delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from the circuit court of the United States, for the eastern district of Louisiana.
During the opening argument of this case, doubts were suggested whether the decree of the circuit court was filial within the act of cQngress, and the attention of the court was directed to that question.
The complainants filed their bill in the circuit court, claiming as heirs a part of the property of Joseph and Lavinia Erwin, deceased. Erwin died in 1829, in the parish of Iberville, having made his will in 1828. His property, real and personal, was much embarrassed; the persons claiming an interest in the succession were numerous; and, from the loose manner in which the property was managed by the testator in his lifetime, and by those who succeeded him, great difficulty was found in the distribution of the estate.
The circuit court, having ascertained the heirship of the claimants and their relative rights in the succession, referred the matter to a special master, “ to take an account of the successions of the said Joseph Erwin, sen., Joseph Erwin, jr., and Lavinia Erwin, in so far as it may be necessary to state the accounts between the plaintiffs and the heirs at law, defendants in this suit, to ascertain the property in kind that remains in the possession and control of either of the defendants, except Adams and Whiteall, as aforesaid — what has been sold, and the prices of the same and the profits thereof; and he will report all the • encumbrances that have been discharged by either of the defendants on the same, and make to them all just allowances for payments, and permanent and useful improvements, and just expenses, and to ascertain what may be due to the said plaintiffs from either defendant; and the said master may make a special report of any matters that may be requisite to a full adjustment of the questions in the cause.”
By the 22d section of the judiciary act of 1789, it is provided, that final.decrees of the circuit court, where the amount in controversy exceeds two thousand dollars, may be brought before this court by an appeal. . The law intended that one appeal should settle the matter in controversy between the parties; and this would be the result in all cases where.the appeal is taken ’on a final decree, unless it should be reversed or modified by this court.
The cases are numerous which have been dismissed on the ground that the appeals were taken from interlocutory decrees. In Perkins
v.
Fourniquet,
The above cases are sufficient to show the grounds on which appeals in chancery are dismissed. To authorize an appeal, the decree must be final in all matters within the pleadings, so that an affirmance of the decree will end the suit. To apply this test, in all cases, cannot be difficult.
' In no legal sense of the term, is the decree now before us a final one. The basis of the decree, embracing the equities in the bill, is found, but the distribution among the parties in interest depends upon the facts to be reported by the master. It is his duty, under the interlocutory decree, to balance the equities by ascertaining what has been expended on the property, and what has been received by each of the claimants; and also every other matter which should have a bearing and influence in the distribution of the property, Until the court shall have acted upon this report and sanctioned it, giving to each of the devisees his share of the estate under the will, the decree is not final.
There may be cases in which the attention of the court has not been drawn to the character of the decree appealed from; but such an inadvertence cannot constitute an exception to the rulé. The decision of the_ court, under the law, establishes the rule which must govern in appeals from the circuit courts.
The case of Whiting
v.
Bank of the United States,
The case of Michaud et al.
v.
Girod et al.
*202
' The case of Forgay et al.
v.
Conrad,
It will be observed, that two deeds for lots in New Orleans were declared tí» be null and void, and certain slaves owned by Forgay, one of the appellants, were directed to be sold on execution, as also the real estate' and the proceeds distributed among the bankrupt’s creditors; and if the defendants principally interested could not take an appeal until the return of the master, their property, under the decree, would have been -disposed of beyond the reach of the appellate court, so that an appeal would be useless. This was the principal ground on which the appeal was sustained, although it was stated that this part of the decree was final.
The court say: “ The decree upon these matters might and ought to have awaited the master’s report; and when the accounts were before the court, then every matter in dispute might have been adjudicated in one final decree; and if either party thought- himself aggrieved, the whole matter would be brought here and decided in one appeal, and the object and policy of the acts of congress upon this subject carried into effect.”
The decree before us is not final, consequently it must be dismissed.
