25 A.2d 707 | Pa. | 1942
This was an action of assumpsit brought against the City of Pittsburgh by Leo J. Coyle, appellant, a licensed *427 real estate broker, to recover for services allegedly rendered to the city, pursuant to an oral contract of employment. The averments of the statement of claim are that in January, 1934, appellant was orally employed by the then city solicitor, acting on behalf of the city, to make appraisals of the value of real estate and to testify as an expert witness in matters involving the City of Pittsburgh, payment therefor to be made in accordance with a certain schedule, as set forth in the statement; that such services were rendered continuously by appellant until April, 1940, under the terms of the oral contract, which was orally renewed and continued in force; and that there remains a balance due him in the sum of $7,350, which he seeks to recover, with interest. To the statement of claim the city filed a statutory demurrer on the ground that the alleged oral contract declared upon furnished no basis to charge the city with contractual liability, because not executed in the manner and form prescribed by Article XV, section 1, of the Act of March 7, 1901, P. L. 20, entitled "An act for the government of cities of the second class," and its amendments. After argument, the court below sustained the demurrer and directed that judgment be entered in favor of the city, stating: "Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that persons entering into contracts with a municipality must see to it that the contract is in writing and that all statutory requirements in relation thereto are obeyed. We can readily understand why a city solicitor should be empowered to employ experts in a particular case in the preparation of a defense for the municipality, but that is not the case before us. This, we might say has to do with a continuing contract which the solicitor had no power to make." Judgment having been so entered, we now have this appeal.
Article XV, section 1, of the Act of 1901, as amended, provides, inter alia, as follows: "All contracts, shall be in writing, signed and executed in the name of the city *428
by the mayor and head of the proper department." The statutory requirement applies not only to such contracts as are the subject of competitive bidding, but embraces all contracts, and must be strictly adhered to in order to charge the municipality with contractual liability: Rieger v. Pittsburg,
As to the contention that, even though the oral contract of employment be invalid for failure to meet the requirements of the Act of 1901, "justice and fairness still compel a determination that the city is indebted to appellant for his services on the theory of quasi-contract," it is sufficient to point out that where, as here, the benefits conferred upon the municipality pursuant to an invalid contract are such that by their very *429
nature they cannot be surrendered, at its option, no implied obligation on the part of the municipality to make compensatory payment can possibly arise. See Luzerne Township v. FayetteCounty, supra, 253; Charleroi L. Co. v. Boro. Sch. Dist.,
Judgment affirmed.
