140 Ga. 435 | Ga. | 1913
Lead Opinion
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
1-3. The members of this court are agreed as to all matters involved in this case, except one. The issues of fact were found in favor of Singletary by a jury on a former trial, and by the auditor when the case was referred to him. The presiding judge has approved that finding, and the evidence was sufficient to authorize him to do so. There was no error in overruling the motion for a rereference. The report of the auditor, while somewhat meagre, was sufficiently, full to withstand the attack made upon it in the motion for a rereference, and a reversal is not required. This disposes of the contentions that the deed made by Caroline Cowart to Singletary was procured by fraud; that the transaction was not in fact a sale with an option to repurchase, but was the securing of an indebtedness; that this debt was infected with usury and included a debt of her husband; that there was such mental disparity between the parties and such inadequacy of consideration as to amount to fraud; and all others depending on questions of fact. Under the evidence the decision in Baggett v. Trulock, 77 Ga. 369 (3 S. E. 162), is not controlling. See, in this connection, Felton v. Grier, 109 Ga. 320 (35 S. E. 175); McElmurray v. Blodgett, 120 Ga. 9 (47 S. E. 531); Brown v. Bonds, 125 Ga. 833, 838 (54 S. E. 933). We were requested to review and overrule the decision in Felton v. Grier, supra. Its special application to this case is the ruling, that, it being legally possible for the owner of real estate to sell it to another at an agreed price, and at the same time secure the right to repurchase, the law will enforce such a transaction when actually made. Whether any criticism can be made upon anything that was said in the opinion is immaterial. The principle announced is correct, and we decline to reverse it.
4. It was urged, that Singletary did not bind himself in writing to Caroline Cowart to pay the purchase-money notes which were given by her to Mrs. Holmes; that if there was any promise to that effect, it was in parol; and that such a promise was obnoxious to the statute of frauds. In the deed to Singletary it -was recited that Caroline Cowart had given her notes for the purchase-money of the land to Mrs. Holmes, and that “Singletary bonds [binds] himself to see that said bond is complied with.” The acceptance of this conveyance by Singletary bound him to carry out such covenant. Kytle v. Kytle, 128 Ga. 387 (57 S. E. 748). As between him and
5. We now come to the only point of difference between the members of this court. The bond for title which was given by Mrs. Holmes to Caroline Cowart, after describing the terms of the sale and the notes given for the purchase-money, and binding Mrs. Holmes "to make or cause to be made” good and sufficient title in fee simple to the land upon payment of the notes, contained the following: "It is hereby understood and agreed that time is of the essence of this contract; and should the party of the second part fail to pay said notes as'they'become due, then this bond to become null and void, and whatever money paid shall be treated as rent at the rate of $150 per annum. And it is further stipulated that this bond is not transferable to any one.” Under the facts of the case, the majority of the court are of the opinion that neither of the two clauses above quoted prevented Singletary from having equitable relief. The first clause declares time to be of the essence of the contract, and provides for a forfeiture in case of non-payment of the purchase-money. This clause does not undertake to put any restriction upon the transfer of the bond or the alienation of the property by the purchaser. There was no evidence to show that Mrs. Holmes ever claimed any forfeiture or breach of the bond 'arising from non-payment. On the contrary she received payment from Singletary of fifteen of the notes substantially, if not exactly, as they fell due, and received a large part of the purchase-money from Grimsley in discharge of the remaining notes before they were due. She could not, of course, claim a forfeiture and at the same time receive the purchase-money. So that any contention that there was a forfeiture and a resale without regard to the original contract finds no support whatever in the evidence. Indeed such is not the contention, but this clause is used in support of the position that there was a limited restriction on alienation, as will appear below.
The clause of the bond for title upon which this branch of the case depends is the second clause above quoted, which reads as follows: "And it is further stipulated that this bond is not transferable to any one.” If the insertion of such a stipulation in the
Before taking up each of these contentions separately, it may be well to note that, strictly speaking, there was no transfer of the bond, but that the obligee made a warranty deed to Singletary. Whatever title the maker of such a deed might acquire thereafter by payment of the purchase-money would pass to her grantee. Parker v. Jones, 57 Ga. 204; Isler v. Griffin, 134 Ga. 192, 196 (67 S. E. 854); Powell on Actions for Land, § 141. By the payment of part of the purchase-money, he or she undoubtedly acquired an equitable interest, which could be conveyed. We deem it unnecessary to consider the question of whether the record of her deed carried constructive notice to Grimsley, as we have found that there was sufficient evidence to show actual notice on his part. If this conveyance by Caroline Cowart to Singletary be treated as substantially an assignment of the bond for title to him, nevertheless was it void, and did he acquire no rights thereunder or by virtue of his1 payment of a considerable part of the purchase-money?
