Appellant Roger Lee Cowards was found guilty of and sentenced to life imprisonment for felony murder. 1
*192 1. The indictment charged appellant with malice murder, felony murder with armed robbery as the underlying felony, and armed robbery. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motions for directed verdicts of acquittal on the felony murder and armed robbery charges.
There is no error in denying a defendant’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal where the evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Blackwell v. State,
The State produced evidence that the victim, the 79-year-old manager of the boardinghouse where appellant resided, bled to death as a result of 57 knife wounds which were inflicted upon him in his room at the boardinghouse. The victim suffered 29 stab wounds to his upper left chest area and his neck was sliced 17 times. Defensive wounds were found on his hands and arms. Drawers of the victim’s dresser and desk were found open, as was his briefcase. The victim’s wallet and keys were missing, and his car was not parked as he would have parked it.
Two women testified that appellant had bicycled to an apartment where he had smoked and shared crack cocaine with them. When they ran out of contraband, appellant left on his bicycle to go to the bank to get money to buy more crack cocaine. When he returned to the two women, he had blood on his clothing and was driving what was identified as the victim’s car. The women took from appellant’s bag a wallet which contained photographs of a man later identified as the victim.
As part of its case-in-chief, the State read into evidence appellant’s testimony at his pre-trial bond hearing wherein appellant asserted he had not killed anyone, but admitted he had seen the dying victim and had taken his car keys without calling for emergency assistance for the victim. In that testimony, appellant acknowledged that he had been smoking crack cocaine the night of the murder and had returned to the boardinghouse to retrieve money to buy more contraband. He also admitted that he owned a four-inch knife with a belt pouch and that he had initially lied to investigating officers by telling them he had been in his room at the boardinghouse all night.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both felony murder and the underlying felony of armed robbery.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Citing
Simmons v. United States,
We fully concur with the U. S. Supreme Court’s holding, but conclude it is inapplicable to the case at bar because appellant was not required to make incriminating statements at his bond hearing in order to receive the benefits of the Eighth Amendment’s right to bail. See
United States v. Dohm,
618 F2d 1169, 1173-1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). A defendant who has filed a petition seeking release on bail has the initial burden of showing, by means of evidence indicating roots in the community, that the defendant does not pose a significant risk of fleeing, threatening the community, committing another crime, or intimidating a witness.
Ayala v. State,
3. Appellant takes issue with several rulings made during the *194 course of the trial by the trial court.
(a) During cross-examination of the lead investigator, the trial court sustained the State’s hearsay objection when appellant’s counsel sought information not personally known to the investigator, but contained in the case investigation file. Such a line of questioning could result in the “trial by dossier” rejected by this Court in
Teague v. State,
(b) Five pages of handwritten notes were admitted after appellant’s former girl friend identified the handwriting as his. Appellant asserted that the prejudicial impact of the notes outweighed their probative value. The objection required the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine admissibility
(Smith v. State,
(c) Appellant unsuccessfully sought a mistrial when one of the women with whom he had smoked crack cocaine the night of the murder testified that she had thrown the victim’s wallet away because she feared that appellant “had done something to somebody.” Whether to grant a mistrial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal “unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial. . . .”
Stanley v. State,
4. Appellant complains that the trial court did not give a circumstantial evidence charge which emphasized that the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt must be the only reasonable hypothesis presented by the evidence. Neither OCGA § 24-4-6, the circumstantial evidence statute, nor the pattern jury instruction on circumstantial evidence requires the inclusion of the evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt when defining circumstantial evidence. The jury was instructed in another portion of the charge that it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find appellant guilty, and was instructed that a case based in part on circumstantial evidence required proof that excluded all other reasonable hypotheses save that of appellant’s guilt. There was no error in the trial court’s failure to give a charge that combined two principles *195 which were given separately in the instructions.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crime occurred on October 12, 1990. Appellant was indicted during the August 1992 term, and his trial commenced January 10,1994. The jury returned its verdict on January 27, and appellant was sentenced on February 9, 1994. His motion for new trial, filed February 17,1994, and amended January 10, 1995, was denied on March 29, 1995. Pursuant *192 to the notice of appeal filed April 7, 1995, the case was docketed in this Court on July 19. Oral argument was heard on October 17, 1995.