MEMORANDUM OPINION
Grаnting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment! Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, the parents of T.C., a minor child with special needs, seek to recover from Defendant, the District of Columbia (“the District”), * the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during their administrative proceeding against the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) under the Individuals with Disabilities'Education Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et. seq. Plaintiffs seek over $50,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs billed by their attorney, Elizabeth Jester, over the course of almost two years. The parties agree that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in the administrative proceedings, but the District disputes the reasonableness of their requested fees' and argues that the Court should apply a reduced hourly rate. The Court holds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate .either that the full USAO Laffey Matrix rates sought by Plaintiffs are the prevailing market rates for IDEA litigar tion, or that the underlying due process proceedings were sufficiently complex to warrant the award of full USAO Laffey Matrix rates. The Court therefore' concludes that only some of Plaintiffs’ requested fees are reasonable and reduces Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees accordingly. The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and denies it in part, and grants Defendant’s .cross-motion for summary judgment in part and denies it in part.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In February 2015, Plaintiffs Thomas Cox, Sr. and Delores Lewis, filed an administrative due process complaint against DCPS under the IDEA, because they felt DCPS was not meeting the special education needs of their son, T.C. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs alleged that DCPS denied T.C. the free and appropriate public education he was entitled to under the IDEA. See -Pis;’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1
An administrative due process hearing was set for April 2015, but- had to be rescheduled to the next month, because. Plaintiffs had a personal emergency. Compl. ¶4; Hearing Officer Determination at 2. After the hearing, Hearing Officer Michael Lazan (“the Hearing Officer”), awarded Plaintiffs most of the relief they sought. The Hearing Officer ordered DCPS to modify T.C.’s IEP to include specialized instruction, provide a psychoe-ducational assessment, and convene an IEP team to review the assessment and “formulate an appropriate program” for T.C. Hearing Officer Determination at 18.
In February 2016, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Elizabeth Jester, submitted an application for payment of attorneys’ fees to DCPS under the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA. Compl. ¶ 5; Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J„ Ex. 2, ECF No. 7-5. As of the filing of the complaint on September 7, 2016, Plaintiffs had not received any payment from the District. Compl. ¶ 5.
In support of their claim for attorneys’ fees, Plaintiffs filed the affidavits of four attorneys who frequently represent clients involved in IDEA litigation. See Verified Statement, of Douglas Tyrka (“Tyrka Aff.”), ECF No. 7-11; Verified Statement of Diana M. Savit (“Savit Aff.”), ECF No. 7-12; Verified Statement of Domiento C.R. Hill (“Hill Aff.”), ECF.No, 7-13; Verified Statement of Alana -Hecht (“Hecht Aff.”), ECF No. 7-14. These affidavits provide information on the practitioners’ IDEA litigation experience, their perceived complexity of the proceedings, and their hourly rates charged. Plaintiffs’ first affiant, Douglas Tyrka, states that his firm has billed DCPS for hundreds of cases, and each bill has requested the full rate in the USAO Laffey matrix. Tyrka Aff. ¶ 13. The' second affiant states that she bills the same amount for IDEA cases and non-IDEA cases, and that IDEA cases are “at least as complex as employment discrimination and commercial dispute work.” Sav-it Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. The third affiant states that he has “restricted [himjself’ to charging seventy-five percent of the USAO Laffey matrix rates, because his firm values speedy recovery of fees over the prospect of full Laffey rates. Hill Aff. ¶ 14. The final affiant cited by Plaintiffs states that she is “typically awarded at least $270.00 per hour for [her] IDEA work.” Hecht Aff. ¶ 13.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under the IDEA, “every child with a disability in this -country is entitled to a
The IEP is the “primary vehicle” for implementing the IDEA. Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia,
When the parents of a student with a disability are dissatisfied with a school district or agency’s “identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), the IDEA entitles them to an “impartial due process hearing,” id. § 1415(f). If a hearing officer finds that a school district or agency denied a child a FAPE, he may award, among other remedies, compensatory education, which is “educational services ... to be provided prospectively to compensate for a past deficient program.” Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia,
Under the IDEA, prevailing parties in the administrative proceedings are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees'' and costs. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The Laffey Matrix is a fee schedule used in some cases to determine reasonаble hourly rates for legal work. See generally Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
V. ANALYSIS
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the amount of attorneys’ fees owed to Plaintiffs. See Pis.’ P. & A. Supp. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 7-2; Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 8.
