In this case, we must determine whether Artavius Donnell Cox (“Petitioner”) was entitled to have suppressed, as evidence at his trial, a quantity of marijuana that the police found on the ground near him, after an arguably illegal stop. The drugs seized in this case were recovered after the police obtained information that there existed an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest. We are asked to review two issues. First, whether a police encounter, in which a uniformed officer approached Petitioner on the street claiming that he “loosely fit” the description of the perpetrator of a recent string of robberies, asked Petitioner for identification, and ran a check on his identification, constituted an illegal stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition, whether a police officer’s subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant represented an intervening circumstance, 1 such that if the stop were illegal, the arrest on the warrant attenuated the taint of the illegal stop.
We need not address the first issue because that question is not dispositive to our analysis of whether Petitioner’s motion to suppress should be granted or denied. Assuming arguendo, that the police encounter constituted an illegal stop, we *204 deem it more appropriate to determine the ultimate question: whether it was proper for the trial court to grant Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence. Although the State did not specifically contend, at the suppression hearing, that Petitioner’s arrest constituted an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of the stop, the issue and the State’s contention on appeal that the arrest pursuant to a warrant was lawful is, nonetheless, preserved for appellate review. We shall hold that the police officer’s discovery of an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest and Petitioner’s arrest pursuant thereto represents an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint of what appears to be an illegal stop. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 6, 2005, Sergeant Jeff Bryant was patrolling the Lancaster neighborhood in Waldorf, Maryland, driving a marked police car and wearing a police uniform, because there had been a series of robberies, the last of which had occurred on the previous day. The victim of that robbery had described the perpetrators as “two teen-age black males.”
At approximately 11:05 a.m., Sergeant Bryant noticed Petitioner and a man, later identified as Mr. Martin, walking towards him, on the sidewalk, adjacent to Lancaster Circle. Sergeant Bryant testified that the men appeared to be avoiding him. The men then left the sidewalk and walked onto another street. Sergeant Bryant was not sure whether the men saw him before changing their route. The Sergeant advised another officer that he intended to stop the men.
Sergeant Bryant circled in his car, met with a second officer at a specified interception point, and then stopped Petitioner and Martin. Two other officers appeared “a couple minutes later.” Sergeant Bryant got out of his vehicle, identified himself, and approached the men. He “asked the gentlemen for identification, explained to [them] that [the police] were *205 having a problem with robberies of the citizens of the area and that the [ ] two gentlemen loosely fit the description of those suspects.” Both Petitioner and Martin provided their Virginia identification cards to Sergeant Bryant. While remaining with the men, Sergeant Bryant “ran that information through the agency radio asking for a local MILES and NCIC check of wanted status.... ” Sergeant Bryant further testified, at the suppression hearing, that while checking Petitioner’s identification, Petitioner was not free to leave but Sergeant Bryant did not know if he would have chased Petitioner if Petitioner had run away.
After about two minutes, Sergeant Bryant received a code “Sam Roberts,” which meant that he should secure his radio (so that the men could not hear it) because at least one of the individuals about whom he had inquired had an outstanding warrant. In response, Sergeant Bryant told both men to sit on the ground with their hands on their heads and awaited confirmation as to which man had the outstanding warrant. Soon thereafter, Sergeant Bryant received confirmation that it was Petitioner who had an open warrant for failing to appear in court on drug charges. The Sergeant then placed Petitioner in handcuffs. One of the other officers on the scene, Officer Gotschall, then noticed a plastic baggie of marijuana lying on the ground. Sergeant Bryant testified that the marijuana was not on the ground before he asked Petitioner and Martin to sit down and place their hands on their heads.
On May 2, 2005, the State charged Petitioner with various drug-related offenses, including possession of marijuana and possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. On May 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the marijuana on the grounds that it was unlawfully obtained.