The first contention stated above is dependent upon analogizing the restraint upon an assignment of a bond for title to a restriction upon alienation by the grantee in a fee-simple deed. The Civil Code, § 3657, declares: “An absolute or fee-simple estate is one in which the owner is entitled to the entire property, with unconditional powers, of disposition during his life, and descending to his heirs and legal representatives upon his death intestate.” This definition excludes the right to limit the power of disposition during the life of the grantee, if the estate is one in fee simple. Moreover, by section 3718 of the Civil Code it is declared: “A condition repugnant to the estate granted is void.” In Freeman v. Phillips, 113 Ga. 589 (38 S. E. 943), it was held: “A devise giving a fee in land to remaindermen on the termination of a life-estate, with the restrictions that the remaindermen should ‘never
If we look to authorities outside of our own code and decisions, attempts to impose general restraints on alienation in granting a fee-simple estate are held void as repugnant to the estate granted. Eestraints upon alienation of leasehold interests, estates for years, and the like are held to be valid in order to protect the reversionary interest of the grantor. Some courts have held, that, coupled with the grant of a fee-simple interest, there may be a reasonable restraint on alienation for a limited time, or prohibiting a conveyance to a particular person, or the like. The leading case in this country in which this subject is elaborately discussed is DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. (2 Selden) 467 (57 Am. D. 470). In Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (18 Am. E. 61), the subject was again discussed at length by Christiancy, J. He attacked vigorously the statement of some text-writers and judges that a grant of a fee-simple estate could be made, and at the same time the grantee could be restricted from selling such estate for a limited time. He declared that this statement had arisen from a misconception of the actual ruling in Large’s Case, 2 Leonard, 82, and had been perpetuated by erroneous obiter dicta which had grown into positive assertion. In conclusion he said: “And we think it would be unwise and injurious to admit into the law the principle contended for by the defendant’s counsel, that such restriction should be held valid, if imposed only for a reasonable time. It is safe to say that every estate depending upon such a question would, by the very fact of such a question existing, lose a large share of its market value. Who can say whether the time is reasonable, until the question has been settled in the court of last resort; and upon what standard of certainty can the court decide it? . . The only safe rule of decision is to hold, as I understand the common law for ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which would
In 24 American & English Encyclopaedia of Law (2d ed.), 867, it is said: "There are many dicta, as well as a few direct authorities, to the effect that restraints on alienation for a limited time are valid, but in a number of cases the validity of such restraint has been said to be doubtful; and on principle, and according to the weight of authority, a restriction, whether by way of condition, or of limitation over, or of bare prohibition against any and all alienation, although for a limited time, of a vested estate in fee, whether in possession or remainder, is void. In the case of a contingent remainder, however, or of any other interest not vested, a restriction upon the power of alienation to last as long, as the interest remains contingent is valid.” As stated above, we need not consider the subject of conditions or limitations over, here mentioned, as they are not now involved.
In jurisdictions where it is held that a restraint upon the right to sell a fee-simple interest for a limited time is permissible, it is generally held, that, to be enforceable, it must be coupled with a reversion or a limitation over. 1 Warvelle on Vendors (2d ed.), § 451, p. 532; Fowlkes v. Wagoner (Tenn.), 46 S. W. 586; Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248 (42 N. E. 623, 637). In 1 Warvelle on Vendors (2d ed.), § 45-3, p. 533, it is said: "Restraints with respect to time have in several instances been held good and the conditions sustained, provided the restriction is limited to a 'reasonable period;’ but the weight of authority would seem to be against the validity of restraints upon alienation, however limited in time.” See also Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.), §§ 54, 105 et seq.
Without entering at length into the various authorities on this subject, we think it is clear that if the test applicable to conveyances of a fee-simple estate with an attempted restriction on alienation were applied to the provision of the bond for title now under consideration, it would not be valid. Even should we follow those authorities which hold that there may be a restraint upon aliena
The writer has dwelt at some length on the question of restraint upon alienation of a fee-simple estate, because it is an important principle in the law of real estate, and there should be no misapprehension as to it; and also because in consultation some of our brethren were of the opinion that the analogy is important, if not controlling, in the case.