Under the IDEA, a district court may award “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Thus, in cases like this, courts use a two-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whether the party seeking attorney’s fees is the prevailing party, and second, the court must determine whether the requested fees are reasonable. See Jackson v. District of Columbia,
A. Prevailing Party
Plaintiffs argue that they were the prevailing parties in the underlying administrative due process proceedings. Compl. ¶ 4; Pis.’ Statement ¶ 4, ECF No. 7-1. The District does not dispute Plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties. Defi’s Resp. Pis.’ Statement ¶ 4, ECF No. 8-1. The Court agrees with the parties.
In District of Columbia v. Straus, the Court of Appeals applied a
Here, the Hearing Officer found that DCPS denied T.C. a FAPE, altering the relationship between the parties and satisfying the first prong of Straus. See Hearing Officer Determination at 12. As for the second and third prongs, the Hearing Officer awardеd Plaintiffs nearly all the relief they sought and entered an Order in Plaintiffs’ favor, requiring DCPS to make various adjustments in T.C.’s IEP. Hearing Officer Determination at 17-18. Therefore, Plaintiffs obtained a favorable judgment and declaratory relief. Taken together, Plaintiffs were indeed the prevailing parties in the due process hearing. The Court thus proceeds to determine the appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs award.
B. Appropriate Fee Award
As the prevailing parties in the administrative proceedings, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees at the full applicable USAO Laffey Matrix rates because they allege that these rates are the prevailing market rates for IDEA litigation. Jester Deck ¶¶ 10-12, ECF No. 7-7;r see Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 5-15; J & W Invoice. The District contends that Plaintiffs have failed to show that full Laffey Matrix rates are the prevailing fee rates in the IDEA litigation community. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 5-7. Instead, the District argues, the Court should reduce the Plaintiffs’ fee award by twenty-five percent given that the USAO Laffey Matrix applies to complex federal litigation, not IDEA proceedings, and that this is the position taken by an “overwhelming majority’-’ of the courts in this circuit. Def/s Mot. Summ. J. at 10 & n.2, 12-14. The Court agrees with the District.
When plaintiffs succeed in their administrative IDEA actions, the Court, “in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). Under the IDEA, the fee award “shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” Id, § 1416(i)(3)(C). If the Court finds that the requested attorneys’ fees “unreasonably exceed[ ] the hourly rate prevailing in' the community for similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation,. and experience," the Court “shall reduce” any attorneys’ fees awarded accordingly. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(ii).
In Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel (“SOCM”),
1. Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs argue that the attorneys’ fees and costs they seek are reasonable given the number of hours that Ms. Jester billed and her hourly rate. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 3. Ms. Jester, they claim, should receive the full Laffey rate because of her “modest and reasonable” billing practices, her over thirty-five years’ experience and specialized knowledge of the practice area, and because it represents the prevailing market rate in the IDEA litigation community. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 3-6. The District does not dispute either the number of hours that Plaintiffs’ counsel billed or her billing practices. See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. However, the District argues that Ms. Jester’s hourly rate is unreasonable because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that full USAO Laffey Matrix rates are the prevailing rates in the IDEA community. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 9-11. The District asserts that the underlying due process prоceedings were not sufficiently complex as to warrant an award of full USAO Laffey Matrix rates and thus contends that seventy-five percent of those rates is more appropriate. Def.’s. Mot. Summ. J.’ at 12-14. The Court agrees with the District and reduces Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees by twenty-five percent.
