Mattie Jean Covington (hereinafter wife) appeals from the Order entered January 2, 1992 dismissing her exceptions to the recommendations of the hearing officer and affirming the Order entered September 24, 1990 finding wife in contempt for failing to pay alimony pendente lite (APL) to Alva Covington (hereinafter husband) as ordered.
The parties were aware that prior to their marriage, each had been married to another person. Wife was divorced on May 18, 1971. On May 24, 1971, an uncontested divorce hearing which husband did not attend was conducted with regard to husband’s previous marriage. Believing in good faith they were divorced from their prior spouses, the parties on that same day applied for a marriage license and on May 29, 1971, were married. It was not until June 11, 1971, hоwever, that a decree was entered divorcing husband from his previous wife. With the exception of a short separation in
§ 1702. Marriage during existence of former marriage
(a) General rule.—If a married person, during the lifetime of the other person with whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequеnt marriage pursuant to the requirements of this part and the parties to the marriage live together thereafter as husband and wife, and the subsequent marriage was entered into by one or both of the parties in good faith in the full belief that the former spouse was dead or that the former marriage has been annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without knowledge of the former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has been remоved by the death of the other party to the former marriage or by annulment or divorce, if they continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith оn the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from and immediately after the date of death or the date of the decrеe of annulment or divorce.
Wife argues the court erred in finding the marriage was valid. She contends 23 Pa.C.S. § 3304
In support of her position, wife cites In Re Estate of Garges,
Wife’s reliance upon Garges is misplaced because the parties’ marriage in that case was not entered into pursuant to the Divorce Code, licensing and a marriage ceremony registered in the Marriage License Bureau, but instead was a common law marriage. Therefore, the curative statute, sec
We find, since section 1702(a) is directly appliсable, the parties were legally married on June 11, 1971, the date husband’s divorce became effective. The trial court concisely yet cogеntly set forth the rationale for such a finding.
As the record indicates in this case, the parties in good faith believed that they were entering into a valid maritаl relationship. Wife admitted that they conducted themselves as husband and wife. To permit Wife to now deny the existence of this marriage after eighteеn years solely because the divorce decree for [husband and his prior wife] was entered on June 11,1971, and not May 24,1971, and the fact that Wife was not aware of this would be contrary to the purposes of the statute and public policy.[2 ]
(Slip Op., Baldwin, J., 5/13/92, pp. 5-6.)
Next, wife argues section 3304 of the Divorce Code requires an undеrstanding by the parties, not present here, that the impediment had been in place prior to confirming the marriage by cohabitation following its remоval. We disagree with wife and find knowledge of an impediment and its removal is not required under section 3304 to make an otherwise void marriage valid. Where, as here, the parties entered
Order affirmed.
Notes
. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3304 states in relevant part:
§ 3304. Grounds for annulment of void marriages
. (a) General’ rule.—Where there has been no confirmation by cohabitation following the removal of an impediment, the supposed oralleged marriage of a person shall be deemed void in the following cases:
(1) Where either party at the time of such marriage had an existing spouse and the former marriage had not been annulled nor had there been a divorce except where that party had obtained a deсree of presumed death of the former spouse.
. The trial court is averring that the wife is estopped from denying the validity of her marriage after рarticipating in the illegal ceremony but continuing to retain the benefits that the status of marriage confers until it no longer suits her convenience. Because we have an available statutory remedy to the issue in this case, it is unnecessary to look to the equitable doctrine of estoppel to properly resolve this issue. It is a viable doctrine in the event the legislature had not supplied a remedy.
