Case No. 42616. In August 1982, Florrie Mobley entered into a written lease agreement with appellant Craft’s Ocean Court, Inc., whereby Mobley agreed to lease to appellant a motel on St. Simons Island. The lease agreement provided it would terminate on August 31, 1983, and that “in the event the lessee should hold over beyond the term expressed with the consent or acquiescence of the lessor, then . . . that said holding over beyond the term shall be as a tenant from month to month, and may be terminated at any time ... by the lessor giving to the tenant sixty days notice.”
On May 31, 1985, Mobley, the president of appellant corporation, conveyed the motel by wаrranty deed to appellees for approximately $1.5 million. Thereafter appellant refused to relinquish possession of the motel to appellees, claiming that appellees purchased the motel with notice of appellant’s right to remain in possession under the lease agreement.
On June 12, 1985, appellees made a demand for possession of the motel under OCGA § 44-7-50. 1 On June 18, 1985, appellant applied *337 for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit appellees from entering upon the motel property. This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of the injunction on June 27, 1985.
Under OCGA § 44-7-7, “Sixty days notice from the landlord . . . is necеssary to terminate a tenancy at will.” Further, Mrs. Mobley and the appellant contractually agreed that sixty days notice frоm the lessor would be sufficient to terminate appellant’s tenancy under the lease. Appellant does not dispute the fact that appellees’ demand for possession triggered the running of the sixty-day period. This period has now expired.
Thеrefore, it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s application for injunction as the issue of whether appellant is entitled to possession under the lease agreement is moot.
Case No. 42685. On June 5, 1985 Mobley filed a complaint seeking, in Count I, to cancel the warranty deed to Coast House on the ground she signed it under duress and undue influenсe. In Counts II and III of the complaint Mobley seeks general and punitive damages resulting from these alleged injuries. When Mobley fаiled to comply with the trial court’s order to tender the purchase money into the court registry, the trial court dismissed Count I of Mоbley’s complaint under OCGA § 9-11-54 (b).* 2 The trial court’s action left pending Mobley’s complaint for damages as well as the counterсlaim for damages and attorney fees filed by Coast House.
1. The trial court did not err in dismissing Count I of Mobley’s complaint. “Equity will not decree the cancellation of an instrument where anything of value has been received until repayment is either made or tеndered, or the defendant has stated that, should a tender be made, it would be refused.”
Wilson v. McAteer,
2. The trial court dismissed Count I of Mobley’s complaint on *338 July 30, 1985. That same day Mobley moved the trial court to rule it had no jurisdictiоn over the pending issues while the dismissal of Count I of the complaint was on appeal to this court. The trial court denied that motion, and on August 1, 1985, Mobley filed her notice of appeal from these rulings.
On August 16, 1985, the trial court denied Mobley’s motion for a protective order to prevent Coast House from deposing her as to the pending claims in the case. On the same day the trial court denied Mobley’s motion for a continuance of a hearing on pending issues. On appeal Mobley argues the trial court did not have the authоrity to make these rulings. We do not agree.
In
Cohran v. Carlin,
Appeal dismissed in Case No. 42616. Judgment affirmed in Case No. 42685.
Notes
OCGA § 44-7-50 provides:
“In all cases where a tenant holds possession of lands or tenements over and beyond the term for which they were rented or leased to him or fails to pay the rent when it bеcomes due and in all cases where lands or tenements are held and occupied by any tenant at will or sufferancе, whether under contract of rent or not, when the owner of the lands or tenements desires possession of the lands or tenements, the owner may, by himself, his agent, his attorney in fact, or his attorney at law, demand the possession of the property so rеnted, leased, held, or occupied. If the tenant refuses or fails to deliver possession when so demanded, the owner, his аgent, his attorney at law, or his attorney in fact may go before the judge of the superior court, the judge of the state court, or the clerk or deputy clerk of either court, or the judge or the clerk or deputy clerk of any other court with jurisdiction over the subject mat *337 ter, or a magistrate in the district where the land lies and make an affidavit under oath to the facts.”
OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) prоvides in part, “When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, сross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason fоr delay and upon an express direction for entry of judgment.”
We note that Mobley filed an application for interlocutory appeal of these orders, No. 3364, which this court denied on September 5, 1985.