113 Cal. 7 | Cal. | 1896
Action for the conversion of stock in a corporation.
Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of this state. On November 18, 1893, plaintiff was the owner of fifty sharés of stock in the defendant corporation, represented by certificates numbered 72 and 79, each for twenty-five shares. These certificates were in defendant’s possession. On the day above mentioned, plaintiff, having agreed to sell forty of said shares to one Kaelin, offered to indorse and deliver said certificates to the corporation, and demanded that forty shares thereof be transferred to said Kaelin, and new certificates issued, one to Kaelin for forty shares, and one to himself for the remainder. This demand was refused for reasons about which there was some controversy, though it is reasonably clear that the only reason given for not complying with the demand was that the stock was “in litigation.”
On November 20th, two days after the demand, this action was brought.
The defense to the action is based upon the claim that the stock in question is liable for certain unpaid assessments. The court refused all the instructions requested by the plaintiff, and instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. This appeal is from the judg
A chronological statement of the assessments made, and of the holdings of the shares in question, will simplify the facts and the questions made.
In 1890 an informal or voluntary call was made of seven dollars per share, and all the stockholders paid except Samuel Merrill, who then owned fifty shares represented by certificate No. 26.
On December 9, 1892, assessment No. 4 was made of ten dollars per share. This assessment was made to cover and include the voluntary assessment of seven dollars per share, Samuel Merrill not having paid his proportion, amounting to three hundred and fifty dollars, the intention being to credit all the others with the voluntary payment, and requiring them to pay three dollars per share in addition, and the Merrill stock to pay ten dollars per share.
Prior to that assessment, on November 23, 1892, Samuel Mekrill sold and .transferred twenty-five shares of his stock to the plaintiff, John W. Craig, and twenty-five shares to J. H. Merrill, and certificate No. 71 was issued to Craig and certificate No. 72 was issued to J. H. Merrill. After that assessment became delinquent Craig and Merrill brought an action to cancel said assessment No. 4, and obtained a restraining order to prevent the sale. Afterward a nonsuit was granted in that action, and plaintiff’s motion for a new trial thereof was denied on November 17, 1893.
On September 20, 1893, at a delinquent sale under assessment No. 5, Merrill not having paid the assessment, Craig bought his stock, and a new certificate, No. 79, w'as issued to plaintiff.
On October 19, 1893, assessment No. 6 of one dollar per share was ordered, to become delinquent November 17th, and the day of sale was fixed for December 6,1893. This assessment was not paid by the plaintiff, and became delinquent the day before plaintiff’s demand for the transfer of his stock was made, though it appears
Assessment No. 4 upon certificates 71 and 72 re.: mained unpaid at the commencement of this action, but under a subsequent assessment, which was paid by 71, No. 72 was sold, and plaintiff became the purchaser, and a new certificate, No. 79, was issued to him; and it is conceded by the respondent that, as to the shares represented by that certificate, they were discharged as to assessment No. 4, so that that assessment now affects only twenty-five shares, while the last assessment, No. 6, affects the whole fifty shares.
The record is silent as to any provision in the bylaws of the corporation affecting the question, nor is there any express provision of the statute permitting or prohibiting the transfer of certificates of stock upon the books of the corporation during delinquency; and the question to be determined is, whether the corporation, by a. transfer of plaintiff’s shares after an assessment thereon became delinquent, affected its right to enforce its assessment against the shares so transferred.
Respondent contends “ that, after an assessment and before delinquent sale, the assessment not having been paid, a transfer of delinquent shares to a stranger would entirely defeat the power or the authority of the corporation to collect its dues in the manner provided for in the Civil Code.”
In support of this contention counsel argue that “the corporation had a lien (or the equivalent of a lien, so far as holding appellant to his status as a book owner of the shares), which appellant could not defeat by diverting the shares into a new channel of ownership beyond the reach of the corporation.”
If, then, the transfer of plaintiff’s shares upon the books of the corporation, and the issuance of new certificates, would not have affected the power of the corporation to collect the delinquent assessment on such shares by a sale thereof, such delinquency did not justify the refusal to make the transfer, and plaintiff’s objection to evidence of those facts set up in the answer, if offered as a full defense to the action, should have been sustained; though proof of the unpaid delinquent assessment would have been admissible as affecting the value of the stock; and it also follows that the court erred in instructing the jury to find for the defendant.
Ranch Land etc. Co. v. Herberger, 82 Cal. 603, cited by respondent, sustains the views we have expressed. I can discover no difference between the right of a corporation to collect a valid assessment, and its right to collect a stipulated part of subscription to stock, nor how the nonpossession of the certificate affects that right in either case. In Mandelbaum v. North American Min. Co., 4 Mich. 465, cited by respondent, the question aróse
The fact that plaintiff did not know of the assessment at the time he demanded the transfer, nor at the time suit was commenced, does not affect the validity of the assessment nor the liability of the stock therefor; but it is evident that if respondent’s contention is sound the holder of stock may not only be deprived of the benefit of an advantageous sale, which he would desire to make under any circumstances, but he would be denied the right to dispose of his stock to avoid personal liability for debts about to be incurred which he did not approve, and which in his judgment would be ruinous not only to the corporation, but to himself as a stockholder.
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed.
Britt, C., and Belcher, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order appealed from are reversed.
Henshaw, J., Temple, J., McFarland, J.
Hearing in Bank denied.