In so far as the argument rests upon the rule that at common law choses in action were not assignable so as to convey title, but only an equitable interest, it is sufficient to say that this rule has been changed by our statute. In the Civil Code, § 3653, it is declared that “All choses in action arising upon contract may be assigned so as to vest the .title in the assignee, but he takes it, except negotiable securities, subject to the equities existing between the assignor and debtor at the time of the assignment, and until notice of the assignment is given to the person liable.” In Bewick Lumber Co. v. Hall, 94 Ga. 539 (21 S. E. 154), a written instrument was as follows: “Credit check $6.50. Number 687. February 20th, 1891. Issued to Aaron Hattan. Not transferable. Payable on demand in merchandise by Bewick Lumber Company. Johnsonville, Georgia. G. B. Monroe.” It was held that this was a chose in action arising upon a contract, and that it was assignable, under the provisions of the code section above quoted. This ruling was made in spite of the fact that the paper contained the words “not transferable.” It may be remarked, however,, that this was not an executory contract containing mutual obligations. That class of contracts will be next considered.
Certain classes of contracts are inherently non-assignable in their character, such as promises to marry, or engagements for personal services, requiring skill, science, or peculiar qualifications. When rights arising out of contract are coupled with obligations to be performed by the contractor and involve such a relation of personal confidence that it must have been intended that the rights should be exercised and the obligations performed by him alone, the contract, including both his rights and his obligations, can not be assigned without the consent of the other party to such contract. The rule is sometimes stated by saying, “Contract rights coupled with liabilities, or involving a relation of personal confidence between the parties, can not be transferred to a third person by one of the parties to the contract without the assent of the other.” Tifton, Thomasville & Gulf Railway Co. v. Bedgood & Co., 116 Ga. 945 (43 S. E. 257). That case furnishes an illustration of the rule. The contract then before the court bound a railway company, for a sufficient consideration, to put in a side-track to connect its main line with the sawmill of a certain firm, and to transport, over its railway lumber shipped by that firm at a certain rate; and it bound the firm to ship all the lumber cut by them over the company’s railway, with a named exception. The firm entered upon the contract 'an assignment of their interest in it, and the transferee entered upon it an assignment to another firm, who sought to enforce the contract against the railway company. It was held that such a contract was not assignable without the consent of the railway company. In Sims v. Cordele Ice Co., 119 Ga. 597 (46 S. E. 841), it was held that an option or contract right to purchase designated property within a given time at a stipulated price, payable in installments, and coupled with certain other agreements, upon the credit of the person owning such right, was not assignable without the consent of the other party. In Simms v. Lide, 94 Ga. 553 (21 S. E. 220), a contract under seal was made by the owner of land to convey it to another upon payment of a stipulated price within a given time. It recited a con
In Sims v. Cordele Ice Co., supra, the two cases last cited were distinguished from the one then under consideration, on the ground that the right to purchase the property in controversy for a designated sum was neither coupled with the assumption of any further liability by' the purchaser to the seller, nor did it involve any relation of personal confidence between the parties. In other words, where it was a mere matter of paying the money and taking a title,
In Robinson v. Perry, 21 Ga. 183 (68 Am. D. 455), E. and P. entered into a contract by which P. leased from E. a lot of land for five years, covenanting to build on it a comfortable cabin, and clear and keep under good fence twenty acres of the lot or more, if he chose, and at the expiration of five years to pay E. $100 for the land, and in the meantime to pay the taxes on the lot, and then the title to the land was to be made to him by E. P. assigned his interest in the land. It was held that the interest was assignable, and that the assignees might have specific performance of E. on showing compliance with the covenants to be performed by P. In these cases the question of limiting by agreement the power to assign a contract, so as to transfer both the rights and duties of the party attempting to make the assignment, was not involved. But they throw light on the question, by illustrating the difference between the assignability of an executory contract involving liabilities and mutual obligations, and one involving merely the payment of a sum of money and the taking of title, where the purchase-money is paid or tendered. Tins distinction is important in connection with contracts which contain a provision against assignment, as well as in regard to contracts which are non-assignable-without such a provision, as will be seen later on.
