144 Va. 286 | Va. | 1926
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the year 1919 the city of Bristol, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 119 of the Code, 1919, changed its form of government by adopting the “city manager” plan.
In 1920, the city of Bristol having been, since 1908,. functioning under a charter of that date, was granted a new charter by which the charter of 1908 was repealed (Acts 1920, p. 432).
Section seven of the charter of 1920 provides: “The council shall consist of five members, who shall be elected on a general ticket from the city at large- and shall serve for a term of four years from the first day of September next following the date of their-election and until their successors shall have been. eleeted and qualified.”
Section eighteen of the charter provides: “A municipal election shall be held on the second Tuesday in June of every fourth year after the year nineteen hundred and nineteen, and shall be known as the-regular municipal election for the election of councilmen. All other municipal elections that may be held shall be known as special municipal elections except the election mentioned in section twenty hereof.”
On the seventh day of April, 1925, Henri Doriot and others, citizens of the city of Bristol, presented their petition to the judge of the Corporation Court of the city of Bristol, and after setting out substantially the facts as above narrated, alleged that the present five members composing the city -council were elected on the second Tuesday in June, 1923, and entered upon their terms of office September
They prayed for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the members of the city council to divide themselves into two groups, as required by the statute as amended.
The members of the city council filed their demurrer and answer to the petition, the effect of both of which is to raise the issue as to whether the provisions of section 2932 of the Code, as amended by Acts 1922, has any application to the city of Bristol, or whether the provision (section seven) of the charter adopted in 1920, above quoted, is controlling in Bristol. In other words, the contention is as to whether section 2932, as amended in 1922, repeals or modifies section seven of the charter of Bristol.
This issue is stated in the demurrer as follows:
“(1) The general law relied upon in the petition does not apply to the city of Bristol, which, as the petition shows, has a charter passed in the year 1920, which provides a four year term of office for its councilmen.
“(2) Even if the general law applies to a city having such charter, its language is not broad or comprehensive enough to repeal by implication the aforesaid charter provisions, and such repeal is not expressly made.”
The question is a very close one. Of course, if the city of Bristol had not been granted an entirely new charter in 1920 there could be no doubt but that the amendment would apply. This is conceded. The difficulty arises because, subsequent to the change in the form of government in 1919, the old charter of 1908 was superseded by that of 1920. The contention is very clearly expressed in the foregoing quotation from the opinion of the learned trial judge.
The situation, as disclosed by the record, involves consideration of the following facts:
In 1918 the legislature enacted into law what is known as the “city manager” plan of government. This act afterwards became chapter 119 of the Code, 1919. There were certain provisions which applied to cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, and there were other provisions applicable to cities of less than 50,000 inhabitants. The application of the statute, however, was optional, and was operative only in those cities which adopted it by a majority vote in a special election in which the question of the adoption of this form of government was submitted to the electorate.
The cities of Virginia consisted, at the time of the passage of the act, of those which were organized under general law, and those organized under special charters.
Cities in both classes availed themselves of the
There were other cities, Norfolk for example, which adopted a manager form of government, but which did so, not under the provisions of chapter 119, but by enactment of a special charter by the legislature. In such cases the question of the change of government was never submitted to the people in an election. So there are two classes of cities today in Virginia which have adopted a changed form, or city manager plan, of government, one of which adopted the change under the general law, or the general provisions of chapter 119, and the other under special charter, providing for a city manager or changed form of. government, but not conforming in all respects to the general law as contained in chapter 119.
The city of Bristol was, at the time of the enactment of chapter 119 of the Code, organized under a special charter, enacted in 1908. In 1919, in conformity with the provisions of chapter 119, at a special election held for the purpose, the city government was changed and the manager plan of government was adopted. It should be observed that the adoption of this plan of government did not repeal any charter of any city. It only repealed any sections of any such charter as were in conflict with the provisions of the chapter (see section 2934 of chapter 119, Code 1919). So that when a city adopted the' city manager form of government under the provisions of chapter 119, it did not cease to be a city organized under a special charter, but it did put itself in a class which had adopted the city manager form of government by election under the general law, as distinguished from a city which had adopted a manager form of government by special charter.
