31 Iowa 513 | Iowa | 1871
I. Numerous grounds were stated in defendants’ demurrer. Only those, however, presented in argument will be considered.
All these averments which, in our opinion, show a series of transactions steeped in the deepest fraud, are confessed by the demurrer, and are sufficient. In charging fraud, it is not necessary or proper for the pleader to set out all the mmute facts tending to establish it. The ultimate facts and not the evidence should be pleaded. . Singleton v. Scott, 11 Iowa, 589; Bev., § 2945. If the statement of facts is not sufficiently specific, it may be assailed by motion, but is not demurrable.for this defect. Bev., § 2948.
The relief sought in this case can only be granted in a court of equity, and the district court has exclusive juris
The demurrer on this ground was improperly sustained. See § 4, art. 5, New Const.; Rey. of 1860, § 2663; Sterrett v. Robinson, 17 Iowa, 61; Richardson v. Barrick, 16 id. 407, and cases cited.
3. Those founded on unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property, or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of . chancery, and all other actions not otherwise provided for in this respect, within five years.” The plaintiff seeks relief from certain orders and proceedings of the probate court procured by the defendant by fraud, and for relief from the alleged fraudulent acts and doings of the defendant under such orders and proceedings. This cause of action was heretofore and still is solely cognizable in a court of chancery. The statute therefore commences to run from the time of the discovery of the fraud. It has been held by this court that when the legal title to real property has been obtained by fraud, an action to recover,
In the ease before us the allegations of the petition show that plaintiff is the equitable owner of the property in dispute; that she has been deprived of the legal title by the fraud of defendant Toole; that his grantees had knowledge of the fraud, and that such fraud came to her knowledge within five years prior to the commencement of the action. Her right to prosecute the suit is, therefore, not barred, and the demurrer should have been overruled.
Reversed.