” one vehicle on Absent only with only intra-policy interpretation applicability Randall that his fairly premium-reducing available to was Therefore, con- stacking. we applied inter-policy waiver facts is and enforceable under the clude that the waiver valid of this case.18 concern supported by public policy conclusion is
This in the household vehicle exclusion cases. our decisions driving cases, held that the of cost-contain- public policy In those we against forced ment “functions to insureds underwrit- protect nor that insureds have neither disclosed ing of unknown risks insure,” prevents “receiving gratis insureds from paid to Burstein, Thus, 208. insurers are not 809 A.2d at coverage.” risks uncompensated to subsidize unknown and “compelled Id.; Eichel- comprehensively.” insurance rates see increasing man, significance A.2d (acknowledging at 1010 by the and the premiums paid “correlation insured between receive”); reasonably expect a claimant should (“The (Castille, J., Colbert, over- dissenting) at 760 Burstein; in powering concern decisions Eichelman riding other earlier cases is to ensure that both the insurer knowing, Although was our we that the waiver this case conclude questions whether waiver nonetheless raises as to consideration knowing policy had one if Randall's covered more than would be ("the If a some cars under one vehicle. named insured insures (“the policy”) and policy”) separate under a second others signs provided in which refers to the waiver of the form subsection policy," named stacking "for each motor vehicle insured under the reasonably premium that he received a reduced could assume regarding of the of the limits the vehicles insured waiving stacking knowledge he policy” with no was "the paying applicable policy” policy,” despite "the limits of "the second urge legislature or premiums policies. on both We the Commis- clarify may a valid waiver sioner to whether and how insurers secure such a case. and insured receive the benefit of is statutorily what required and contractually agreed-upon (consistently statutory more.”). requirements) and nothing Therefore, hold inter-policy we stacking can be waived and, fact, was waived under the facts of this case. The *18 prevents waiver thus Craleys from recovering the “sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to injured which the person 1738(a). is an Instead, insured.” § 75 Pa.C.S. be- cause $30,000 State Farm paid the Craleys under Jayneann’s policy, which was the stated limit under both Jayneann’s policy and Randall’s policy, they can not claim any additional benefit Thus, under Randall’s policy. we affirm the decision of the Superior Court reversing the trial court and remanding for entry of summary judgment of favor State Farm. CASTILLE,
Justice Justice NEWMAN and Justice join SAYLOR the opinion.
Former Justice NIGRO did not participate the decision of this case.
Chief Justice CAPPY liles a concurring opinion.
Justice EAKIN files a concurring opinion. CAPPY,
Chief Justice concurring. I am join constrained to result reached the Majority Opinion. I write separately order to express my views regarding the inconsistency between the rejection written form 1738(d)(1) found at § 75 Pa.C.S. and the remainder of Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 § Pa.C.S. view,
In my plain (a) language of Subsection of 1738 for allows both inter- and intra-policy stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Similarly, unlike the I Majority, believe the plain (b) language of Subsection of 1738 generally provides named insureds option with the to waive of stacking uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, which would include both inter- and intra-policy stacking. (c) alia, Subsection inter specifically requires, that each or motorist uninsured underinsured purchasing named than one under a must for more vehicle coverage of such to waive the provided opportunity with the (d)(1) general moves back coverage. Subsection insured shall be informed and instructs that named “[t]he of the stacked limits uninsured may he exercise waiver coverage prescribed by signing” legislatively motorist 1738(d)(1). rejection written form. Pa.C.S. the Legislature
All this me to the conclusion that leads unin- intra-policy inter- intended to allow for motorist the waiver sured and underinsured said, measured against of the same. when With in the inconsistency there is remainder of Section rejection written form regarding aforementioned inter-policy stacking. rejection form reads follows:
The written I am stacked limits By signing rejecting myself under the uninsured motorist *19 cover- of household under which the limits my members of be the sum limits each motor age available would of Instead, the limits of policy. vehicle insured under the reduced to the limits coverage purchasing I am shall be voluntarily reject I and the policy. knowingly stated in the my limits I coverage. premiums stacked of understand reject coverage. if I will be reduced 1738(d)(1) added). The emphasized § (emphasis 75 Pa.C.S. to if a above seems indicate named language stacking, to then the amount of would decide not waive each be the sum of the limits for coverage available would rejec- the policy. insured under named insured’s This vehicle form, therefore, to the of appears speak only tion effects to the of stacking inter-policy not effects intra-policy coverage limits permit available stacking, which would to be of the limits for each motor vehicle insured the sum I any policies. respect- under the other relevant and/or cure incon- fully Assembly that the General could submit rejection the written form and remainder sistency between 1738 if the General Section would Assembly amend the rejection written form as follows:
By signing this I am stacked limits of rejecting uninsured motorist under the policy myself and members of household my under which limits of cover- age be available would the sum of limits for each motor policies. Instead, vehicle insured under or the limits of that I purchasing am shall be reduced limits in the I policy. knowingly stated and voluntari- reject the ly stacked limits of I coverage. understand that my premiums reject if I will reduced this coverage. I do not that the believe inconsistency between written form rejection and the remainder of Section renders rejection Randall Craley’s particular unin- or sured motorist coverage underinsured invalid or unenforce- as it applies inter-policy able stacking. reality is that only because Mr. Craley insured one under his policy, vehicle form, he signed rejection when he “could have thought he was receiving premium a reduced for waiving intra-policy there could be no intra-policy stacking [since] ” one vehicle on only policy.’ Opinion ‘the Majority Pa. at I, therefore, A.2d at join am able result Opinion. reached the Majority EAKIN, concurring.
Justice join I Chief Cappy’s Justice interpretation 75 Pa.C.S. (b) Ias provides believe subsection a named insured option both inter- waiving intra-policy stacking of uninsured coverage, and underinsured motorist and that op- (c) (d), is not tion undone subsections even though the language those subsections seems to speak the intra- policy situation alone.
I write to address the separately household vehicle exclu- see sion Randall’s policy, Majority 488-92, 586 Pa. at Op., 533-34, A.2d at 895 State Farm argues is valid and enforceable. While the reach majority does not a discussion clause, of this I believe clause precludes also the Craleys’ recovery of uninsured motorist benefits under Randall’s poli-
508 household vehicle exclusion clause similar to
cy. This is Pru- held enforceable. See this Court has previously clauses Company Insurance v. Col- Casualty Property dential (2002) (household bert, 82, 747, exclusion Pa. 813 A.2d Na- MVFRL); v. Eichelman public policy consistent with 1006, Pa. Company, Insurance tionwide (household it (1998) furthers exclusion enforceable underinsured motorist legislative policy behind stopping intent spiralling and furthers MVFRL’s MVFRL insurance). reason, public There is no costs automobile otherwise, this exclusion. enforce policy or above, I offered concur. For the reasons
LYNN SEWER TOWNSHIP Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of Argued April 2006. April Decided Kantra, II, Valley, for Alex S. Esq., Center Emil William Hornstein. Montgomery, Esq., Lynn and Jennifer
Bridget Elizabeth Eul, Building Industry curiae Harrisburg, amicus Esq., Co. PA Builders Association. Association Lancaster &