Craig P. WALLIN, Appellant,
v.
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dennis Benson,
individually and in his official capacity as Chief Executive
Officer (Warden) of the Minnesota Correctional Facility at
Stillwater; David Corbo, individually and in his official
capacity as Personnel Director and Associate Warden;
Elizabeth A. Binkley, individually and in her official
capacity as a Correctional Officer; John & Jane Does,
individually and in their official capacities as
Correctional Officers at the Minnesota Correctional Facility
at Stillwater; Terry Bath, individually and in his official
capacity as a Correctional Officer, Appellees.
Craig P. WALLIN, Appellant,
v.
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dennis Benson,
individually and in his official capacity as Chief Executive
Officer (Warden) of the Minnesota Correctional Facility at
Stillwater; David Corbo, individually and in his official
capacity as Personnel Director and Associate Warden;
Elizabeth A. Binkley, individually and in her official
capacity as a Correctional Officer; John Doe, individually
and in their official capacity as Correctional Officer at
the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Stillwater; Jane
Doe, individually and in their official capacity as
Correctional Officer at the Minnesota Correctional Facility
at Stillwater; Terry Bath, individually and in his official
capacity as a Correctional Officer, Appellees.
Nos. 97-3309, 97-3956.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 12, 1998.
Decided Aug. 17, 1998.
Stephen Charles Fiebiger, Stephen C. Fiebiger & Associates, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Margaret Eileen Hendriksen, Steven M. Gunn, Kurt J. Erickson, Attorney General's Office, St. Paul, MN, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BEAM, ROSS, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Craig Wallin was twice discharged from his position as a corrections officer at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Stillwater (MCF-Stillwater) and twice reinstated after grievance proceedings. After his second discharge and subsequent reinstatement, Wallin sued the Minnesota Department of Corrections, warden David Benson, human resources director David Corbo, and coworkers Terry Bath and Elizabeth Hughes, claiming they discriminated against him on the basis of his disabilities of alcoholism and depression in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and failed to provide him due process or equal protection of the laws in connection with his terminations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Wallin appeals. We affirm.
I.
Wallin began working as a corrections officer at MCF-Stillwater in 1980. Eleven years later, in 1991, Wallin was diagnosed with depression and, in July 1991, MCF-Stillwater gave Wallin two weeks of leave on account of his depression. According to Wallin, after he returned, coworker Bath said: " 'I think I'm going to get ahold of a psych so I can get a week off work. I understand that's how you got time off.' " Wallin Dep. (Mar. 6, 1996) at 80-81, reprinted in J.A. at 87-88. Wallin also noticed that someone had drawn pictures on his calendar on each of the days he was absent from work that appeared to be psychiatrist beds. Wallin reported the bed incident, but not Bath's comment, to his supervisor. It was around this time that Wallin began abusing alcohol.
In March 1992, Wallin was arrested and charged with assaulting his girlfriend. Pending trial, MCF-Stillwater permitted Wallin to return to work if he completed a chemical dependency program and remained chemical-free for three years. In August 1992, Wallin pled guilty to one count of gross misdemeanor assault in connection with the assault and received a fifteen-day workhouse sentence. On August 25, 1992, MCF-Stillwater discharged Wallin because of the conviction.
Wallin's union, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), represented Wallin in grievance proceedings under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering Wallin's employment. The grievance proceedings resulted in a settlement between AFSCME and MCFStillwater that reinstated Wallin with a demotion of one rank, but without reducing his pay (Settlement Agreement). The Settlement Agreement, dated December 11, 1992, settled all claims between the parties.1 AFSCME and MCF-Stillwater signed the agreement, and Wallin acknowledged that he "underst[oo]d and voluntarily accept[ed] the terms of this Settlement." Settlement Agreement (Dec. 11, 1992) at 2, reprinted in J.A. at 26.
After Wallin returned to work in January 1993, he claims he was subjected to discrimination when, on January 31, 1993, he overheard coworker Bath say the following to another employee: "It's just like these alcoholic fuckers that--around here that go to treatment, go serve a jail sentence, and the institution allows them to come back; this is a bunch of bullshit." Bath Dep. (Feb. 7, 1997) at 40, reprinted in J.A. at 3172. Bath later apologized for this comment, and received a verbal reprimand after MCF-Stillwater investigated the incident. In the spring of 1993, Wallin requested to be transferred to certain other prison facilities, but never suggested that a transfer was necessary to accommodate his disabilities. In fact, there is no evidence that Wallin gave any reason for requesting the transfers. His requests were denied by the transferee prisons.