The Circuit Court for Charles County heard testimony and argument on August 12, 2005. At the hearing, the State argued that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to an outstanding warrant and cited
Gibson v. State,
The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that (1) Petitioner was not illegally detained, and that (2) even if he was, the evidence should still not be suppressed because the arrest warrant constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the illegality of the detention. Petitioner argued that the State failed to preserve for appellate review the latter argument. In an unreported opinion, filed on March 29, 2006, the intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. That court found that the stop of Petitioner was actually a mere accosting because it was both “consensual and voluntary.” The intermediate appellate court agreed with Petitioner, as to the second point, because it perceived that the State argued only two points at the trial level: that the encounter was consensual and that Petitioner’s identity was not suppressible. The court determined that neither point preserved an argument based on the attenuation doctrine. As a result, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the marijuana should not have been suppressed, and, because the police encounter was consensual, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari
2
in this Court
*207
and the State filed a conditional cross-petition.
3
We granted both petitions.
Cox v. State,
DISCUSSION
A.
The Legality of the Police Encounter
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. Because of this constitutional protection, police officers must have, at a minimum, reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is involved with, or has committed, criminal activity before they can lawfully seize that individual.
Ferris v. State,
*208 do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is -willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification.
Stanberry v. State,
the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person’s documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave.
Id. This Court has used a “totality of the circumstances approach” when evaluating these factors to make its ultimate determination of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. See, e.g., id.
Petitioner argues that, based upon the above-mentioned factors, he was the subject of a seizure prior to the time that the officers received the code “Sam Roberts” alerting them *209 that Petitioner had a warrant outstanding for his arrest. Petitioner argues that the stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. In evaluating the factors for support of the legality of the stop, Petitioner argues that he was stopped by four officers, at least one of whom was in uniform, that the officers asked him for identification, that the record fails to indicate that any of the officers ever told him that he was free to leave, that Sergeant Bryant admitted at trial that Petitioner was not free to leave, and that Sergeant Bryant explained to Petitioner that he loosely fit the description of the perpetrator of a recent robbery that the officer was investigating. Petitioner asserts that no reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would have felt free to leave.
The State argues that, prior to the discovery of the outstanding warrant, the encounter constituted merely an accosting, and not an illegal stop. The State cites several cases for the proposition that an officer may ask an individual for things like identification so long as he does not use physical force or restraint. In evaluating the Ferris factors, the State posits that the encounter occurred at 11:05 in the morning, in a residential area, and that nothing indicates that Petitioner was moved to another area. In addition, the police never told Petitioner that he was not free to leave. Sergeant Bryant also told Petitioner about the other robberies and told Petitioner that he only “loosely” matched a description. Lastly, the officer did not walk away with Petitioner’s identification and never told Petitioner that he was under arrest, never touched Petitioner, never handcuffed him, never drew his gun, and never used the word “stop.”
We need not reach the merits of these arguments because our decision in this case is not dependent on the outcome of Petitioner’s contention that the stop was illegal. We reach this result because the discovery of the outstanding warrant and arrest pursuant thereto constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the arguably illegal stop. We assume
arguendo,
as we did in
Myers v. State,
B.
The State’s Preservation for Appellate Review of the Intervening Cause Issue
We now examine whether the State preserved for appellate review its intervening circumstance argument. Petitioner contends that because the State failed to argue to the motions court that the arrest constituted an intervening circumstance, the State failed to preserve that argument for appellate review. Petitioner explains that the prosecutor put forth only two arguments to the motions court: that the stop was consensual and that Petitioner’s identity is not subject to exclusion, even if the stop was unlawful. To support this latter argument, the prosecutor cited, and relied upon,
Gibson v. State,
The State counters arguing that, although the prosecutor never specifically mentioned the words “dissipate” or “attenuate” to the motions court, the argument was preserved by mention of the outstanding arrest warrant and reference to Gibson, because that case explains the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the three theories of “unpoisoning” the fruit; attenuation and dissipation of taint are fruit of the poisonous *211 tree concepts. The State asserts that by citing Gibson, “the underlying doctrine of unpoisoning the fruit of the alleged illegal stop was before the motions court” and, therefore, the Court of Special Appeals erred by holding otherwise.
