Charles Cox, Plaintiff, v. Centerra Group, LLC, and Jason Quattlebaum, Defendants.
Civil Action No.: 1:15-cv-04608-JMC
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA AIKEN DIVISION
August 16, 2018
Plaintiff Charles Cox (“Plaintiff“) brought this action against Defendants Jason Quattlebaum (“Quattlebaum“) and Quattlebaum‘s employer, Centerra Group, LLC (“Centerra“),1 pursuant to
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early 2012, Plaintiff separated from his wife, Lana Cox (“Ms. Cox“),2 an employee with Savannah River Nuclear Solutions based at the Savannah River Site (“SRS“) in Aiken County,
On January 14, 2013, Ms. Cox contacted Defendant Centerra, an organization contracted to provide security services to the SRS, to report Plaintiff for harassment. (ECF No. 47-2.) Centerra assigned the matter to Quattlebaum, an investigator with the SRS Law Enforcement Department. Id. On January 15, 2013, Quattlebaum met with Ms. Cox at the SRS, and she complained that Plaintiff had been repeatedly sending emails to her at her work email address. Id. Ms. Cox explained that she had asked Plaintiff to stop emailing her on several occasions, but he had continued to do so despite her requests. Id; (see also ECF Nos. 47-5 to 47-8; ECF No. 47-10; ECF No. 47-12; ECF No. 47-13.) Ms. Cox further detailed that she and Plaintiff had been recently divorced pursuant to the Consent Order. (ECF No. 47-2); (see also ECF No. 47-3.) Though Plaintiff‘s use of communication methods outside of Our Family Wizard was not explicitly in violation of the Consent Order, Ms. Cox represented to Quattlebaum that the Consent Order limited Plaintiff‘s means of communication to Our Family Wizard and that Plaintiff‘s conduct violated the Consent Order. (ECF No. 47-2 at 4.) Ms. Cox also indicated that Plaintiff harassed
On the same day, Quattlebaum, in his capacity as a law enforcement constable for the SRS, personally appeared before South Carolina Magistrate Judge Patrick D. Sullivan in New Ellenton, Aiken County, South Carolina. (ECF No. 47-21.) Quattlebaum informed Judge Sullivan of his meeting with Ms. Cox and Ms. Cox‘s attempts to have Plaintiff stop sending emails to her SRS email. Id. Quattlebaum also relayed that these emails were causing Ms. Cox emotional distress and that she wanted to press charges against Plaintiff. Id. In addition, Quattlebaum provided Judge Sullivan with copies of numerous emails between Plaintiff and Ms. Cox from the interim of March 2012 to January 2013. Id. After reviewing the information presented, Judge Sullivan determined that Quattlebaum had provided sufficient evidence to show probable cause and issued an arrest warrant for the magistrate level offense of harassment in the second degree pursuant to
Later that day, after Judge Sullivan issued the warrant, Quattlebaum telephoned Plaintiff. (ECF No. 47-2 at 3.) Quattlebaum identified himself to Plaintiff and informed Plaintiff of the warrant to which Plaintiff responded that he was on deployment with the U.S. Army and was in the process of boarding a plane to Kuwait. Id. Quattlebaum advised Plaintiff to contact him when
On January 30, 2013, Centerra released a Uniform Crime Report documenting the existence of the warrant to the U.S. Army. (ECF No. 48-6.) On February 23, 2018, Plaintiff‘s commanding officer issued a Military Protective Order forbidding Plaintiff from contacting Ms. Cox by any means, other than through Our Family Wizard, until October 1, 2013. (ECF No. 48-16.) During the interim of August 27, 2013 to September 5, 2013, Plaintiff sent seven emails to Ms. Cox at her private email, one of which he also sent to her SRS email.4 (ECF No. 48-2.) The Magistrate Judge noted in the Report that the contents of these seven emails were not particularly harassing. (See ECF No. 54 at 4 n.4; see also ECF No. 47-16.)
