70 Neb. 313 | Neb. | 1903
This is a foreclosure proceeding brought by the county of Valley against Maggie B. Milford and her husband, to foreclose a lien for taxes upon certain property owned by the Milfords in Ord, in that county. The petition pleads five causes of action, each for taxes against the same property for separate years. The first four causes of action are upon sale certificates issued by the county treasurer, upon sales made to the county, in accordance with law,’ after the property had been offered at public tax sale and remained unsold for want of bidders. The fifth cause of action was an attempt on the part of the county to foreclose its general lien for taxes, without a sale having first been made and a certificate issued. The regularity of the assessment and levy of the taxes was conceded, and the petition of the county was sufficient to recover upon all the causes of action except the fifth, unless the several causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Milfords interposed general demurrers to each cause of action. The demurrers were sustained as to the first
As to the first contention, it may be regarded as finally settled against the rights of a county to foreclose in the absence of a sale, by the determination of this court in the case of County of Logan v. Carnahan, 66 Neb. 685. Of the soundness of the conclusion reached in that case we have no doubt. It follows that the action of the trial court, in decreeing a foreclosure as to the fifth cause of action, is wrong and must be reversed.
There can be no doubt of the right of the county to purchase at private tax sale under the provisions of both section 1, article 4, and section 1, article 5, chapter 77, Compiled Statutes, and this right has been expressly recognized by this court in County of Lancaster v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119, and County of Lancaster v. Trimble, 33 Neb. 121.
It follows, therefore, that the only remaining question requiring determination in this case is, whether the limita
“They (the county commissioners) may, in the name of their respective counties, proceed by action at any time before the expiration of five years from the date of such sale, to foreclose such certificates or liens in the district court of such county.”
In view of the constitutional provision which provides that the tax debtor may redeem from the tax sale at any time within two years, and in view of other provisions of the statute, this court has repeatedly held that the five years, within which foreclosure proceedings might be brought, did not commence to run until the expiration of the two years within which the tax debtor might redeem from the sale. This rule has been so repeatedly announced by this court that the question may be no longer regarded as an open question. It follows, therefore, that proceedings to foreclose under a tax sale certificate must be brought by the ordinary tax sale purchaser within seven years from the date of the sale upon Avhieh the certificate was issued.
There would seem to be no valid reason why the statute of limitations should not be held to apply to a foreclosure brought by a county, upon a tax sale certificate issued under the provisions of section 1, article 4, chapter 77, inasmuch as the section which authorizes the purchase, in express terms, limits the time within which the county can bring its foreclosure proceeding. Such being the evident purpose and intent of the legislature, we are constrained to hold that the county must exercise its right to foreclose upon a tax sale certificate issued to it, within seven years from the date of such certificate, or its action Avill be by the statute. ■
It is contended on behalf of the county that, if the section quoted from be held to be a limitation upon the right of the county to foreclose, such section is, to that extent, unconstitutional; that, under the provisions of section
In the case of Foree v. Stubbs, 41 Neb. 271, this court said:
“The provision of the revenue law by which taxes are declared to be a perpetual lien is designed for the benefit of the state and the different municipalities which are authorized to provide revenue by taxation.”
To the same effect is Johnson v. Finley, 54 Neb. 733. The county, therefore, does not in any way waive its lien by a purchase at tax sale; it simply takes advantages of one of the provisions of the statute, to enable it to procure a judicial sale of the property that will devest the title of
We'are, therefore, of the opinion that while the statute of limitations in this particular case applies to a foreclosure of a tax lien by a county, yet, upon a sale for taxes to the county, and the failure of the county to institute and prosecute to completion a foreclosure of its lien, the county’s lien for taxes is not devested and the county must again purchase at tax sale for the years covered by its prior purchase, and must, within the period fixed by law, foreclose upon its second purchase; and that the lien of the county for taxes is not devested except upon the judicial sale resulting from foreclosure proceedings, or the payment of the taxes.
It appearing in this case that more than seven years had elapsed from the date of the sale, in each cause of action, before the commencement of the proceedings, the first, second, third and fourth causes of action were wholly barred by the statute of limitations. It follows that the judgment of the trial court as to the first and second, causes of action was right, and as to the third, fourth and fifth causes of action, was wrong. It is therefore recommended that the judgment of the lower court be reversed and the proceedings dismissed.
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the proceedings dismissed.
Reversed.