*1 object support to such cumulative evidence does not a claim of counsel.”). ineffective assistance of

Judgment Mercier, JJ., McMillian and concur. affirmed. July 10,

Decided 2017. appellant. Luttrell, K. for

James Attorney, Fortner, Garrett, Brian K. District A. Assistant Sean Attorney, appellee. District HEALTH,

A17A0295. COWARDet al. v. MCG INC. Presiding Judge. MILLER, Mary Bargeron (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

Catherine Coward and alleging Health, Inc., sued MCG that MCG Health terminated their employment Georgia’s in violation of Whistleblower OCGA § granted summary judgment Health, 45-1-4. The trial court to MCG appeal, contending, alia, and Plaintiffs now inter each prima 45-1-4; established a facie case of retaliation under OCGA § terminating that MCG Health’s true reasons for their discriminatory; were and that the reasons articulated MCG Health pretextual.1 thorough for their termination were After a review ofthe record, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to show this Court that their complaints triggered by Georgia afforded Whistle- Therefore, blower Statute. neither Coward nor established engaged purposes establishing that she in a 45-1-4, a grant facie case under OCGA and we must affirm the summary judgment to MCG Health.

Summary judgment proper genuine when there is no judgment issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to applies as a matter of law.A de novo standard ofreview to an appeal grant summary judgment, from a and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences light it, drawn from in the most favorable to the nonmovant. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish a facie case of Consequently, retaliation. the trial court did not reach the issues of whether MCG Health’s true terminating discriminatory reasons for were or whether its stated doing pretextual. reasons for so were *2 Caldon v. Bd. the Univ. (Citation omitted.) see also v. (715 487) (2011); Tuohy City of Atlanta, viewed,

So the record shows that Plaintiffs are nurses. registered Coward for MCG Health in 2001 and was trained as began working nurse.2 for MCG Health in 2004 as charge Bargeron began working a Senior Staff R.N. and also worked as a nurse. charge Initially, unit, Plaintiffs were to the child and adolescent assigned psychiatric and worked in the adult unit they occasionally psychiatric (herein- after the “Adult Unit”). Plaintiffs were to work in the Adult August reassigned 11,2009,

Unit on a basis. On Coward was regular September assigned to work as the nurse for the 3:00 to 11:00 shift in the charge p.m. p.m. Adult Unit. Coward had been the nurse in the Adult Although charge before, Unit she asked another nurse to take including prior day, her nurse for that shift. Coward did not place charge report to at MCG Health or to the unit change assignments any manager clerk who administrative for the Adult Unit. This provided support was the first time Coward had her nurse changed charge assignment since her transfer to the Adult Unit. 15, 2009,

On the Coward was evening September working the Adult Unit when a in that ward suicide. patient attempted Coward’s came in that and took statements from the night staff, Coward. Coward told her that she believed including suicide resulted from in the Adult attempted short-staffing later, Unit. One week MCG Health terminated Coward’s employment duties as nurse on perform assigned charge 11, 2009. September 31, 2010,

On to work as the May charge nurse in the Adult Unit. The unit was and there was no unit busy, clerk when arrived for her shift at 3:00 twice p.m. Bargeron understaffed, called her the unit was manager report told her both times to obtain the Bargeron’s manager necessary official status from the shift’s nurse so as to report3 charge call, shifts. transition between the two the second During phone 2 According Dictionary, charge to the Merriam-Webster nurse is a nurse who is in hospital, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charge of one section of a nurse. 3 Bargeron deposition obtaining report meeting testified in her the status involved unit, already regarding many patients with the staff in the Adult Unit how were in the what is care, going patient, including patient’s on with each each level of and whether were expecting any new admissions. *3 informed her that she had not obtained a status Bargeron manager nurse,4 from the shift’s and refused to report prior charge Bargeron forward with her The instructed go staffing assignment. supervisor home, and, later, to a few MCG Health terminated Bargeron go days for shift. Bargeron’s employment refusing May Health, Plaintiffs filed suit MCG subsequently against alleging that it retaliated them for out about the understaff- against speaking and terminated their in violation of OCGA 45-1-4 the “Whistleblower (hereinafter Statute”).5 Following discovery this MCG Health moved for that summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs failed to establish a facie case of retaliation. MCG Health further it had argued legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for and that Plaintiffs terminating could not show that the reasons for their termination were pretex- Health, tual. The trial court to MCG and granted summary judgment this ensued. appeal