At some point “on or before February 20, 2013,” Quattlebaum had a telephone conversation with David Miller, an assistant solicitor for the Second Judicial Circuit of South Carolina. (ECF No. 47-22.) During that conversation, Quattlebaum conveyed to Miller that Plaintiff had been repeatedly sending Ms. Cox text messages and emails to her SRS email, in disregard of her requests to stop contacting her, and that Plaintiff‘s actions were causing Ms. Cox mental and emotional distress. Id. Based on the information provided, Miller conveyed to Quattlebaum that, in his opinion, Plaintiff‘s actions constituted harassment in the second degree. Id. After this conversation, on February 20, 2013, Quattlebaum followed up with Miller through text message to inquire as to the appropriate charge if he could prove Plaintiff violated a Georgia
On February 25, 2013, Quattlebaum again appeared before Judge Sullivan. (ECF No. 47-21 at 3-4.) Quattlebaum reported that he had not yet served the first warrant upon Plaintiff and that he had obtained a written account from Ms. Cox detailing the circumstances of the case, and he informed Judge Sullivan of the “existence of a divorce decree and/or military order of protection.” Id. Quattlebaum also presented the Consent Order to Judge Sullivan. (ECF No. 47-2 at 12.) Quattlebaum further informed Judge Sullivan of his conversation with Miller. (ECF No. 47-21.) Based on the information provided, Judge Sullivan issued an arrest warrant for the general sessions offense of harassment in the second degree pursuant to
Plaintiff returned from deployment around September or October of 2013. (ECF No. 47-2 at 6; ECF No. 48-2 at 109.) On February 7, 2014, Plaintiff turned himself in to Sharon Cormier, Quattlebaum‘s supervisor, at the Aiken County Detention Center. (ECF No. 47-17; ECF No. 48-2 at 165-172.) Cormier and a deputy arrested and booked Plaintiff pursuant to the second warrant for the general sessions offense, and Plaintiff was released on bond later that day. (ECF No. 48-2 at 165-172.) However, because Plaintiff‘s communications outside of Our Family Wizard were not in violation of the Consent Order, despite Quattlebaum‘s belief to the contrary, on March 26, 2014, South Carolina Magistrate Judge Melanie Dubose dismissed the charge of harassment in the second degree for lack of probable cause. (See ECF No. 47-2.)
Initially, Plaintiff filed this suit in state court, alleging false arrest and other causes of action, on September 29, 2015, and Defendants removed the matter to this court on November 13, 2015. (ECF No. 1-1.) On September 8, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 47.) On September 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Reply in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.5 (ECF No. 48.) After Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 52), the Magistrate Judge issued the Report on December 1, 2017, recommending that the court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 54.) Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report on December 28, 2017. (ECF No. 57.) On March 24, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff‘s Objections. (ECF No. 68.) Plaintiff‘s Objections are now before the court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge‘s Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. Further, to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party must set forth facts beyond “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. at 252. The non-moving party must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party in order to avoid summary judgment. See id. at 248.
3. South Carolina Harassment Statute
South Carolina law defines harassment in the second degree as follows:
“Harassment in the second degree” means a pattern of intentional, substantial, and unreasonable intrusion into the private life of a targeted person that serves no legitimate purpose and causes the person and would cause a reasonable person in his position to suffer mental or emotional distress. Harassment in the second degree may include, but is not limited to, verbal, written, or electronic contact that is initiated, maintained, or repeated.
(A) Except as provided in subsection (B), a person who engages in harassment in the second degree is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two hundred dollars, imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.
(B) A person convicted of harassment in the second degree is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned not more than one year, or both if:
(1) the person has a prior conviction of harassment or stalking within the preceding ten years; or
(2) at the time of the harassment an injunction or restraining order, including a restraining order issued by the family court, was in effect prohibiting the harassment.
III. DISCUSSION
1. False Arrest Claim
In making his false arrest claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Quattlebaum deprived him of his Fourth Amendment rights in seeking and obtaining an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 56.) Arrest by a law enforcement officer is reasonable when there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004); see also
A. Probable Cause—The General Sessions Level Offense
In support of his false arrest claim, Plaintiff relies primarily upon the fact that the Consent Order did not prohibit Plaintiff from using methods outside of Our Family Wizard to communicate with Ms. Cox. (See, e.g., ECF No. 57 at 8.) As a result, Plaintiff contends that his emails were not in violation of any court order. (ECF No. 57; ECF No. 48.)
