{¶ 2} Alfred and Toni married in February 1980 and two children were born as issue of the marriage.
{¶ 3} In April 2004, Toni filed for divorce and requested spousal support. Both children were emancipated as of the date of the filing. Additionally, Toni moved for temporary spousal support and exclusive use of the marital residence.
{¶ 4} In May 2004, Alfred counter-claimed for divorce. Subsequently, the magistrate issued a temporary order granting Toni exclusive use of the marital residence and held the issue of spousal support in abeyance.
{¶ 5} In September 2004, the case was placed on inactive status because the parties jointly filed for bankruptcy. *3
{¶ 6} In February 2005, the case resumed active status.
{¶ 7} In March 2005, the trial court held a hearing, during which the parties stipulated to disposition of all matters in the case except the issue of spousal support.
{¶ 8} In April 2005, each party filed a spousal support statement with accompanying documentation. The parties did not dispute that the duration of the marriage was twenty-five years; that each party had a public retirement account; that the parties were in good mental and physical condition; that the children were emancipated; that the parties had a moderate standard of living; that each party had a high school education; and, that an award of spousal support would not have any tax consequences. However, the parties disputed Alfred's annual income and Toni's earning capacity.
{¶ 9} In his statement, Alfred submitted that his gross annual income for 2005 would be $32,658. Alfred obtained this figure by multiplying his hourly pay rate of $12.00 by forty hours per week by fifty-two weeks, excluding overtime, for a base income of $24,960.00. Alfred then added his income as a township trustee of $7,698.00 to his base income. Regarding his trustee income, Alfred provided that "[u]ntil he does not choose to run for re-election or until he is fired, his Township Trustee compensation is $7,698.00. As a result, $32,658.00 is his true measure of income of which $7,698.00 is subject to re-election or choosing to *4 continue to be an elected official." (Alfred's April 2005 Statement, p. 2). Additionally, Alfred stated that Toni's income should be estimated at $18,720.00 instead of between $14,000 and $15,000 because she only worked during the school calendar year and could obtain work in the summer months; that Toni has health insurance through her employer, but Alfred does not; and, that neither party lost income production based upon his or her marital responsibilities.
{¶ 10} In her statement, Toni submitted that Alfred's gross annual income for 2005 would be $40,500.00 and that hers would be $14,877.72. Toni calculated Alfred's income by extrapolating his gross income earned during his full-time job from January 2005 through March 2005 to the remainder of the year, which yielded $32,802.00.1 Toni then added Alfred's annual income earned from his trustee position, $7,698.00, to the 2005 income extrapolation to derive a total gross income of $40,500.00. Additionally, Toni provided that she was a homemaker and cafeteria worker and had stayed home as the primary caretaker of the children during the marriage; that, had she not done so, her earning capacity would have been greater; and, that her likelihood of obtaining employment with any significant medical or retirement benefits was marginal. *5
{¶ 11} In August 2005, the trial court bifurcated the issues of divorce and spousal support and entered the judgment of final divorce. The judgment provided that the parties owned no real estate;2 that the marital debt had been discharged in bankruptcy; that the parties divided their personal property; that Toni would retain the car titled in her name; that Alfred would retain the truck titled in his name; and, that the parties would retain their respective retirement accounts. Additionally, Alfred filed a supplemental spousal support statement, in which he provided that Toni inappropriately extrapolated his income for 2005 based upon his pay stubs from January through March 2005. Alfred argued that, because he worked some overtime during the first two months of the year doing inventory, but would not have substantial overtime the remainder of the year, use of his hourly pay rate to extrapolate his 2005 income would be more appropriate.
{¶ 12} In June 2006, the trial court issued its judgment entry, in which it ordered that Alfred pay Toni $100 per week. In doing so, the trial court provided that Toni was 49 years of age; that Toni worked as a school cook and earned $14,877.72 in 2004; that Toni had health insurance coverage and SERS retirement; that Alfred was 47 years of age; that Alfred worked three part-time jobs, was a township trustee, and earned $34,820.78 in 2004; that Alfred now had one full-time job earning $12.00 per hour and retained his trustee position; that the *6 marital debt was discharged in bankruptcy; and, that Toni was "largely a stay-at-home mother and homemaker during the children's minority." (June 2006 Judgment Entry, p. 1). In determining the parties' 2005 income, the trial court explained:
[Toni] believes that spousal support of $150.00 per week ($7800.00 annually) is appropriate. She believes that [Alfred's] income, based on extrapolating his salary from January to March 2005, and adding his trustee salary, is close to $40,000.00. Such an award would give [Alfred] annual income of $32,700.00 and [Toni] annual income of $22,677.72.
[Alfred] proposes spousal support of $150.00 per month ($1800.00 annually) for three years. He believes [Toni] can earn extra income by working at another job during the school breaks and he believes $18,000 annually is a fair figure for her earning capacity. He further states that his annual income is about $25,000.00 from [his employment] (at $12.00 per hour) and $7698.00 from [his] Union Township [trustee position]. There is no guarantee that [Alfred] will be reelected to his trustee position. Using [Alfred's] spousal support figure, his annual income would be $30,898.00 [after the $1800.00 spousal support award] and [Toni's] annual income would be $19,800.00.
The Court adopts part of each argument. [Toni] should be able to secure part-time or seasonal employment during the school's summer breaks and the annual figure of $18,000.00 should be the starting point for any analysis. [Alfred's] income for spousal support computation purposes should be $32,698.00. A spousal support award of $100.00 per week ($5200.00 annually) would give [Alfred] annual income of $27,498.00 and [Toni] would have annual income of $23,200.00, assuming she acquired additional work in the summer months.
Based on the arguments presented, and reviewing the factors contained in R.C.
3105.18 , the Court ORDERS spousal support *7 in the amount of $100.00 weekly ($5200.00 annually). The award should terminate upon the death of either party. The Court should retain the jurisdiction to modify the terms of the spousal support award pursuant to R.C.3105.18 (F).
(June 2006 Judgment Entry, p. 2).
{¶ 13} It is from this judgment that Alfred appeals, presenting the following assignments of error for our review.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BOTH IN THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD AND THE DURATION OF THE AWARD OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SET FORTH WITH REASONABLE SPECIFICITY OR DETAIL THE BASIS FOR ITS DETERMINATION ON THE ISSUE OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT.
{¶ 14} We apply the following standard of review throughout.
{¶ 17} In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and necessary, and in determining the nature, amount, terms of payment, and duration of spousal support, trial courts must consider all of the factors listed in R.C.
a) The income of the parties, from all sources * * *;
b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;
d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
e) The duration of the marriage;
f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
h) The relative extent of education of the parties; i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties; j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;
k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;
m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities; n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.
R.C.
{¶ 18} Here, Alfred first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in considering his trustee income because he moved out of Logan County and, *10 subsequently, to Indiana; therefore, he was no longer eligible to be a trustee. However, a review of the record suggests that Alfred retained his position as a trustee at all times relevant to the trial court's June 2006 judgment entry. While Alfred had to move from the marital residence when the trial court granted Toni exclusive use of it in the May 2004 temporary order, the trial court did not require that Alfred move out of Logan County. Additionally, Alfred made no mention of his alleged ineligibility as a trustee in his April 2005 statement submitted to the trial court and, in fact, indicated that he was still a trustee and included his trustee income in his 2005 income calculation. Moreover, it is clear from the trial court's June 2006 judgment entry that the trial court believed Alfred was a trustee at that time. Although we discourage the trial court's lengthy delay in issuing its June 2006 judgment entry, the record is devoid of any attempts by Alfred to inform the trial court of any changes in his trustee status prior to issuance of the entry.3 Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Alfred's trustee income in its calculation of spousal support.
{¶ 19} Next, Alfred argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering permanent spousal support given the parties' ages at divorce and their abilities to be self-sustaining. In general, where a payee spouse "has the resources, ability and potential to be self-supporting," the trial court "should provide for the *11
termination of the award, within a reasonable time and upon a date certain" in order to disentangle the parties. Kunkle,
{¶ 20} Finally, Alfred argues that the trial court abused its discretion by attempting to equalize the parties' incomes because equalization of incomes is not *12
the goal of a spousal support award. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that R.C.
{¶ 21} Here, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court's intent was to equalize the parties' incomes or that the trial court focused solely upon the parties' incomes in ordering spousal support. The trial court listed several of the factors in R.C.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, we overrule Alfred's first assignment of error.
{¶ 24} As noted above, a trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C.
{¶ 25} Here, Alfred argues that the trial court failed to provide a sufficient basis for awarding spousal support to Toni. A review of the record indicates that, while the trial court did not explicitly spell out its reasoning for awarding spousal support, it did mention several of the factors under R.C.
{¶ 26} Moreover, we note that Alfred could have requested specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 52, but did not do so. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 8th Dist. No. 86718,
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we overrule Alfred's second assignment of error. *16
{¶ 28} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed. SHAW, J., concurs. WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs in judgment only.