1. On Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in appeal, to MCG Health. We granting summary judgment disagree. 45-1-4, The Whistleblower OCGA § from a prohibits public employers (1) retaliating against a violation of or public employee disclosing noncompli- ance with a to either a a a government agency; (2) retaliating against public to, in, to employee objecting of the activity, policy, public employer has reasonable cause to believe is in viola- public employee tion of or Caldon, and at

(Citation punctuation omitted.) 158. Our courts have appellate repeatedly explained statute, this fundamental construing [Cjourt applies

[i]n rules of construction us to construe statutory require [that] terms, a statute to its words their give and to look for the intention of ordinary meaning, diligently 4 Bargeron got general “report” testified that she based on her own assessment of the unit prior charge and the “little bit” of information she was told admitted, however, shift’s nurse. report that she told her that she never obtained a status from the nurse, got report. shift’s and she admitted that she never an official status grievance process Both Coward and availed themselves of the internal terminations, appeal upheld. their which were

319 Assembly. plain language the General Where the ofa statute susceptible only construction, is clear and of one reasonable we must construe the statute to its terms. (Citations omitted.) Eady, (3) (b) (773 321, Lue v. 297 Ga. evaluating

In the context of whether a state whistleblower claim subject summary adjudication, this Court utilizes the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis used in Title VII retaliation cases. Tuohy, supra, (1); Douglas at 848-849 see McDonnell Corp. Green, 792, 1817, v. 411 U. S. 802-806 SCt 36 LE2d (1973). Douglas plaintiff framework,

Under the McDonnell prima must first make a facie case of retaliation. If the plaintiff prima production makes a the burden of employer legitimate, shifts to the to articulate some nondis- criminatory reason for the decision. If the employer successfully production, meets this burden of then plaintiff the burden shifts back to the proffered to show that each pretext. reason was

(Citations omitted.) Tuohy, supra, (1). appeal, specifically argue

On Plaintiffs satisfied the (i) public employer; facie case because MCG Health was a (ii) they engaged they complained activities when about (iii) they issues; and were terminated as a result of their conduct.

To establish a facie case of retaliation under the Whistle- blower public employee (1) must demonstrate that [she]

employed by public employer; (2) made a [she] objection; (3) employ- suffered an adverse [she] (4) relationship action; ment there is somecausal between and the adverse action. (Citations omitted.) and footnote Albers v. Bd. Ga. Ga.App. (1)(766 SE2d 520) (2014); Univ. see Dept. Svcs., also Forrester v. Human Ga. (1) (a) (708 660) (2011) (physical precedent only). *5 case,6 the second of the

Addressing prong of the Whistleblower Statute Coward and language required to show that either disclosed a violation of or they (1) noncompliance law, rule, with a to a or to or regulation supervisor7 (2) objected refused to in an that participate activity, policy, practice law, believed to be in violation of or reasonably noncompliance rule, or See OCGA 45-1-4 Under the Whistle- (d) (2), (3). § law, rule, federal, state, blower “includes regulation any or local statute or ordinance or rule or any regulation adopted federal, state, or local statute or ordinance.” OCGA any § 45-1-4 (a) (2). Coward made a .

(a) objection Whether Coward to her the Adult Unit was complained supervisor suicide, short-staffed after a which Coward attrib patient attempted uted to an insufficient ratio. Coward also told her nurse-to-patient that she thought short-staffing affecting patient care and was a “chronic these problem.” making complaints, Coward identified internal only operating procedures Indeed, as the basis for her concerns. she admitted in requirements that she never identified to her deposition violated aris understaffing any regulation. Complaints not, however, under internal are of policies type the Whistleblower Statute was intended to Edmonds activity protect. of Ga., v. Bd. the Univ. 6-7 System (1) (689 of concern under an internal 352) (2009) (a safety arising policy not a under the in statute), disapproved part on other v. Bd. ts the Univ. grounds, Regen Wolfe n. 5 (2) (d), favor, Construed in Coward’s her own and the record testimony, whole, that, termination, as a show to her Coward failed to that would have under the engage any activity triggered protection Moreover, Whistleblower Statute. no evidence showed that she objected to or refused to that she activity, policy, of, with, believed to be in violation or in law, rule, or of whether these regulation. Regardless apparently serious concerns have been the lack of sufficient may justified by for MCG Health’s Coward did not nursing support patients, allege engage protected activity, Because we conclude that Plaintiffs did not we need not “public employer” decide whether MCG Health is a under the Whistleblower Statute and we express opinion apparently open question. no on this undisputed It is that neither Coward nor made disclosures to an outside government agency. (a) (1), (d) (2). See OCGA 45-1-4 *6 law, rule, that MCG Health violated a response or until she filed her summary judgment. to MCG Health’s motion for reaching conclusion, this we need not determine what termi- nology required trigger of the Whistleblower requires specific magic Statute, nor do we believe that the statute pre-termination words. All we conclude is that Coward’s statements supervisors to her hospital’s about that was inconsistent with the policy, any allegation

internal without that this understaff- regulation, law, rule, violated a is insufficient. assuming deciding Thus, even without that Coward met the required other elements of a she failed to show that objection and, therefore, she made a she failed to establish a facie case ofretaliation under the Whistleblower (d) (2), (3); supra, Ga.App. Edmonds, Statute. See OCGA 45-1-4 § (1). at 6-7

(b) made a disclosure. Whether Bargeron’s favor, Construed in the record shows that she also complained supervisor only patient lacking to her care was hospital because the was short-staffed and not that MCG Health engaged any activity Consequently, unlawful for the reasons set Bargeron, above, Coward, forth like did not disclose a violation or comply regulation prior failure to with to her Hosp. Auth., termination. See Brathwaite v. Fulton-DeKalb (2) (729 111, 115 (c) Bargeron objected participate to or in an Whether refused activity, policy which she believed to be in violation analysis Bargeron’s here, however, Our claim does not end because she was terminated for shift as Unit, nurse in the Adult and she testified that she refused her shift understaffing. Bargeron’s due to concerns about concerns were based hospital staffing specific on internal standards and the needs of the patients well-founded, in the unit at that time. No matter how we are Bargeron’s general safety regarding constrained to find that concerns understaffing procedures hospital’s operating in the unit based on the internal qualify

do not under the language (d) (3); supra, Edmonds, of the statute. See OCGA 45-1-4 (1). Compare Albers, at 62 (1) (a) (factual question regarding university remained whether police reasonably engaged protected whistleblowing activity chief where he university

believed that the administration had obstructed justice by interfering in violation of the law with a criminal investi- gation). Consequently, Bargeron also failed to establish that she objected activity, policy, practice to or refused to *7 which she believed to be in violation of or qualify so as to for the ofthe Therefore, Whistleblower Statute. she likewise failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Bargeron engaged

Because neither Coward nor in conduct qualified Statute, that the trial court requirements under the Whistleblower

properly satisfy concluded that failed to the holding, for a facie case of retaliation. In so we recognize importance employees raising safety concerns. Never- Bargeron’s theless, well-intended, and no matter how Coward’s and activity specifically given legal conduct did not rise to the level of protection penalty by legislature. Edmonds, under of law our See (1). Compare supra, Albers, (1) (a). engage activity at 62 Since Plaintiffs failed to that would trigger protection under the Whistleblower the trial court properly granted summary judgment to MCG Health. light

2. In of our conclusion in Division 1 that Plaintiffs failed to they engaged protected activity, establish that we need not address remaining enumerations of error. Judgment Barnes, J., McMillian, J., P. concurs. con- affirmed. judgment only. curs in Judge, concurring judgment only.

McMlLLIAN, majority While I concur with the result reached in this agree Accordingly, case, I do not with all that is said. I concur in the judgment only, majority’s opinion binding result, and as a is not precedent. Appeals (a). See Court of Rule 33 201 Decided June July

Reconsideration denied appellants. Brown, M. John

Constangy, Prophete, Brooks, III, & Frank L. Butler Smith Alyssa Jeffery Thompson, appellee. Peters, K. L. H.,

A15A1092. In the Interest of D. V. a child. (802 887) Presiding Judge. McFADDEN, H., In In the Interest D. V.

(2015), juvenile delinquency we affirmed the court’s dismissal of two petitions brought by against the state D. V. H. In In the Interest of