To determine the reasonableness of an hourly rate, the Court must evaluate three sub-elements: (1) “the attorneyt’s] billing practices,” (2) “the attorneyt’s] skill, experience, and reputation,” and (3) “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Covington v. District of Columbia,
Courts must “fix[ ] the prevailing hourly rate in each particular case with a fair degree of accuracy.” Nat'l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def.,
Fee applicants may submit a relevant attorneys’ fee matrix, which serves.as “‘a useful starting point’ in calculating the prevailing market rate.” Eley,
Plaintiffs provide five justifications for their request for the Laffey Matrix rate. First, they produce affidavits from other IDEA practitioners describing their hourly rates. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 7-8, ECF No. 7-2. Second, Plaintiffs argue that this casе is uniquely complex. Id. at 9-15. Third, Plaintiffs cite cases—which they contend are similar to this one—where attorneys have received the rates they sought, including some awards at Laffey Matrix rates. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 9-15. Fourth, Plaintiffs provide the United States’s Statement of Interest filed in Eley, which discusses the various Laffey matrices. Id. at 8-9; Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 12 (“Statement of Interest”), ECF No. 7-15. Fifth, Plaintiffs urge the Court to consider the District’s delay in paying attorneys’ fees as a factor supporting higher rates. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 16-17. The Court addresses each of Plaintiffs’ five arguments in turn.
a. Affidavits
Plaintiffs provide, in addition to their own attorney’s affidavit, affidavits from four other IDEA practitioners. These affidavits describe the practitioners’ experience and skills, and the difficulties of IDEA litigation. See generally Tyrka Aff.; Savit Aff.; Hill Aff.; Hecht Aff. The District argues that these affidavits are unhelpful in determining the appropriate hourly rate, because they do not sufficiently explain how IDEA litigation is complex in the context of broader federal litigation, nor do they provide the hourly rates actually recovered by the affiant attorneys. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8-9. The Court agrees with the District’s arguments, and thus holds that the affidavits do not justify Plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to full Laffey Matrix rates.
As outlined above, IDEA plaintiffs requesting a particular hourly rate may support their requested hourly rate by providing “affidavits. reciting the precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases.” Eley,
Of Plaintiffs’ four affiants, three do not provide the specific rates that they typically receive; they only state how much they charge. One affiant mentions that his firm bills аt the applicable LSI Laffey rate, not that he typically receives or is awarded this amount. Tyrka Aff. ¶ 13.
Three out of four affidavits that Plaintiffs provided thus do not help the Court in determimng the prevailing community rate for IDEA litigation, because they lack any indication of the “precise fees” that the practitioners have “received.” See Eley,
The sole affiant who actually mentiоns the amount of fees that she charges and has received states that she is “typically awarded at least $270.00 per hour” for IDEA litigation. See Hecht Aff. at ¶ 13. But a $270.00 hourly rate is only eighty-three percent of the applicable Laffey Matrix rate. See USAO Attorney’s Fees Martrix—2015-2016 (setting a $325.00 hourly rate for attorneys with four to five years of experience); Hecht Aff. ¶ 3 (indicating that Ms. Hecht has been litigating IDEA cases “since 2010,” and that, as such, she had five years of experience in 2015 when she executed the verified statement). Thus, Ms. Hecht’s affidavit does not support Plaintiffs’ proposed Laffey Matrix rate. If anything, the affidavit undermines Plaintiffs’ proposal'by showing that prevailing community rates may indeed be less than those contained in the USAO Laffey Matrix. Regardless, the declaration of one practitioner alone is insufficient to establish the prevailing market rates for IDEA litigation. See, e.g., Flood,
> Taken together, the affidavits cited by Plaintiffs are alone insufficient to justify their contention that Laffey Matrix rates are comparable to rates prevailing in the community for similar services in IDEA litigation.
b. Complexity
Plaintiffs state that their attorney charged full Laffey Mhtrix rates" because of the complexity of IDEA litigation. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 9-15;' Jester" Decl. ¶¶ 22-23; see also Tyrka Aff. ¶¶ 5-8; Shvit Aff. ¶¶6-11; Hill Aff. ¶¶4-7;--Hecht Aff.