We reject Petitioner’s argument and the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals, as to this point, and hold that the intervening cause or circumstance issue is properly before us. It is well settled that an arrest is constitutionally valid where the arresting officer acted in good faith and obtained a warrant based upon probable cause.
Chimel v. California,
In the instant case, the State contended at the suppression hearing that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant. For certain, the burden was on Petitioner to prove at that hearing that his arrest was unlawful. In that regard, Petitioner argued that the stop was unconstitutional and that the subsequent arrest and seizure of evidence were the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” In response, the State did not use the words “intervening circumstance or cause.” Its basic premise, however, was the same at the suppression hearing and on
*212
appeal—that Petitioner was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant; the burden was on the defense to show that the arrest warrant was invalid. In addition, the State relied on
Gibson,
We hold that the issue as to the legality of the arrest was plainly preserved, for appellate review, even though the State did not use the “magic words,” “dissipate” or “attenuate,” to explain why “the initial encounter [did] not matter”—because of the intervening event, i.e., the discovery of an outstanding warrant and an arrest pursuant thereto. Thus, we are satisfied that the issue was put forth at the trial level and the contention that there was an intervening circumstance is properly before us. 4
C.
Suppression of the Evidence-An Application of Myers v. State
Because the intervening cause argument is properly before us, we now examine whether the police discovery of the arrest warrant and arrest of Petitioner pursuant to that warrant
*213
constituted an intervening cause that dissipates the taint of the arguably illegal stop. Petitioner argues that even if the State’s intervening cause argument was preserved, the trial court nonetheless correctly suppressed the evidence recovered after Petitioner was illegally stopped. Petitioner cites
Ferguson v. State, 301
Md. 542,
As to the first factor, Petitioner asserts that the discovery of the marijuana and the illegal stop were contemporaneous and that this Court, in
Ferguson,
stated that a lapse of twenty minutes weighed in favor of suppression.
Ferguson,
Petitioner states further that even if the arrest warrant does constitute an intervening cause, that fact alone does not mandate admission of the tainted evidence. Instead, Petitioner cites cases in other jurisdictions for the proposition that the analysis is actually a balancing test and that no one factor should be given dispositive weight. Petitioner then discusses the third Ferguson factor and argues that an officer’s act of arresting an individual without probable cause weighs in favor of suppression. According to Petitioner, because Sergeant Bryant stopped Petitioner without reasonable articulable suspicion, Sergeant Bryant acted purposefully and flagrantly. Moreover, Petitioner states that Sergeant Bryant stopped him with the hope that the officer would discover an outstanding warrant or contraband because he never questioned Petitioner about the recent robberies, making his conduct even more flagrant. Petitioner lastly asserts that
[t]o permit the State to use evidence obtained in this fashion would simply encourage officers to begin stopping individuals without reasonable articulable suspicion to do so and with the sole intention of uncovering contraband, knowing that if it was revealed that the individual had an outstanding warrant any evidence recovered would not b e subject to the exclusionary rule despite their unlawful act of stopping the individual in the first place.
*215 Petitioner therefore concludes that suppression is the proper remedy.
The State contravenes Petitioner’s position on the basis that even if the stop were illegal, the existence and discovery of the warrant dissipates the taint. The State explains that this Court, by adopting the case law of the Supreme Court, has noted three methods by which evidence obtained after initial unlawful conduct can be purged of any taint. First, taint will be purged if the police would have inevitably or ultimately discovered the evidence notwithstanding a constitutional violation.