Of course, it was not only possible for the city, as heretofore stated, to have changed its form of government by special charter, but it was within the power of the legislature, even after Bristol, or any other city, had changed its form of government pursuant to chapter 119 of the Code, to grant it a special charter, adhering in its essentials to the city manager form of government, and yet containing provisions as to the manner of election and term of office of its councilmen, or otherwise, in conflict with the general provisions of chapter 119, and thus become, in effect, a city which had adopted a changed form of government by charter; but that was not the case here. The city of Bristol, as said, was organized under a charter of 1908. In 1919 it adopted .the manager form of government, pursuant to chapter 119 of the Code, and the charter of 1908, except in so far as it was in conflict with this chapter, was in full force and effect. But there were many conflicts in the fundamental law of the city, its charter and the new form of government adopted, which naturally resulted in confusion, making the adoption of a new charter to conform to new conditions almost necessary. So that when the legislature granted to Bristol, in 1920, an entirely new charter, strictly in conformity, and in harmony with all the provisions of chapter 119, it was not intended thereby, either by the legislature or by the city of Bristol, to place the city in the category of such cities as had adopted a city manager plan by charter, in contradistinction to a city which had changed its form of government pursuant to chapter 119 of the Code. Of course, it was, as heretofore stated, possible for Bristol, hav
The change in the law, involved in the amendment of 1922, was such a step of progressivism, and its plain object was to prevent the election of an entirely new council, unused to the conduct of municipal affairs, at one time. There was no change ultimately in the term of office. The only real change was in the time of election. By the new method, there was necessarily at all times in every city council about half of the councilmen who had had experience in the conduct of municipal affairs.
All this is strongly persuasive in the construction of the charter of 1920 and the amended section, 2932, as they relate to each other.
If we bear this in mind and examine the language of the amendment, we think the conclusion is well nigh irresistible that the charter of the city of Bristol, of 1920, which we construe as a reaffirmance of the general law touching the city manager plan of government and not an intention to depart from it, was amended along with the general law by the amendment of section 2932. Viewing the situation in this light,
The amendment states that “the successors of all councilmen now holding office under the provisions of this act in any city, as well as all councilmen elected at the first election hereafter held for councilmen hereunder in any city that has already or may hereafter adopt such change in its form of government,” etc.
The city of Bristol comes strictly within the provisions of the amendment. The councilmen, in office at the time of the filing of the petition, were councilmen holding office under the provisions of the act and the city was one which had already adopted the change in its form of government under the act. It did not make any* change in its form of government by its charter of 1920. That charter neither made any change in its form of government nor did it contain any provisions in conflict with the general law by virtue of which the change in the form of the government of the city of Bristol was brought about. So that when the general law, under which the change in the form of the city government „ was made, and which had not been subsequently altered by charter, expressly declared that the amendment should apply to all cities which have already adopted such change in their form of government, under and by virtue of the law (chapter 119), and when it appears that Bristol changed its form of government by virtue of this law and had not changed it by charter in any way, when the amendment was enacted, there seems no escape from the conclusion that the city of Bristol is affected by the amendment. To repeat, the amendment applied to all cities which had changed their form of government under chapter 119 of the Code, and Bristol had
The distinction to be observed, as will readily appear from the language of the amended statute (2932), is not as between cities organized under special charter or general law, but it is between cities which made a change in their form of government by virtue of chapter 119 on the one hand, and cities which made a change in their form of government by special charter or which have made no change at all on the other. The statute (2932), as amended, applied to the class of .cities first mentioned, and we think Bristol is one of those cities.
The city of Bristol answered to the description of a city whose councilmen or their successors held office under the provisions of the act, and which had adopted the only change which had been made in its form of government, under the act, and to all such cities the amendment applies in exact terms.
Issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for cannot be now ordered as the time designated in the prayer of the petition has passed.
However this may be, the matter is of sufficient importance to justify a construction of the statute, so that petitioners or others, if they desire to do so, may take such steps as they are advised are necessary to preserve their rights in the premises.
Reversed.