It has been quite frequently said that the parties to an executory contract may in terms prohibit its assignment so that an assignee does not succeed to any rights in the contract by virtue of the assignment. This broad statement, however, is subject to certain modifications. It would hardly be held that a vendor and vendee of land could contract that the vendee should never assign or yield possession of the land sold, and thus preclude it from being seized and sold for the vendee’s debts. As to a contract for the sale of land, such a provision is simply for the benefit or security of the vendor. If the vendor receives the full purchase-price, he needs no further security, and can no longer insist on a provision against alienation or assignment, the object of which was to secure such payment or to limit his dealings in regard to the sale to his vendee. If a case might arise where other rights of the vendor than the payment of the purchase-money require protection, no such fact appears in this case. The vendor may also waive such a provision jy his conduct.
Turning now to some of the decisions in this State, in Street v. Lynch, 38 Ga. 631, Burnett purchased land from Hanna, took a bond for title, and paid him a part of the purchase-money. Lynch bought the land from Burnett, paid the entire purchase-money, and 'took a bond for title. Burnett deposited with him the grants from the State of Georgia, and promised to return home and pay the balance of the purchase-money to Hanna and then make a deed to Lynch. Instead of doing so, Burnett sold the land to Street before he paid the balance of the purchase-money to Hanna; and Burnett and Street went to the widow and father of Hanna, who had died, and Burnett paid the balance due on the land with part of the money which Street was to pay him for the land, and at his request the Hannas made the deed, not to him for Lynch’s benefit, but to Street, the subsequent purchaser. Chief Justice Brown said: “Now the whole case would seem to turn upon notice. If Street, at the time he made the purchase, had notice of the sale to Lynch, he took subject to the rights of Lynch, and held the land as the trustee for Lynch, and the most he could claim was that Lynch pay him the amount of balance of purchase-money paid by him to Hanna, when he was bound to make Lynch a deed and deliver the possession to him.” In Brown v. Crane, 47 Ga. 483, it was held: “Where ‘M’ held a tract of land under bond for titles from ‘W’ and sold the same to ‘O’ executing a bond to make a fee-simple title so soon as he obtained a title from ‘W,’ ‘C’ paying the purchase-money in full, and ‘B,’ with a full knowledge of these facts, confederating with others, by threats, etc., induced ‘M’ to sell the land and to transfer to him ‘W’s’ bond, under which transfer ‘B’ procured a deed from ‘W’: Held, that a demurrer to a bill filled by ‘G/ setting up the foregoing facts and praying that ‘B’ may be decreed to execute to him .a title to said land, was properly overruled.” Chief Justice Warner in the opinion said:
It is true that in the cases from which quotations are made above, the original bond for title did not contain a stipulation against a transfer. But if we are correct in the statement which we have made, that the ground on which such a stipulation can be sustained in an executory contract is for the protection of the vendor, that there was no hint of any right on the part of Mrs. Holmes requiring protection except to secure payment of the purchase-money, and that when she had been fully paid she could not further insist on such a stipulation as against the grantee of her purchaser, then, under the facts of this ease, the stipulation in the bond for title had served its purpose and was no longer of force. Mrs. Holmes did no more than protect herself by such a stipulation until she received her purchase-money. She had received it in full. She conveyed her title and took up her bond for title. While she was named as a party in the action, it appears in the evidence that she died, and no administrator appears to have been made a party; so that neither she in her lifetime nor her administrator after her death appeared and sought to enforce the stipulation against assignment. The only persons who are attempting to assert priority over the rights of Singletary, and who claim that Singletary has no interest because of such stipulation in the original bond, are Grimsley, who took with notice of Singletary’s rights, and sought to get advantage of the payments which had been made by the latter, and Caroline Cowart, who could not set up such a claim against her
Under the facts as disclosed by the evidence, Grimsley and Caroline Cowart could not defeat Singletary’s right because of the stipulation in the bond from Mrs. Holmes to Caroline Cowart that it should not be transferred.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I can not concur in the decision reached by my learned brethren in this case. The evidence tends to show that Mrs. Holmes owned a farm in Early county. She had leased it for a number of years to Singletary, who in turn subrented it, first to Shep Cowart, and later to his wife, Caroline. At the expiration of the lease to Singletary, Caroline Cowart, whose husband had become involved in debt, and who had formerly belonged as a slave to the parents of Mrs. Holmes, made a contract of purchase for the lot of land in controversy with Mrs. Holmes for the sum of $1,250, the latter executing to Caroline a bond for title, with the stipulation that “this bond is not transferable to 'any one.” Singletary was a merchant and did a supply business. The Cowarts were indebted to him for supplies for the farm. Caroline, before the first purchase-money note became due, and before she had paid any of the purchase-money, executed a deed to the land to Singletary, “for and in consideration of, that A. J. Singletary will comply with the conditions of the bond she holds from Mrs. E. E. Holmes, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.” Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Singletary executed an instrument by the terms of which he declared that he had “leased to Caroline Cowart all of the cleared land” on the lot in controversy for a term of six years, the consideration of the lease being 1,750 pounds of middling lint-cotton payable Oct. 1st each year. It is stipulated in this lease that Singletary agrees at the “termination or end of this lease, should the said Cowart pay all rents that may be due on this lease and 'all other indebtedness that she may owe said Singletary, and in addition seven hundred and fifty dollars,
From a careful inspection of the record in this case, I think that the court erred in entering a decree requiring G-rimsley to execute to Singletary a deed to the premises in dispute. I am aware of the rule that “If, after notice that another has made a contract for the purchase of land, a third person cuts in, buys it, and takes a conveyance, such person stands in the place of his vendor; and a court of equity, if it would decree a specific performance of the contract against the latter, will render a like decree against the former.” Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438. But the present case is different from the Bryant ease. There is no evidence in the instant case that Mrs. Holmes, the original vendor, ever knew that Caroline had sold to Singletary a title that she did not possess. The title was in Mrs. Holmes, and she was not bound, in selling it, to examine the records and see whether some one else claimed a title to her land. This duty may he upon a purchaser, but not upon one having the legal title and who desires to sell; and it is clear that Mrs. Holmes had the legal title. Nor is there in the record any evidence tending to show that Mrs. Holmes knew that Singletary was paying her the money for himself, but, on the contrary, Singletary testified, “I don’t reckon she did” know who the money was paid for. Hnder the circumstances, Mrs. Holmes could not be made to execute a deed to Singletary. She had not contracted .with, nor sold to him the land. She had no knowledge that he was paying her the notes as a purchaser from herself, or from Caroline. She had sold to another (Caroline), and the latter had requested that titles be made to Grimsley. How could Mrs. Holmes be made to perform specifically to Singletary when she had never contracted to do so, or in any other way become bound to do so? If she can not be made to perform specifically as to Singletary, I fail to see how her vendee can be so compelled. Mrs. Holmes’s administrator was not a party to this suit.
It- is argued that the assignee of the obligee in the bond stands in the shoes of the obligee; and that when part of the purchase-money is paid by the assignee, and the remainder is tendered by him to the vendor, the latter will be compelled to execute a conveyance. But the reply is that there was a restriction in the bond for title that it was not to be transferable. The assignee had .notice of the
But it may be insisted that such a restriction as that contained in the bond in the present- case, against alienation of-the bond for title, is against public policy and void, unless by the terms of the restriction there is a limitation over of the property, or a forfeiture of the rights of the obligee in case of alienation; and there is some authority to that effect. But if a restriction' against alienation, without a clause of forfeiture, is void as being against public policy, I fail to see why it is not equally so when there is a provision for forfeiture in case of alienation; for the foundation of this rule of public policy is that the public welfare demands that there be freedom to dispose of what one owns, and there is as much restraint on disposition where a forfeiture is imposed as when there is simply an agreement not to transfer.
Nor is the restriction void in this case because it amounts to a perpetuity. Under my construction of the bond for title, it can not be transferred until the time when the last purchase-money note is paid, and I think that this is a reasonable time within which, to limit alienation. And, as held in many jurisdictions, a contract in restraint of alienation is not void if not unreasonable. An option in a lease to be exercised within fifteen years has been held not void as against perpetuities. 1 Page on Contracts, § 382. Any other rule than this would deprive two or more persons of the right to contract; and this itself would be contrary to public
This case is very different from the Bryant case, supra, where a third person had “cut in” to deprive a purchaser of his trade. In the view I take of the case, at the time Crimsley purchased the land from Mrs. Holmes, Singletary had not effected a legal contract of purchase of the land from Caroline, on account of the restriction in the bond providing that she could' not alienate it, or with Mrs.