Courts in this district generally do not recognize IDEA litigation as complex when it comes to fee awards. See, e.g., Flores v. District of Columbia,
Plaintiffs fail to show that their underlying administrative proceedings were sufficiently complex to warrant Laf-fey Matrix rates. Supporting their idea that they were, Plaintiffs state that “[DCPS] disclosed 7 witnesses to testify at the hearing and 15 [ejxhibits with over 80 pages,” Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 10; that “Plaintiffs’ administrative hearing record involved. 33 exhibits totaling over 260 pages,” Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 10; and that the. proceeding “required knowledge of the procedural rules, the substantive rules and, more importantly a working knowledge of the complex educationаl issues and the factors underlying/comprising [T.C.’s] complex disability of autism and how [T.C.’s] needs could be appropriately addressed,” Pis,’ Mot. Summ.' J. at 13. And, as previously mentiohed, Plaintiffs’ affiants state that IDEA litigation requires “specialized non-legal knowledge,” Tyrka Aff. ¶ 5, Savit Aff. ■ ¶ 7, Hill Aff. ¶ 5, Hecht Aff. ¶ 5, involves limited discovery, Tyrka Aff/¶ 7, Savit Aff. ¶ 8, Hill Aff. ¶ 6, Hecht Aff. ¶ 6, entails the lack of advanced notice
Rather than differentiate this case from a run-of-the-mill IDEA case, Plaintiffs list attributes that are common to many IDEA cases. Indeed, Plaintiffs identify characteristics that were present in other cases where courts in this district have awarded fees using rates equivalent to seventy-five present of Laffey Matrix rates. See, e:g., Platt,
c. Case Law
To further support their argument that they are entitled to full USAO Laffey Matrix rates, Plaintiffs cite to cases where courts have awarded fees at similar rates. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 7, 14 In the cases that Plaintiffs cite, the courts found the facts sufficiently complex to warrant full USAO Laffey Matrix rates. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 11-13. With respect to four of the cases,
IDEA Plaintiffs may show that their requested hourly rate is reasonable through “evidence of recent fees awarded by the courts ... to attorneys with comparable qualifications handling similar cases.” Eley,
As a baseline matter, the cases cited by Plaintiffs are the exception, not the rule. In this district, “an overwhelming number” of cases awarding IDEA fees adopt rates equivalent to seventy-five percent of Laf-fey Matrix rates. Platt v. District of Columbia,
Four of the cases that Plaintiffs cite provide limited support for their position because they do not involve “similar services” to those performed by Plaintiffs’ counsel here. Eley,
As outlined above, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their case is unusually complex compared to ordinary IDEA due process prpceedings, and they have not shown that their case is similar to the unusually complex cases they cite—Cox, Garvin, Gaston, and Bucher. Plaintiffs presented three witnesses and the District presented none.
Additionally, in three of the five cases cited by Plaintiffs as evidence for an award of full USAO Laffey Matrix rates—Garvin, Bucher, and Cox—the plaintiffs sought fees at hourly rates below the applicable USAO Laffey Matrix rate. Garvin,
The final case cited by Plaintiffs, Holbrook, is a 2004 case in which Judge Kes-
The cases cited by Plaintiffs are insufficient to show that 'full USAO Laffey Matrix rates are the prevailing market rates for IDEA litigation, especially in light of the “overwhelming”, .authority pointing to the seventy-five percent rate.
d. Statement of Interest of the United States
As evidence supporting their argument for full -Laffey rate fees, Plaintiffs also include the Statement of Interest filed by the United States in Eley v. District of Columbia, No. 11-309 (BAH) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 7, 2011).
e. Delay in Payment
For their final argument, Plaintiffs cite to the District’s delay in payment up to this point to support its claim to full Laffey rates. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 16-17. They argue that the Court should at least award fees at a higher rate than one at which the fees were incurred. Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 16-17. Outside of the IDEA context, some courts have acknowledged that delay in payment may be an appropriate factor to consider in determining fee rates. See Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel. Agyei,
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In short, Plaintiffs have not shown that full USAO Laffey Matrix rates “are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services,” and thus' have not shown that they are entitled to such an award from the Court. Eley,
The Court calculates Plaintiffs’ total attorneys’ fees by first adopting the applicable Laffey Matrix rates.
