William CRAIG v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 47580.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
October 15, 1973.
284 So. 2d 57
A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by John Underwood, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
RODGERS, Presiding Justice.
The appellant, William Craig, was tried and convicted оf the crime of armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Itawamba County, Mississippi, and sentenced to serve a term of thirty (30) years in the Mississippi State Penitentiary.
He has appealed to this court and contends that he should be released and dischargеd upon the ground that he was not granted a speedy trial in the circuit court.
The facts shown in the record leave no doubt that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged. The only issue is whether or not he was given a speedy trial within the meaning of
This is the sequel of events leading to the conviction of the appellant. The robbery was committed April 1, 1971. Appеllant was immediately captured. The Circuit Court of Itawamba County was not scheduled to meet until the fourth Monday of September. [
The district attorney in Mississippi claimed the prisoner; therefore, he wаs returned to Mississippi in August, 1972. The appellant was brought before the court and at that time he advised the court that he would employ his own attorney. He was given a few days to see attorneys. It developed later, however, that he was indigent аnd could not employ an attorney. On September 18, 1972, an attorney was
An examination of the record in this case has resolved itself into the question as to whether or not the prisoner was denied a speedy trial on September 22, 1972, bеcause up to that date it is obvious that the State of Mississippi had done all within its power to give the appellant an early trial. The case was set over to the end of the September term in order to give the prisoner time to emрloy an attorney and to prepare for trial. When it developed that he could not employ an attorney, there was still time to give the defendant a jury trial before the juries then present in the court. The defendant, however, desired to exercise his statutory right to demand a special venire. The granting of this motion would have necessitated an extensiоn of the regular term of the Circuit Court of Itawamba County; but this was impossible, because the two judges of that circuit court district were required to go into two other counties — Tishomingo and Prentiss — to hold court.
The appellant has cited several federal cases where the court was required to dismiss charges against a defendant, but these cases show a much longеr period of years in which the prisoner was not given a trial.
The United States Supreme Court pointed out in Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 576, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905) that the right to a speedy trial is “necessarily relative ... and depends upon circumstances.” This theory of relativity has been followed in Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957) and United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1965).
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recognizеd that the State has the right to have a fair opportunity to prosecute a defendant and must have time to so do. Ex parte Jefferson, 62 Miss. 223 (1884).
In the recent case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court recognized that in each case where the question of speedy trial was at issue, the issue must be approached on an ad hoc basis. The court recognized that the length of delay may be the triggering mechanism, but therе are also other factors to be considered, including the reason for delay, the defendant‘s assertion of his right, and thе prejudice to the defendant.
This court has held that where the defendant is being tried in other jurisdictions or his trial is delayed during the time he was being tried for other crimes, or because of his own misconduct by being a fugitive, his claim of failure of the court to grant a speedy trial is not well founded. Saucier v. State, 259 So.2d 484 (Miss. 1972).
The facts in the instant case are entirely different from the facts in Bell v. State, 220 So.2d 287 (Miss. 1969). In that case
Thе judicial system of Mississippi is patterned in a large sense from the old English courts of assize and nisi prius. In fact, our circuit court in which сriminal cases are tried has “all the powers [of an old English court] belonging to a court of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery, ...”
In the instant case, under the facts here shown, we are of the opinion that the contention that the defendant was denied a speedy trial is not well founded and, therefore, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
SMITH, ROBERTSON, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur.