This is an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been received in a collision between plaintiff’s automobile and a street car operated by defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $18,000. On the hearing of the mоtion for a new trial the court, with plaintiff’s consent, reduced the judgment to $7,000 and denied the motion. Defendant appeals from the judgment.
Much of the evidence is conflicting, but as we must resolve every conflict in favor of the verdict our statement of faсts will recite the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was driving south on Forty-third Avenue in the city and county of San Francisco, and the street car was going west on Fulton Street, which is an arterial. The plaintiff and other witnesses testified that she stopped at the arterial; there was other testimony that she was going fast on Forty-third Avenue and merely slowed at the intersection. She first saw the street car when she came to the. intersection and the car had then not reached Forty-second Avenue. Shе testified that as she started up again the street car was at Forty-second Avenue and she did not know whether it was moving or standing. She proceeded at the rate of about *645 six miles per hour and did not see the car again until her front wheels were on the nоrtherly track and the car was almost upon her. Her automobile was struck on the left front side, shoved off the tracks but not overturned, and the street car went from three-quarters of a block to a block before it stopped. Various witnesses estimated the speed of the street car at between 12 and 15 miles per hour and between 40 and 45, depending upon their interest in the litigation. In all eases the speeds mentioned were said to be the usual speed of street ears at this particular plaсe. Plaintiff drove over this intersection almost daily on her way to work, knew that the ears went fast, and testified that when she first saw the ear it seemed to be going at a normal rate of speed. The intersection was an “obstructed” one on a closely built-uр street in a residential district. The street car approached the intersection without giving any warning by bell or other signal.
Upon this evidence respondent argues that the jury was justified in finding that appellant was negligent and that she used reasonable care and that, though the alleged excessive speed of the street ear was not noticed, she had the right to assume, after looking once, that appellant would act within the law and approach the intersection in a prudent manner. We are satisfied, without further repetition of the evidence, that it is sufficient to support the verdict on these two issues. This controls the appeal as to these issues under the settled rule recently followed in
Crawford
v.
Southern Pac. Co.,
3 Cal. (2d) 427 [
*646 In compliance with the rules of court appellant’s brief contains a stаtement of six questions as those involved on the appeal. Three of these are merely restatements of the same issue—the right of way on an arterial or boulevard; two are restatements of a related issue—the application of sрeed limits on arterials; the sixth presents the question of respondent’s asserted contributory negligence. The questions relating to the right of way and to the speed limits on arterials are argued under assignments of error to instructions given and to instructions propоsed by the appellant and refused. It would serve no good purpose to quote at length either the instructions complained of or those refused. They all relate to the one theory advanced by the appellant—that, because Fulton Street was designated as an-arterial, the appellant had the “right of way”. This may be granted but, in doing so, we do not concede the result which appellant insists should follow. The decisions are uniform that all speed regulations are referable to the primary demand that all vehicles shall be operated at “a careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper” and that they shall not be operated in such a way “as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person”. (Calif. Vehicle Act, Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act No. 5128, sec. 113.) Thus the so-called statutory speed limits are merely directory and, though a speed in excess of such limits may be made prima facie evidence of negligence, it is not conclusive evidence and that is аs far as these instructions went.
But appellant’s theory that it had an absolute and uncontrolled right of way over all vehicles approaching the arterial is not supported by any authority cited. “Right of way” merely means a preference to onе of two vehicles asserting the right of passage at the same place and at
approximately
the same time. It was never intended that a vehicle should be charged with negligence
“per
se” if it attempted to cross an arterial when any other vehicle was approaching on the arterial at any distance whatever. Again emphasizing that negligence is the subject-matter of the inquiry the question reverts to the simple matter of what is negligence, or what would a reasonable person do under the circumstancеs. If the jury determines that a reasonable person might cross an arterial when a street car is seen ap
*647
proaching a block distant then all the niceties of court instructions become purely academic. We had the same question before us in
Keyes
v.
Hawley,
Under the facts proved respondent entered the intersection when appellаnt’s street car was a block distant (270 feet)— so far away that she was unable to say whether it was moving or standing still. The authorities cited effectively dispose of the argument that, under such conditions, the street ear had the right of way and as effectively compel the conclusion that the question of respondent’s contributory negligence was one of fact to be left to the jury.
In the matter of the limits of speed the trial court instructed the jury that, under the municipal traffic ordinance, it was lawful to operatе the street car at a speed not in excess of fifteen miles an hour when traversing the intersection and that speed in excess of this was
“prima facie
but not conclusive evidence of a speed greater than is reasonable and proper’’. The ordinаnce was received in evidence without objection and the particular sections relating to speed of street cars were read to the jury without objection. In the instructions complained of the trial court strictly followed the terms of the ordinance. But the appellant argues that these instructions should not have been given
*648
because these provisions of the ordinance are inapplicable to traffic on an arterial.
Gritsch
v.
Pickwick Stages System,
Appellant uses the same authority in support of his criticism of an instruction that the operator of the street car should “anticipate the presence on the public street of other-persons exercising ordinary care”. This is far different from the instruction criticised in the Gritsch ease, which advised the jury thаt the operator of the stage should anticipate that other vehicles would enter the boulevard “in violation of law”. Without further elaboration we are satisfied from our examination that the jury was fully and fairly instructed on all these issues and that the ablе trial judge did not err in the refusal to give any of those proposed by the appellant.
*649 We have covered all the questions stated by appellant 1o be involved on this appeal, but appellant’s brief discusses other questions which will require brief comment. The elementary principle that a street car traveling on fixed rails must have the right of way over other movable traffic may be conceded, but it has no application to the facts of this case. The repetition of the arguments on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence is answered by what we said in the beginning. Respondent’s witnesses placed her at the intersection of Forty-third Avenue when the street ear was at Forty-second. Appellant’s motorman testified that he saw the respondent approach the intersection and that “she did not stop at the arterial sign”. If the jury believed respondent’s witnesses the charge of contributory negligence falls; if the jury believed the motorman then his negligence is established, becausе the only conclusion which could follow is that, after he saw that respondent would be in a place of extreme danger, he deliberately operated the street car at such an excessive and reckless speed that he could not аvoid the injury.
The criticism of the evidence and the instruction relating to respondent’s loss of profits from her business is answered by
Hollander
v.
Wilson Estate Co.,
The criticism of the instruction relating to damages for aggravation of a preexisting disease is without merit. The evidence was conclusive that respondent was suffering from an infection of the colon at the time of the accident and developed chronic ulcerative colitis as a result of the injury. No claim is made that the verdict, as reduced by the trial court, is an excessivе award for the permanent injuries alone suffered by the respondent.
No other point discussed in the briefs requires consideration.
The judgment is affirmed.
Sturtevant, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
A petition by appellant to have the. cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on October 3, 1935.