The District argues that Plaintiffs have not proven that paralegals in IDEA administrative,proceedings are entitled to the full USAO Laffey Matrix rates, and advocates that the Court should instead award seventy-five, percent of the Laffey paralegal rates. Def.’s Mot. Summ;.J, at 14. Ms. Jester states that her paralegal “has formal training .,. and has worked with [her] ,., for-approximately 19 years,” Jester Decl.- ¶ 14. The Court sees no reason that the Court’s analysis above does not also apply to an IDEA paralegal. See, e.g., Briggs v. District of Columbia,
C. Appropriate Cost Award
In its cross-motion for summary judgment, the District argues 'that Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of costs not permitted under the IDEA. See Def.’s Mót. Summ. J. at 15-17. The District specifically contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel" billed travel time at twice the legally permitted amount,
An attorney “is entitled to all expenses associated with the litigation that [she] would normally expect to pass on to fee paying clients,” so long as the costs are reasonable. Holbrook v. District of Columbia,
1. Travel Costs
Plaintiffs seek recovery of Ms. Jester’s travel time at a rate of fifty percent of her hourly rate. See J & W Invoice. The District argues that the Court should reduce Ms. Jester’s travel rate to fifty percent of “the hourly rate deemed appropriate by this Court.” Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 16. The Court concludes that Ms. Jester’s travel' time should be awarded at a rate of fifty percent of seventy-five percent of the applicable USAO Laffey Matrix rates.
“In [the D.C.] Circuit, travel time generally is compensated at no more than half the attorney’s appropriate hourly rate.” Blackman v. District of Columbia,
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s invoice shows that she billed travel time at half of the full Laffey rate. See J & W Invoice at 2-3, 6-8, 11-12, ECF No. 7-6. Because Plaintiffs have already appropriately reduced the travel costs to half of their proposed hourly rate, the Court will only reduce the hourly rate for the travel costs by an additional twenty-five percent to reflect the change in the hourly rate outlined above. This yields the same amount as fifty percent of seventy-five percent of the applicable full USAO Laffey Matrix rates, which is the appropriate reimbursement rate tor travel costs. See, e.g., Blackman,
2. ■ Mileage and Parking
Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for Ms. Jester’s mileage costs at a rate of fifty-eight cents per mile, which is “the rate paid by [the] D.C. Superior Court.” Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 15, The District disputes Plaintiffs’ mileage charges and argues that it should not be “responsible for subsidizing [Ms. Jester’s] travel from her office in Great Falls, Virginia.” Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 17. The District states that Plaintiffs should absorb this cost because there “is no basis for payment of this cost under the IDEA,” Id. The Court finds that Plaintiffs should be reimbursed for mileage costs, but concludes that the appropriate reimbursement rate is that promulgated by the U.S. . General Services Administration (“GSA”)- and adjusts -Plaintiffs’ mileage award accordingly. And because the Dis
Plaintiffs’ counsel states that her firm normally charges the mileage expenses described in this case. See Jester Decl. ¶ 17. These charges appear to the Court to be reasonable. Courts in this district, including this Court, have previously awarded Ms. Jester similar mileage costs. See, e.g., Briggs,
Ms. Jester states that the mileage rate she charges—fifty-eight cents per mile—is “endorsed by the federal government and D.C. Superior Court.” Jester Deck ¶ 17. Although this may be the rate used at Superior Court, see Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19, ECF No. 7-22, the federal government’s mileage rate is promulgated by the GSA and fluctuates over time, POV Mileage Rates (Archived), U.S. General Services Administration, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103969 (last reviewed Dec. 27, 2016). All the mileage for which Ms. Jester has invoiced DCPS accrued in 2015 at which time the GSA mileage rate for privately owned automobiles was $0,575. The Court will therefore award Ms. Jester’s mileage costs at the GSA rate, for a total of $118.45.
3. Photocopying, Faxing, and Postage
Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of twenty-five cents per page of photocopying and faxing. In support of their argument, they cite to the rate often awarded at D.C. Superior Court of twenty-five cents per page. Defendants argue that the Court should reimburse Plaintiffs at a rate of fifteen cents per page because the rate that Plaintiffs seek has been found excessive by other courts in this district. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 17.
As previously stated, “[c]osts for.copying, faxing, and postage” are customarily awarded in IDEA fee litigation. McClam,
Beyond asserting that twenty-five cents per page is the rate awarded by the D.C. Superior Court and listing the typical elements required to make photocopies, such as “paper, toner, and electricity,” Plaintiffs provide no explanation for why their rate exceeds the fifteen cents per page ratio used in this circuit. See Johnson,
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Taken together, the Court will award $38,527.88 in attorneys’ fees and $2,577.85 in costs. The total amount of Plaintiffs’ fee award is $41,105.73.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Notes
. Because the District filed its motion and memorandum of points and authorities as one document, thus creating some duplicative page numbers, the Court utilizes the ECF document page numbers when referring to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.