In late March, Wallin began a dangerous pattern of misconduct and misbehavior. On March 28, 1993, Wallin administered an overly aggressive and unusually lengthy shakedown of an inmate even though a fellow officer could not discern the inmate doing anything wrong. Wallin smiled and told the fellow officer that that was how a shakedown was done. On April 3, 1993, Wallin intentionally left the cell doors in an entire cell block unbolted, creating a security breach. In a memo admitting to the incident, Wallin would not admit that what he had done was wrong, instead explaining that he sought to test a fellow officer who was assigned to check Wallin's work. Wallin would not assure MCF-Stillwater that such unauthorized conduct would not be repeated, instead saying that "it more than likely won't happen again." Wallin Mem. (Apr. 4, 1993), reprinted in J.A. at 2394. On April 20, 1993, Wallin threatened coworker Hughes in front of inmates, while the two were alone doing a nighttime check of the cells. Wallin became very agitated, held the keys needed to get through a gate, backed Hughes up against a railing, cornering her, and refused to give her the key she needed to get through the gate. According to Hughes, Wallin told her: " 'Don't you be telling me what to do.... You really think you're something around here but you ain't shit.' " Hughes Interview (Apr. 21, 1993) at 4, reprinted in J.A. at 2358. Wallin finally opened the door, saying that he did not care if she reported him.
Thereafter, Wallin was interviewed regarding the security breach, the shakedown, and the Hughes incident. Wallin would not admit to much of what others claimed he had done, and often claimed that he could not remember important details. Wallin was suspended without pay pending further investigation.2 On April 30, 1993, at a meeting between Wallin, Benson, Corbo, Wallin's attorney, and Wallin's union representative, Wallin was terminated. At the meeting, Wallin explained that he was having problems with his medication. Wallin received a termination letter at the meeting that explained that Wallin's termination was due to the three above-described incidents, along with numerous other minor incidents of misconduct.
AFSCME again represented Wallin in a grievance challenging his termination. The grievance was submitted to arbitration. An arbitrator concluded that the security breach and shakedown warranted discipline, but that the incident between Wallin and Hughes was not harassment and did not constitute punishable wrongdoing. According to the arbitrator, the two incidents of misconduct were not extreme and did not constitute just cause for terminating Wallin. Therefore, the arbitrator ordered that Wallin be reinstated, and that the period between Wallin's termination and his reinstatement be treated as an unpaid disciplinary suspension. The discharge letter remained in his file, but was renamed a "suspension" letter.
On November 11, 1993, while the arbitration was pending, Wallin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charging that he was the subject of disability discrimination between January 14, 1993 and April 30, 1993. On August 3, 1995, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter.
Wallin then filed the instant suit, claiming that MCF-Stillwater violated the ADA under a variety of theories. Wallin also claimed, under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, that Benson, Corbo, Hughes, and Bath denied him due process and equal protection of the laws. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Wallin's claims. The district court also awarded partial attorneys' fees of $330.67 to the defendants. Wallin appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment.3
II.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc.,
A.
Wallin first claims that MCF-Stillwater violated the ADA by terminating him in 1993 because of his alcoholism and depression.
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that she was a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, and that she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Miners,
Proceeding directly to the third element of Wallin's prima facie case under the ADA,4 Wallin is required to come forward with evidence that his firing occurred in circumstances that could give rise to an inference of discrimination. That happens when "one can infer ... that it is more likely than not that such actions were 'based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under [federal law].' " Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
Wallin argues that similarly situated employees were disciplined differently. Having examined the undisputed record, we disagree. The other employees cited by Wallin were not similarly situated to Wallin because their misconduct was not as egregious as Wallin's. Wallin, unlike the other employees, created a substantial public danger by leaving an entire cell block unbolted, and was involved in three serious, unrelated incidents in a short, one-month period while demonstrating a pattern of violent behavior. Additionally, Wallin, unlike the other employees, was evasive during investigation of the misconduct, would not admit to wrongdoing, and could not assure supervisors that he would not repeat his misdeeds.
No other evidence raises an inference of discrimination. The only event with any discriminatory implications was coworker Bath's statement that Wallin was an "alcoholic fucker." However, MCF-Stillwater showed that it would not tolerate such conduct when it promptly investigated the incident and reprimanded Bath. Thus, rather than allowing one to infer discrimination, MCF-Stillwater's prompt response gives rise to the opposite inference.
Nor will we infer discrimination simply because the arbitrator reinstated Wallin; instead, the reinstatement suggests only that, in the arbitrator's eye, MCF-Stillwater overreacted to Wallin's misconduct. See Johnson,
B.
Wallin next argues that when he returned to work in 1993, his work environment was hostile. This Court has never recognized an ADA claim based on a hostile work environment, though other courts have done so. See, e.g. Keever v. City of Middletown,
Wallin points to numerous incidents of friction between himself and his coworkers, but provides no evidence that this workplace friction was due to his disabilities. See Smith v. St. Louis Univ.,
C.
Wallin next argues that his 1993 discharge was in retaliation for making internal discrimination complaints. However, Wallin failed to allege retaliation in his EEOC Charge of Discrimination. "Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumscribe the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge." Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works,
The retaliation Wallin alleges was not the result of his filing of the EEOC charge. Indeed, the retaliation alleged by Wallin occurred at the same time as the alleged discrimination, long before he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because Wallin did not allege retaliation in his EEOC charge, we need not consider this claim.
D.