See Myers,
*217
We reject Petitioner’s contention as to this point and again agree with the State. As we stated
supra,
even if the police officer’s initial encounter with Petitioner was illegal, that fact would not be dispositive at this stage in our analysis. In
Myers v. State,
we analyzed the impact of an outstanding arrest warrant on an arguably unlawful stop by police officers and the application of the three factors under
Brown
for determining whether the causal connection had been sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal conduct. In
Myers,
a case factually similar to the case,
sub judice,
we held that, assuming
arguendo,
the initial stop by the police of Myers’s vehicle was illegal, the officer’s discovery of the outstanding warrant and arrest of Myers pursuant to that warrant was sufficient to remove the taint of the initial stop such that the subsequent search of Myers and his vehicle were lawful. In addition, we acknowledged that some of the evidence was seized almost immediately after the arrest, whereas some was seized some time later after the officer obtained the additional warrants. We reasoned, however, as the State asserts, in the instant ease, that “the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, especially because there was an outstanding arrest warrant discovered between the initial stop and the subsequent search incident to the arrest, even though some of the evidence was discovered shortly after the illegal stop.” Further, we explained that the discovery of the warrant for Myers’s arrest constituted an intervening circumstance or cause that attenuated the taint of the illegal stop. Ultimately, we looked to the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s conduct and determined that the purpose of the stop “was not to effectuate the arrest of Myers on an outstanding warrant or to search his vehicle. Merely because Officer Weikert’s stop of Myers was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.”
Myers,
In our application of Brown v. Illinois and Myers to the facts of this case, we focus our attention on the three factors articulated in Brown, supra.
The Temporal Proximity Factor
First, we examine the temporal proximity between the illegal stop and the evidence obtained. The stop and discovery of the marijuana were nearly contemporaneous in this case, which is likely not enough of a time lapse to attenuate the taint of the presumptively illegal stop, as Petitioner suggests. This factor suggests that the greater the time lapse between the illegality and discovery of evidence, the greater the chance that the taint has been purged. In the case
sub judice,
there existed a time lapse of merely two minutes. Neither the Supreme Court, nor this Court, has articulated an exact length of time that would guarantee that the taint had been purged, however, the time lapse between the illegal stop and discovery of evidence can hardly be less than it was here. Although, the two minute time lapse in this case, on the surface weighs in Petitioner’s favor, it is not, on its own, dispositive. The temporal proximity factor must depend, therefore, on other factors to which it relates, because a “lengthy detention can be used to exploit an illegal arrest at least as easily as a brief detention.”
Ferguson,
Because the temporal proximity factor has been labeled ambiguous and our observation in
Myers
that the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, we focus on the other two factors. This proposition has been echoed in other courts, including the Seventh Circuit in
Green,
where a period of only five minutes elapsed between the illegal stop and discovery of evidence.
See Green,
The Intervening Event Factor
We therefore turn our attention to the second factor to evaluate the existence of an intervening event. As we stated in
Myers,
*220 While Petitioner again cites lenco, this time for the proposition that a lawful arrest is not an intervening circumstance because the lenco court determined that it was not an intervening event, we must reject that argument as well. Petitioner’s argument lacks merit because lenco is distinguishable from the case sub judice on a significant point. The officers in lenco did not discover an outstanding warrant, as Sergeant Bryant did in this case; hence, lenco is inapposite. 9
The Flagrancy of the Police Conduct Factor
The third and final factor is the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. In this case, Sergeant Bryant testified that he stopped Petitioner because he and Martin loosely fit a witness’s description of the perpetrators of recent robberies. Sergeant Bryant also knew that the robberies had occurred in that area. There exists nothing in the record to suggest that the Sergeant acted in bad faith. As we stated in Myers, once Sergeant Bryant discovered the outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, he “gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search [Petitioner].” Furthermore, “[m]erely because [the Sergeant’s] stop of [Petitioner] was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.” Id.
A balance of the factors therefore demonstrates that the arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant sufficiently attenuates any taint caused by the arguably illegal stop. While only two minutes elapsed between the illegal stop and discovery of the marijuana, we have made clear that this factor alone is not *221 dispositive on the attenuation issue. The arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant constituted an intervening event, and nothing in the record suggests any flagrant misconduct by Sergeant Bryant when he stopped Petitioner and asked for identification. The other two factors therefore outweigh the temporal proximity factor.