More specifically, Plaintiff argues that Quattlebaum lacked probable cause for the general sessions offense because no reasonable officer could have concluded that Plaintiff‘s conduct was in violation of a court order. (See, e.g., ECF No. 57 at 8.) Given that the Consent Order does not
However, while Quattlebaum did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for the general sessions level offense, if Plaintiff cannot allege a set of facts that would make it unreasonable for an officer to conclude some other offense had been committed, the court must still dismiss Plaintiff‘s false arrest claim. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 145; Brown, 278 F.3d at 368. Although the facts as known to Quattlebaum at the time that he obtained the warrant were not sufficient to show that Plaintiff‘s behavior was in violation of a court order, this requirement only applies to the general sessions offense, not to the lesser magistrate level offense. See
B. Probable Cause—The Magistrate Level Offense
In Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. at 148-49, a state patrol officer initiated a traffic stop on Alford, whom she had reason to suspect had been impersonating a law enforcement officer. While Devenpeck, the officer‘s supervisor, was questioning Alford, he noticed that Alford was recording their conversation and had him arrested for violation of the State Privacy Act. Id. at 149-50. The
The facts of the present case parallel those of Devenpeck. Here, Quattlebaum initially obtained a warrant against Plaintiff for the magistrate level harassment offense, but later obtained a new warrant and had Plaintiff arrested for another offense, which Judge Dubose then dismissed in state court. (ECF No. 47-2.) Therefore, the Magistrate Judge was correct in concluding that Plaintiff must demonstrate that there was not probable cause to arrest him on the first offense to avoid summary judgment on his § 1983 claim, regardless of the offense invoked by Defendants in making the arrest or obtaining the warrant. (ECF No. 54.)
In his Objections, Plaintiff argues that there was not probable cause to arrest him for the magistrate level charge in the first warrant.6 (ECF No. 57 at 5-7.) Plaintiff alleges that no
The court also rejects Plaintiff‘s argument that there cannot be probable cause for harassment where the target could have taken affirmative steps to block or ignore the harassment. (ECF No. 57 at 8-9.) The text of the harassment statute does not explicitly require that the target must first act to stop the harassment on his or her own. See
Finally, regarding Plaintiff‘s claim that Ms. Cox instigated some of the email communications to Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not refer to any specific evidence nor does he add any additional evidence to the record in making this claim. (ECF No. 57 at 9.) The emails that Ms. Cox
In sum, according to the record (ECF No. 47-2 at 2-4), Quattlebaum was aware that Ms. Cox had asked Plaintiff to stop emailing her at her SRS email on several occasions, yet Plaintiff was continuing to do so. Ms. Cox indicated that these emails were causing her emotional distress. Id. at 13-14. She had also furnished Quattlebaum with copies of emails from both Plaintiff and herself that supported her statements. Id. at 2-4. Given this evidence, the court finds that the record in this case can only support the conclusion that when Quattlebaum came before Judge Sullivan on January 15, 2013, he was aware of sufficient facts to show probable cause that Plaintiff‘s conduct satisfied the magistrate level offense of harassment in the second degree. Therefore, the court dismisses Plaintiff‘s false arrest claim.
2. Malicious Prosecution Claim
To establish a state law claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must show: “(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of [] [D]efendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in Plaintiff‘s favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage.” Law v. S.C. Dep‘t of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 435 (2006) (quoting Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321 (1965); Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Coop., Inc., 277 S.C. 475, 477 (1982)). Plaintiff must show a lack of
3. Qualified Immunity
In his Objections, Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge‘s finding that, irrespective of the constitutionality of Plaintiff‘s arrests, Defendant Quattlebaum is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 57 at 10-12.) Qualified immunity provides that government officials performing discretionary functions are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This inquiry is a two-part test: “A court ‘must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and, if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.‘”7 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)).