. Douglas Tyrka’s affidavit briefly mentions the fees that he received through two settlements with DCPS, in which DCPS paid Mr. Tyrka most of what he requested using LSI Laffey Matrix rates. See Tyrka Aff. ¶ 15. Although evidence of prevailing community rates may include "evidence of recent fees awarded ... through settlement,” Eley,
. In his 2015 affidavit, Plaintiffs’ affiant Dom-iento Hill stated that "99[ ] percent of [his] current legal work is in the field of IDEA law in the District of Columbia,” that his practice of billing clients at seventy-five percent of the Laffey billing rates is done out of necessity, and that continuing to bill at that rate will force him to close his practice. Hill Aff. ¶¶ 3, 10-11, 13-14. The Court notes that it does not appear as though Mr. Hill has been forced to close down his practice. In fact, as recently as July 16, 2017, Mr. Hill brought a case in this district to recover fees under the IDEA. See Cook v. District of Columbia, 17-cv-1407 (CKK), (D.D.C. 2017). Courts have defined market rates as those that are adequate to "attract competent counsel.” See Reed v. D.C.,
. The Court notes that the declarant-attorneys in Plaintiffs' affidavits state that their practices -are struggling in part because they do not receive full Laffey Matrix rates and LSI Laffey Matrix rates. See, e.g., Hecht Aff. ¶ 14 ("If all judges .., were to award ... 75% of the Unitеd States Attorney’s Office version of the ‘Laffey matrix,' I would likely be forced to leave my current practice and either work only for paying clients or find entirely different work.”). But to the extent that the attorneys rely on a public interest in granting them larger fee1 awards, see, e.g., Savit'Aff. ¶ (explaining that given the uncertainty of full Laf-fey Matrix rates recovery she has been forced to only accept work from paying clients, thus detrimentally affecting the "low-income clients who need contingent fee lawyers .., the most' .., because the system ... [has] treat[ed] them particularly poorly due to their limited resources”), another public interest favors smaller fee awards: public education itself. “[I]nflated fee awards are far from harmless; they produce windfalls to attorneys at the expense of public education.” Price v. District of Columbia,
. Because the D.C, Circuit has not yet ruled on the categorical approach-to determining the applicability of Laffey Matrix rates or a fixed percentage thereof, this Court continues to reject such an approach and determines fee awards on a case-by-case basis. See Eley,
: The courts in Garvin v. District of Columbia,
.
.
.
.
.No. 14-1249,
. .Bucher predates the D.C. Circuit's Eley decision, issued in 2015. See Bucher, 777 F.Supp.2d 69 (issued Apr. 11, 2011), As such, the Bucher Court partially awarded Laffey rates because it relied on the fact that the District failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify its proposed DCPS guideline rates.
. The Court recognizes Plaintiffs’ argument that their counsel was required to prepare for cross-examination of the District’s witnesses, even if, at the hearing, the District chose not to call any witnesses. However, the District listed only six or seven witnesses, see Jester Decl. ¶ 22 (stating six); Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J, (stating seven). This number is considerably lower than in cases where courts have found the number of witnesses significant. See, e.g., Garvin,
. .Ms, Jester rendered the legal services in 2002, but fees were not awarded until 2004.
. In addition to the cases cited in Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and subsequent filings, the Court considered the cases set forth in Plaintiffs.’ "Notice of Recent Case,” ECF No, 14. The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not change the Court's reasoning. In Wimbish v. District of Columbia, the plaintiff filed two due process complaints, attended multiple proceedings, filed for a preliminary . injunction in federal court, and had to brief a novel issue—what percentage of the student’s private school education DCPS was required to fund. No. 15-1429,
. The Court notes that the Statement of Interest is incomplete as filed. The original filing in Eley v. District of Columbia, No. 11-309, ECF No. 49, contains two exhibits—the Declaration of Dr. Laura A. Malowane and the Declaration of Joseph A. Yablonski—both of which were omitted from Plaintiffs’ filing. Compare Eley, No. 11-309, ECF No. 49 with Pis.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 12, ECF No. 7-15. Dr. Malowane’s Declaration seemingly undercuts Plaintiffs’ request for full Laffey Matrix rates in that it indicates that based on the market survey attached thereto, the prevailing market rate was below the USAO Laffey Matrix rate. See Eley, No. 11-309, ECF No. 49-1 ¶ 63 (concluding that "the prevailing hourly rate ... is between $390 and $512[, which] ... is slightly lower than the $520 rate indicated by the USAO Laffey Matrix”); see also Taylor v. District of Columbia,
. Ms. Jester has been a practicing attorney since 1980. Jester Decl. ¶ 2. Accordingly, she had thirty-six years of experience at the time Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment in 2016. See PL’s Mot. Summ. J. (filed Dec. 23, 2016). Ms. Jester's applicable hourly rates are as follows: (1) $520 under the 2014-15 Laffey Matrix, see 2014-15 Laffey Matrix, (2) $568 under the 2015-2016 Laffey Matrix, see 2015-2016 Laffey Matrix, and (3) $581 under the 2016-2017 Laffey Matrix, see 2016-2017 Laffey Matrix.