Furthermore, we agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Green,111 F.3d 515 , 522 (1997):
Where a lawful arrest pursuant to a warrant constitutes the “intervening circumstance” (as in this case), it is an even more compelling case for the conclusion that the taint of the original illegality is dissipated. Typically, the intervening circumstance which dissipates the taint involves a voluntary act by the defendant, such as the voluntary confession or consent to search given after an illegal search or seizure. In intervening circumstance cases involving subsequent action on the defendant’s part, courts exercise great care in evaluating the later consent or confession to ensure it is truly voluntary and not the result of the earlier, and unconstitutional, police action .... In such cases, the dispositive question is whether the illegal act “bolstered the pressures for him to give the [statement], or at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination.... ” In these cases, the time between the illegality and the consent is important because the closer the time period, the more likely the consent was influenced by the illegality, or that the illegality was exploited. Conversely, where a lawful arrest due to an outstanding warrant is the intervening circumstance, consent (or any act for that matter) by the defendant is not required. Any influence the unlawful stop would have on the defendant’s conduct is irrelevant. And in the case of an arrest made pursuant to a warrant there is also no chance that the “police have exploited an illegal arrest by creating a situation in which [the] criminal response is predictable,” such as creating a situation where the criminal will flee, which in turn will give the *222 police an independent basis for an arrest, and thus a search incident to the arrest. Thus, in this case there is less “taint” than in the cases already recognized by the Supreme Court and this and other circuits as fitting within the intervening circumstances exception.
(Citations omitted.)
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Notes
. The phrases “intervening circumstance" and “intervening cause” will be used interchangeably through out this opinion.
. Petitioner presented the following issue in his petition for writ of certiorari:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that petitioner was the subject of a[ ] consensual encounter for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that petitioner was stopped by multiple *207 police officers who asked him for his identification, informed him that he "loosely fit" the description of a robbery suspect, and proceeded to run a warrant check on him while one of the officers remained by his side?
. The State presented the following question in its conditional cross-petition:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the State's attenuation argument was not preserved for appellate review?
. Moreover, even if the issues were not preserved, this Court has, and the Court of Special Appeals had, the discretion to review the intervening circumstance argument pursuant to Rule 8-131. Maryland Rule 8-131, entitled “Scope of review,” states, in pertinent part:
(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.
See Dorsey v. Tarpley,
. Petitioner explains that in lenco officers responded to a call concerning a disturbance in a building and saw lenco leaving upon their arrival. After questioning lenco, the officers took his wallet and driver's license and placed him in the backseat of the patrol car while the officers continued their investigation. lenco was subsequently arrested and taken to the police station. Several hours later, the police searched the patrol car and discovered a key to a minivan, which police later *214 searched and recovered incriminating evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that lenco was unlawfully arrested when placed in the backseat of the patrol car while the police continued their investigation. The court then determined that the legal arrest was not an intervening event that cut off the causal connection between the illegal detention and van search, noting that lenco could have left the key in the minivan during the period of the illegal detention in the car.
. In
United States v. Green,
.
See Myers v. State,
. We note that if Petitioner abandoned the marijuana on the ground, then he could not later claim that seizure of that substance was illegal and, therefore, inadmissible against him in court. It is well settled that "Fourth Amendment protection, however, does not extend to property that is abandoned. By abandoning property, the owner relinquishes the legitimate expectation of privacy that triggers Fourth Amendment protection.”
Stanberry v. State,
. Of additional consequence, as the State points out, is that the
lenco
court specifically noted that, "the interval between the police misconduct and the acquisition of evidence is not itself dispositive and must be considered along with any intervening circumstances,” and then cited to
Green,
where it had held that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant constitutes an intervening circumstance.
Ienco,