The first part of the qualified immunity test assesses whether there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right. Id. As concluded by the court in the two previous sections of this opinion, there has not been a constitutional deprivation of Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights because Quattlebaum had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. See supra Part III.1. As such, “because government officials cannot have known of a right that does not exist,” the inquiry ends there. Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 1998). However, assuming that there is sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation, the next step in the analysis is to examine whether the right was clearly established. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. In order for a right to be clearly established, it “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The Fourth Circuit has clarified that the second part of the qualified immunity test requires that “the manner in which [the] right applies to the actions of the official must be apparent. Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
In the present case, the mistake which resulted in Judge Dubose dismissing the general sessions charge was Quattlebaum‘s incorrect belief that the Consent Order limited Plaintiff‘s means of communication to only Our Family Wizard. (See ECF No. 47-2.) However, this part of the qualified immunity test depends not on whether Quattlebaum‘s interpretation of the order was inaccurate, but on whether his interpretation was unreasonable. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The Fourth Circuit has noted that one of the purposes of qualified immunity is to avoid “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
In his Objection, Plaintiff also argues that Quattlebaum acted unreasonably with regard to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis, alleging that Quattlebaum deliberately mislead Judge Sullivan and also withheld exculpatory evidence by failing to inform Judge Sullivan that he was aware of emails initiated by Plaintiff in pursuing the first warrant. (ECF No. 57 at 11.) However, Judge Sullivan‘s affidavit states that Quattlebaum “furnished [] copies of numerous email transmissions,” of which “[i]n at least two emails Ms. Cox asked or demanded [Plaintiff] to stop contacting her . . . ,” which suggests that Judge Sullivan was aware of the emails initiated by Ms. Cox. (ECF No. 47-21 at 2-3.) Further, as noted previously, the fact that Ms. Cox may have initiated some emails to Plaintiff is not “exculpatory” in and of itself. See supra Part III.1.B. Plaintiff alleges that Quattlebaum failed to conduct a full investigation and did not advise Judge
4. Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff contests the Magistrate Judge‘s finding in the Report that Centerra is not liable to Plaintiff under supervisory liability. (ECF No. 57 at 12-15.) For a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must provide evidence that Cormier or another supervisor at Centerra had actual or constructive knowledge that Quattlebaum engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens such as Plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). However, as established in the preceding analysis, Quattlebaum‘s conduct did not result in a constitutional injury to Plaintiff because Quattlebaum had probable cause for the arrest of Plaintiff. See supra Part III.1. Moreover, Quattlebaum‘s mistake in interpreting the terms of the court order does not amount to conduct that posed an unreasonable risk of a constitutional injury. See supra Part III.3. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for supervisory liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided above, Plaintiff Charles Cox has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights or malicious prosecution by Jason Quattlebaum or supervisory liability on the part of Centerra Group, LLC. Moreover, Jason Quattlebaum is entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the court ACCEPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 54). Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. Michelle Childs
United States District Judge
August 16, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
Notes
Although the subject matter of many of Plaintiff‘s emails did concern his children, the fact that the subject matter of the allegedly harassing communications in question may pertain to a matter of some significance is not sufficient to show that an officer lacked probable cause because he failed to consider that purpose. See Hewitt, WL 6654237, at *5 (finding the plaintiff‘s argument that her harassing emails were related to an impending civil suit between her and the target of the harassment was not sufficient to show that the arresting officer lacked probable cause); see also Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Reasonable law enforcement officers are not required to ‘exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a suspect‘s guilt before probable cause is established.‘” (quoting Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991))). Furthermore, the emails on the record do not suggest
the 2nd degree for the arrest of [Plaintiff].” (ECF No. 52-1 at 21.) However, the date on this document conflicts with the rest of the evidence in the record, which demonstrates that Quattlebaum instead first met with Judge Sullivan on January 15, 2013. (See ECF No. 47-21.) In fact, the signature on the first warrant is dated January 15, 2013. (ECF No. 48-5.) Given this evidence, the only reasonable conclusion is that the date printed on the Investigating Officer‘s Report was made in error and that Quattlebaum in fact met with Judge Sullivan and obtained the first warrant on January 15, 2013. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [a] plaintiff‘s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [a] plaintiff.“).