Next, Wallin argues that MCF-Stillwater violated the ADA when it failed to reasonably accommodate his disabilities by transferring him to a different prison facility where he would not be harassed. We disagree.
In general, "it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1992).
Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, as is often the case when mental disabilities are involved, the initial burden rests primarily upon the employee ... to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.
Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc.,
Here, Wallin requested transfers, but made no connection between these requests and his disabilities. Thus, MCF-Stillwater had no reason to think that the transfers were requested as accommodation for his disabilities. See Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents,
III.
Wallin next argues that his 1992 termination violated the Due Process Clause. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Wallin waived constitutional claims stemming from events occurring prior to his signing the December 1992 Settlement Agreement. Wallin, supported by the EEOC as amicus, argues that because AFSCME was only authorized to negotiate Wallin's claims under the CBA, it was beyond AFSCME's authority to negotiate away Wallin's constitutional claims in the Settlement Agreement. We disagree.
The CBA, which only provided for arbitration of disputes over application of the CBA, did not authorize an arbitrator to resolve Wallin's statutory and constitutional claims. Cf. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc.,
Wallin understood and consented to a waiver of all pre-settlement claims. See Settlement Agreement at 1-2 (Wallin "understand[s] and voluntarily accept[s] the terms" of the settlement, which provides that the parties release each other from "claims based upon ... violation of civil or constitutional right."), reprinted in J.A. at 25-26.8 Moreover, Wallin's personal attorney reviewed the Settlement Agreement and signed off on its terms. See Lyght v. Ford Motor Co.,
IV.
Wallin also raises due process claims in connection with his 1993 termination, which we address in turn.
A.
Wallin first argues that he received an inadequate hearing, under Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,
B.
Wallin next argues that Benson and Corbo deprived him of property without due process when they suspended him for five days without pay prior to his pretermination hearing. This Court has held that a Loudermill hearing is required prior to the "suspension of a public employee who has a property interest in retaining the job." Bartlett v. Fisher,
To determine what process is due, we balance three factors: first, "the private interest that will be affected by the official action;" second, "the Government's interest;" and third, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Mathews v. Eldridge,
The state's interest in taking every precaution to preserve a safe prison environment, on the other hand, is substantial. This concern is heightened when the behavior alleged, if it continued, would endanger prisoners, prison employees, and the general public. Wallin's behavior created precisely those risks.
Finally, we "look more closely at the procedures [Wallin] actually received, to see if they adequately protected him against the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his interest in not being suspended from his job." Ibarra v. Martin,
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Notes
The relevant section of the Settlement Agreement reads as follows:
The parties agree that this Settlement and Release is made for the purpose of releasing and discharging each other (including their employees, agents, officers and officials jointly and severally, individually and in their official capacities) by compromising and finally settling all claims, differences, grievances and causes of action against the above-noted parties based on any and all acts or omissions allegedly committed by them, including but not limited to, claims based upon contract, employment agreement, violation of statutory law, violation of civil or constitutional right, or tortuous conduct arising from or in any way connected with the parties' employment relationships, up to and including the date of this Settlement and Release.
Settlement Agreement (Dec. 11, 1992) at 1, reprinted in J.A. at 25 (emphasis added).
The CBA specifically permitted "an investigatory suspension without pay provided a reasonable basis exists to warrant such suspension." CBA at 48, reprinted in J.A. at 1190. The CBA limited such an unpaid suspension to five days
Wallin also appeals the award of attorneys' fees. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. See Warner v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625,
As to the first element of the prima facie case, we doubt that Wallin has come forward with evidence that his alcoholism impaired a major life activity, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), because he was chemical free for one year prior to the period of alleged discrimination (and for two years after), and has presented no evidence showing that his major life activities were impaired. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,
Wallin also claims his discharge violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Wallin has not come forward with any evidence that would permit the inference that he was treated differently because of his disability, his equal protection claim must also fail. See Klinger v. Department of Corrections,
These first two incidents occurred in July 1991, a year and a half before the period during which Wallin claims his work environment became hostile, and prior to the effective date of the ADA. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (effective two years after its July 26, 1990 date of enactment)
Moreover, Wallin felt comfortable reporting the "alcoholic fuckers" incident under MCF-Stillwater's harassment reporting procedures, and MCF-Stillwater quickly and thoroughly investigated the incident, ultimately reprimanding Bath. Neither Bath nor Wallin's other coworkers have engaged in any such conduct since that reprimand. Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, --- U.S. ----, ----,
The EEOC argues that because the Settlement Agreement does not "refer to any specific federal statute," it does not comprise a waiver of rights under § 1983. Br. of EEOC at 11. This argument is meritless. See Pilon v. University of Minn.,
We also reject Wallin's claim that he was deprived of liberty without due process when stigmatizing statements were made in his termination letter. Wallin's Loudermill hearing on April 30, 1993 was all the process he was due in connection with those stigmatizing statements. See Nelson v. City of McGehee,
Wallin's claim that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1985 is meritless, and does not warrant further discussion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B