. Ms. Jester’s reduced hourly rates are $390.00 for 2014-2015, $426.00 for 2015-2016, and $435.75 for 2016-2017;
. Ms. Jester reports 96 hours of compensa-ble work on Plaintiffs’ case, which the District does not challenge. See J & W Invoice at 1-13; Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 1-18. Ms. Jester performed 71.5 of the hours during the period governed by the 2014-15 Laffey Matrix. See 2014—15 Laffey Matrix (setting 2014-15 Laffey Matrix rates for the period between June 1, 2014 and May 31, 2015); J & W Invoice at 1-8 (listing work performed between Dеc. 1, 2014 and May 27, 2015). She performed 21.5 of the hours during the period governed by the 2015-2016 Laffey Matrix. See 2015-2016 Laffey Matrix (setting 2015-2016 Laffey Matrix rates for the period between June 1, 2015 and May 31, 2016); J & W Invoice at 8-13 (listing work performed between June 1, 2015 and Feb. 17, 2016). Lastly, Ms. Jester performed 3.0 of the hours during the period governed by the 2016-2017 Laffey Matrix. See 2016-2017 Laffey Matrix, (setting 2016-2017 Laffey Matrix rates for the period between June 1, 2016 and May 31, 2017); J & W Invoice at 13 (listing work performed between July 28, 2016 and Sept. 2, 2016).
. At the time the work was performed, in August 2016, Ms. Jester’s paralegal’s rate was $157. Reduced by twenty-five percent, the paralegal rate is $117.75, This rate multiplied by the 1.5 hours invoiced yields $176.63,
. The District initially contended that Plaintiffs are seeking reimbursement for travel costs at the full hourly rate, see Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 15, but later corrected itself by stating that Plaintiffs’ counsel billed her travel time at half the USAO Laffey Matrix rate, id. at 16."
. See supra note 20.
. Four of Ms. Jester’s travel time entries were billed between January 2015 and May 2015, and two were billed in August 2015. The Court therefore applies the 2014-2015 USAO Laffey rate ($520) to the first four entries, reduces it by fifty percent to reflect the appropriate hourly rate for trаvel time ($260), and reduces it once more by twenty-five percent to yield $195. Multiplying 6.4 hours by $195 yields $1,248. For the last two travel time entries, the Court applies the 2015-2016 USAO Laffey rate ($568), reduces it by fifty percent to reflect the appropriate hourly rate for travel time ($284), and reduces it once more by twenty-five percent to yield $213. Multiplying 4.0 hours by $213 yields $852. Thus, the total travel costs the Court will award are $2,100.
. Additionally, the District does not contest Plaintiffs entitlement to the reimbursement of parking charges, which are customarily included in attorneys’ fees awards. See DeLa Cruz,
. Additionally, the District does not dispute Plaintiffs’ postage charges. Because these charges are reasonable and are typically included in IDEA litigation fee awards, the Court will also award Plaintiffs the $1.80 sought for postage.
. If Plaintiffs choose to file a timely request for an additional award of fees, as compensation for the time and effort that their attorney reasonably expended in seeking their award of attorneys’ feеs, the Court will entertain such a motion at that time. See Compl. at 3 (requesting an "[a]ward to Plaintiffs, pursuant to IDEA, [of] the attorney fees and costs incurred by virtue of the instant lawsuit”); see also Kaseman v. District of Columbia,