100 Pa. 249 | Pa. | 1882
delivered the opinion of the court, May 22d 1882.
The plaintiff avers that he was induced to purchase the lease, good will and fixtures of a stable, by false and fraudulent representations by the defendant. His action is upon an alleged tort; not upon a contract. To support it, he must show that the representation was untrue; was known by the defendant to be untrue; was calculated to induce the plaintiff to act; and he, believing it, was induced to act accordingly. The representation must have been both false and fraudulent. A positive statement of a falsehood, or suppression of material facts which the plaintiff ought to have known, would constitute the falsity. As one of the questions relates to the defendant’s good faith, if the jury believed that he honestly believed what he stated was true, the action M'ould fail; for in such case the representation was not fraudulent. And if the plaintiff knew the truth of the matter, he was not induced to purchase by the false rej>resentation.
In case for deceit, it is somewhat material that its requisites be established, and if any essential point be wanting, the plaintiff ought not to recover. Upon judgment in such action against the defendant, he is not entitled to the benefit of the statutes exempting property from execution for debt, and if he has no property, he may be arrested and imprisoned. That the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff upon contract, should not be used as a malce-weight against him in a suit for his tort.
The evidence tended to show, and the jury must have found, that the defendant had made a prior sale of part of the property to Ranalls, who was in possession at the time the plaintiff purchased. Rut there was also evidence tending to show that the sale to Ranalls was conditioned upon his giving security, which he failed to do. If the plaintiff believed that because of Ranalls’ failure to perform the condition, the contract with him had ended, he was not guilty of deceit, though he might be answerable for breach of contract, if he failed to give possession to the plaintiff. The court affirmed the defendant’s third point, “If plaintiff knew of the claim of ownership made by Ranalls to the stable before he purchased "from .defendant, then under the pleadings in the case, the plaintiff cannot recover.” We are not persuaded that the words added to its affirmance, “ if you find that he knowingly bought it,” did any injury, and the fourth assignment of error is not sustained.
The fifth and sixth assignments embrace the defendants fifth point and the answer thereto: “ That even if the defendant promised to return the purchase money after the sale to the
For the errors set out in the fifth and sixth assignments, the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed and venire facias de novo awarded.