Plaintiffs’ action at law for damages is divided into six counts. The first five counts thereof are based upon civil liability arising out of the Dram Shop law, appearing as chapter 129, Code of 1954. Count VI is based upon negligence under the common law. Pursuant to- certain amendments, beer as defined in section 124.2, subsection 10 of the Code, was identified as the beverage served by defendant tavern owners. Allegedly, this caused the intoxication of Raymond F. Vohl and established a legal cause of action against the defendants for the death of Ernest Cowman, Jr., who was fatally injured later in an automobile accident resulting from the negligent driving of Vohl. Motions to dismiss by defendants, based upon the theory that the Dram Shop law in Iowa does not apply because beer containing less than four per cent' of alcohol by weight is non-into-xicating by legislative definition, were sustained by the trial court. The trial court also dismissed plaintiffs’ Count VI for the reason that “the common law provided for no relief or remedy” under the circumstance, and plaintiffs appeal.
This appeal presents but two issues: (1) Did the legislature, by enacting section 125.2 of the Code, exclude from the pre-existing law in chapter 129 of the Code, beer containing less than four per cent of alcohol-by weight; and (2) does the common law recognize a right of action in tort against a dispenser of alcoholic beverages for injury or damage caused by a consumer after he has left the establishment?
Chapter 129, Code of 1954, provides in section 129.2 as follows:
*361 “Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who shall be injured in person or property or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name against any person who shall, by selling or giving to- another contrary to the provisions of this title any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.”
Substantially, the provisions of this statute have remained unchanged since the Code of 1873. It has appeared in Title VI of the Code since 1924. In 1933 the legislature enacted what is known as the Liquor Control Act, which also became a part of Title VI, and at that time made a distinction between beer and other alcoholic beverages. It adopted section 124.2, subsection 10, which provided that beer containing not more than four per cent alcohol by weight should come under the provisions of chapter 124 and be dispensed in a, different manner than other beverages containing a greater per cent of alcohol. At the same time it amended section 1923, which now appears in the Code as section 125.2, by striking the period after the word “whatever” and inserting in lieu thereof the words, “provided, however, that the words ‘liquor’ or ‘intoxicating liquor’ wherever used in title six of the code of Iowa, 1931, shall not be construed to include beer * * * containing not more than three and two-tenths per centum (3.2%) of alcohol by weight.” Subsequently it was again amended raising the 3.2% to 4%. The section now provides:
“The word ‘liquor’ or the phrase ‘intoxicating liquor’ when used, in this title, shall be construed to include alcohol, brandy * * * and all intoxicating liquor whatever provided, however, that the words ‘liquor’ or ‘intoxicating liquor’ wherever used in this title of the Code shall not be construed to- include beer * * * containing not more than 'four percent of alcohol by weight.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Plainly stated, these sections of the Code are a mandate that we shall not construe beer containing not more than four per cent alcohol intoxicating wherever the term “intoxicating *362 liquor” is used in Title VI. The words used admit of no cither meaning.
I. Statutes that are clear and unambiguous are not subject to interpretation by the courts. No principle of law has received more attention in decisions and in legal treatises. Mallory v. Jurgena,
Admittedly, this amendment illustrates both the good and evil of reference amendments. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 36, page 57. If perchance the legislature did not wish to’ amend the Dram Shop Act, the use of the words “wherever used in this title” were unfortunate, for they are so clear they permit of no deviation. Then, too-, if there was to be a deviation, where in Title VI would the exception or exceptions apply? Does the law permit us that lawmaking power? Obviously it does not.
In Eysink v. Board of Supvrs.,
“It must be remembered that it is only where a statute is of doubtful or uncertain meaning that courts are at liberty to apply rules of construction. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the expressed terms of the statute. This court' has no power to write into the statute *363 words which are not there. These rules are of course elementary, and do not require the citation of authorities. * * * As this court observed in a case involving the construction of the Sales Tax Act, ‘In construing this statute we are bound by the definition of terms made use of by the legislature. * * * “the legislature is its own lexicographer.” ’ Sandberg Co. v. Board,225 Iowa 103 , 107,278 N.W. 643 , 645.”
We agree with the trial court and the defendants that here the legislature has been its own lexicographer insofar as Title VI of the Code is concerned. It is presumed to have known of the provisions of chapter 129 of the Code, and that it was in Title VI of the Code when enacting the amendment to what is now section 125.2. It redefined “liquor” and “intoxicating liquor” as used in Title VI of the Code, and by clear and definite reference made it applicable throughout the title without exception.
Those who feel the legislature actually did not intend to distinguish between a whisky and beer drunk in the application of our civil damage act must take their case to the general assembly for correction. We concede the logic of plaintiffs’ argument against any distinction as far as the public welfare is concerned, but it is clearly addressed to the wrong government body. It is a proper matter for the legislature to consider, and if perchance the reference “wherever used in this title” was too broad, only that body can make the correction. In the meantime we must presume that it well knew it could have excepted chapter 129 of the Code from that definition of “intoxicating liquor”, but did not.
The Dram Shop Act being a civil damage act, its extent and conditions, of course, are clearly within the power of the creator, our legislature. It can extend or diminish the right and provide the remedy as it sees fit. It is its own lexicographer, and common-law and dictionary definitions must yield when the legislature, by express enactment, defines its own terms. Muscatine City Water Works v. Duge,
We find no quarrel with plaintiffs’ contention that, when construction is appropriate, we should construe such a statute *364 so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. It simply is not applicable here. Their contention, that there is an ambiguity involved herein due to the fact that chapter 129 itself was not specifically amended to exclude four per cent beer as nonintoxicating, is not persuasive. It is quite clear that the general assembly wished only to avoid much needless repetition, and indeed it would be hard to find a place where the legislative intent to amend generally was more clearly expressed. The proviso “that the words ‘liquor’ or ‘intoxicating liquor’ wherever used in this title * * *” is all inclusive. As before pointed out, it even goes further. There is a mandate to the courts that no construction should be made that will permit the inclusion of beer containing not more than four per cent alcohol by weight as “intoxicating liquor.”
Further citations are unnecessary, but a recent discussion of this subject in Young v. O’Keefe,
It is our conclusion here that we are not permitted to engage in any fancy application of rules of construction. The words clearly express the intent to remove from the Dram Shop law the civil rights and remedies formerly created and established for persons injured, or damages by one who consumed intoxicating liquor provided by another, when that liquor was beer containing’ not more than four per cent alcohol by weight. However, it is not to be understood that we are holding, as a matter of law, that four per cent beer is not intoxicating.
Although sufficient Iowa authority and reason support our conclusion, we note that the Supreme Court of Minnesota was recently faced with a similar question in the case of Beck v. Groe (1955)
“The legislature in the exercise of its police power for the purpose of controlling and x^egulating the liquor traffic has a *365 wide discretion in defining' intoxicating liquor * * *. We cannot ascribe to tbe legislature any intent not expressed in its enactments when it considered all related matters involving the control and regulation of alcoholic beverages of whatever content and specifically designated 3.2 beer as nonintoxicating and all spirituous, vinous, or malt beverages in excess thereof as intoxicating liquor setting up separate control and separate regulations in dealing with related subjects. We must and do take it for granted that the legislature had in mind the effect of later and specific legislation, upon existing statutes, where inconsistencies might arise * *
The Minnesota court concluded that the illegal sale of 3.2 beer to the minor violated the beer control act, but that it did not constitute an illegal sale of intoxicating liquor under their present liquor license law regulating the sale of intoxicating liquor nor the civil damage act.
II. Plaintiffs next assert that, in case there is no statutory right to recover under the Dram Shop law, the sale or gift of four per cent beer to an intoxicated person would give rise to a common-law tort liability against the tavern owners when the consumer so negligently drove his ear that it resulted in the death of plaintiffs’ son.
As a basis of that contention, in Count VI plaintiffs say that when defendant tavern owners saw, or should have seen, the intoxicated condition of Vohl, they failed to' exercise due care toward the plaintiffs’ intestate, and that they knew or should have known that Vohl would drive a car and that young Cowman or others would be injured or killed. In other words, plaintiffs contend the common law permits recovery for such negligence by the tavern owners and should recognize such negligence as the proximate cause, or one of the proximate causes, of the accident, injury and damage. The trial court did not agree, and neither do we.
The common-law coverage for tort liability is well known and we have considered it on many occasions. Its application is more difficult, so when we say the court can apply old rules to new situations, and not create new rules for new situations, we mean the court may extend its rules as to negligence and proximate cause only so far and no further.
*366
We have said that while some loose expressions in the books to the effect that one is not liable for negligence unless the results of his acts might reasonably have been foreseen by him, the
true doctrine,
as. we understand it, is that it is not necessary to a defendant’s liability that the consequences of his negligence should have been foreseen. It is sufficient if the injuries are the
natural,
though not the necessary or inevitable, result of the wrong. The test, after all, is, would ordinary prudence have suggested to' the person sought to be charged with negligence that his act or omission would
probably
result in injury to someone? Burk v. Creamery Pkg. Mfg. Co.,
We have even said a recovery may be had even though the willful or negligent act of a third person intervenes and contributes to the injury, provided such act should have been foreseen. Dahna v. Clay County Fair Assn.,
The key question then appears to be, Was this an apparent situation that required guarding against ?
In the case of Dennis v. Merrill,
If we attempt to analyze these cause and effect situations, we note that while it may be foreseen, or it may be a natural result of furnishing an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person, that he himself will get hurt, it is not at all clear that
*367
lie will naturally assault someone, drive a car and injure or kill another, or do some other tortious act. It is possible, but it is open to debate, that such results are probable. This would seem even more clear where another’s negligence intervenes, such as a third party’s asking the intoxicated person for a ride in his automobile, or furnishing the intoxicated one an automobile. Such result would scarcely be a natural result of the tavern keeper’s negligence. On the contrary, in the latter circumstance we decided one who furnishes an intoxicated person a car was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of injury to another, under the common law. Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co.,
On the other hand, plaintiffs point to these cases and ask us to hold that when the legislature excluded four per cent beer from the Dram Shop law it left common-law rules effective and those rules construed under modern conditions should afford relief for the injured parties. They would have us go one step further than any previous ease in Iowa or elsewhere and hold that it is actionable negligence to furnish legal beer to an intoxicated person and that the natural consequences of that negligence are the negligent driving of an automobile and the resultant injury or death of another.
They argue the common use of automobiles by all qualified persons is so well known that when one leaves a tavern, it is probable that he will drive a car, operate it in a negligent manner, and injure a third person.
Citing Pratt v. Daly,
III. The common law as known in this state did not recognize a tort liability arising out of a sale of intoxicating beverages. The general rule we originally followed is stated in
“The common law gives no remedy for injury or death following the mere sale of liquor to the ordinary man, either on the theory that it is a direct wrong or on the ground that it is negligence, which imposes a legal liability on the seller for damages resulting from the intoxication.”
It is pointed out therein that as a result of this general conclusion by the courts of this country, a number of jurisdictions, including Iowa, have adopted statutes creating a right of action under specified conditions against persons- furnishing intoxicants, as well as prescribing the remedy. -Such legislation was thought necessary in Iowa since 1873, indicating a strong belief that the common-law remedy was inadequate under the old rules.
Plaintiffs, with commendable frankness in their brief, recognize that most authorities have made such announcements as to the common-law rule, but contend vigorously that such decisions are not based on clear and satisfactory reasoning or the proper application of old rules to such situations. It is argued that it may be that the consumption by a normal person is the proximate cause of any subsequent injury to a third *369 person by reason of the intoxication rather than the sale of the liquor. However, where such sale or gift is made to one intoxicated, or otherwise incompetent, and the incapacity of the consumer’s will is known to the vendor, or should be known, he should foresee that the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act in selling that intoxicant wotild be injury to someone. Plaintiffs argue such natural and probable consequences here would be the driving of an automobile and the accident and injury to Ernest Cowman, Jr. In other words, they contend there was here actionable negligence on the part of defendants which was the proximate cause of the death of Ernest Cowman, Jr., recognized under the old rules of common law applied to new conditions. Conceding for the moment that such a gift or sale of legal four per cent beer to an incompetent would be a negligent act, we are not convinced that it was sufficient to constitute proximate cause or a cause which, unbroken by any intervening independent agency, naturally produced a given result.
While it may not be important here, it is to be noted that there is no allegation charging defendants with knowledge of Vohl’s condition. It is alleged in Count VI that defendants provided him with beer after he was intoxicated. Whether or not such intoxication was such as to destroy his will and place him in the class of non compos mentis, or insane, does not appear. However, in view of the dismissal of the action on motion, we must and do read the allegations in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. If we give plaintiffs the benefit of all doubt, and if we consider that they have alleged negligent acts by the tavern owners, we are still left in the uncharted sea of how far this negligence is legally recognizable as a proximate cause of the injury.
We have been cited no cases in Iowa squarely upon this issue. In the few cases we have found in other jurisdictions, or that were cited to us considering similar contentions, the courts have in every-case denied recovery under the common law. They have, without exception, determined that the injury or death of a third person due to negligent actions by the consumer of liquor was too remote to be a proximate cause of *370 the negligent act of selling intoxicating liquor to an incompetent.
Perhaps the case of Seibel v. Leach,
It may be observed that negligence in placing the intoxicated party in the rig might well be the proximate cause, rather than the selling of intoxicants. Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co., supra.
It was pointed out that no civil damage statute appears in Wisconsin, and that in the Demge v. Feierstein case,
Another recent case of State for Use of Joyce v. Hatfield (1951)
There, also, no allegation appeared that defendant knew the driver, or none of his crowd, was in an unfit condition to drive, or that defendant intended to drive. A demurrer was sustained on the ground that the proximate cause of the collision was not the unlawful sale of liquor to the minor, but the negligence of the minor who drank the liquor. The court reviewed many previous decisions and cites many authorities and came to the conclusion that “No case, English or American, has been cited, and we have found none, in which (apart from statute) a seller of intoxicating liquor has been held liable for a tort of the buyer who drank the liquor.” (Page 254 of 197 Md., page 756 of 78 A.2d.) It recognized that courts may in proper instances apply old rules to newly-created conditions, but reasoned they cannot create new rules for conditions already under regulation. The Seibel v. Leach case, supra,
*372 The court’s conclusion (page 256 of 197 Md., page 757 of 78 A.2d) that “plaintiff argues, earnestly but futilely, that the eases were all wrongly decided, that the common law was not, and is not, as the cases say it is, that the cases are not supported by reason and have acquired no force as authority by repetition and adoption in one jurisdiction after another, * * *” sounds familiar.
But we are not as pessimistic as the Maryland court in stating that it would be worse than futile for us to attempt to convince plaintiffs by reason, when all other courts have failed and the accumulated mass of authority carries no weight.
While we believe the legislature of Iowa has entered this field and, wisely or not, has recognized the need for civil damage legislation only in cases where intoxicating liquor, as defined by it, has been served, yet in order to give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, we have tried to review the basis of denial of liability under the common law, as well as cite all recent pronouncements on the subject. Perhaps the belief that the consequences are too remote or unforeseeable will not satisfy plaintiffs, but we can see no end to the possibilities, or contentions, if it were held otherwise. Judicial limits are hard to extend without usurping legislative functions, especially when they pertain to substantive rights.
We should refer to one more case which seems to review all the recent and leading eases' on this subject. Cole v. Rush (1955)
In Fleckner v. Dionne,
Whether or not we would go so far need not now be decided. The only allegation here is that defendants furnished legal beer to Vohl before and after he became intoxicated. While it may be, under certain conditions, negligence to serve any beverage containing alcohol to one not sound of mind, with knowledge of that condition or disability, actual or constructive, it is clear such negligent act is but one element that would be necessary for recovery under the common law. It must also be a proximate cause of the injury in order to permit recovery under the common law.
We are satisfied that a natural result of such a sale or gift of legal beer was. not that the vendee would depart, drive a car, operate it in a negligent or reckless manner and thereby injure or kill someone. We must, therefore, hold that furnishing legal beer to Vohl was too remote to be held a proximate cause of the injury or damage. Extension of civil rights to cover such cases must be by action of the legislature, which has well and often considered such rights in this state. The judgment is affirmed.. — ■ Affirmed.