Appeals from three judgments of the Supreme Court (Demurest, J.), entered July 31, 2013 and September 9, 2013 in St. Lawrence County, which partially granted petitioner’s applications, in three combined proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 and actions for declaratory judgment, to annul three determinations of respondent Commissioner of Health disallowing petitioner’s claims for Medicaid reimbursements.
As of 1984, the state became fully financially resрonsible for Medicaid services provided to certain mentally disabled recipients, in what were called overburden expenditures (see Social Services Law § 368-a [1] [h]). In practice, the counties— which are also social services districts for Medicaid purposes— would initially pay the state for these Medicaid expenditures and the state would reimburse the counties. When the Medicaid Cap Statute went into effect in 2006, it altеred the funding formula for Medicaid in general (see L 2005, ch 58, § 1, part C, § 1). Respondent Department of Health (hereinafter DOH) took the position that it was no longer obligated to reimburse counties for overburden expenditures incurred prior to January 1, 2006, but this Court and others declared that the state was still obligated to make such reimbursements (see Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Daines,
While that litigation was pending, the Legislature enаcted a 2012 amendment, which provided that,
“[notwithstanding the provisions of [Social Services Law § 368-a] or any other contrary provision of law, no reimbursement shall be made for social services districts’ claims submitted on аnd after the*91 effective date of this paragraph, for district expenditures incurred prior to January 1, 2006, including, but not limited to, [overburden expenditures]” (L 2012, ch 56, § 1, part D, § 61).
After the April 1, 2012 effective date of that amendment, petitiоner submitted three separate claims to DOH seeking reimbursement for overburden expenditures incurred prior to 2006. DOH denied those claims, citing the 2012 amendment. Petitioner commenced these three combined proсeedings and declaratory judgment actions seeking, among other things, to annul respondents’ determinations on those claims, a declaration that the 2012 amendment is unconstitutional and an order directing DOH to review, verify and pay any legitimate overburden expenditures. Supreme Court partially granted petitioner’s applications, annulling DOH’s three determinations, finding the 2012 amendment unconstitutional because it retroactively extinguished petitioner’s vested right to reimbursements, ordering DOH to review and pay any of petitioner’s legitimate claims and ordering DOH to identify, verify and pay the total unpaid overburden expenditures that petitioner incurred prior to 2006. Respondents appeal.
Initially, despite respondents’ argument to the contrary, their assertion that petitioner, as a political subdivision of the state, can have no due process claim against its creator, is essentially a challenge to petitioner’s capacity (see City of New York v State of New York,
The 2012 amendment did not retroactively extinguish petitioner’s vested right to reimbursement pursuant to Social Services Law § 368-a (1) (h). “[A] statute is not deemed impliedly modified by a later enactment unless the two are in such conflict that both cannot be givеn effect. If by any fair construction, a reasonable field of operation can be found for [both] statutes, that construction should be adopted” (Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation,
Social Services Law § 368-a and the 2012 amendment can be read together and “interpreted to achieve legislative objectives that are not inherently inconsistent with each other” (Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah,
The 2012 amendment is not unconstitutional. Petitioner contends that, to the extent that it extinguishes petitioner’s right to reimbursement that had already accrued, the amendment violates petitioner’s due process rights. However, we have herewith determined that the amendment did not extinguish petitioner’s substantive right to reimbursement; the amendment only prevents petitioner from obtaining any remedy in relation to that right after a certain date. The amendment did not, therefore, retroactively affect any substantive rights, but was only retroactive in that “it shorten [ed] a limitations period for claims that accrued prior to the statutе’s effective date”
While the Legislature did not expressly set a grace period in the 2012 amendment, this Court “may uphold the constitutional validity of the retrospective application of the new statute by interpreting it” as permitting the filing, “within a reasonable time after the statute’s effective date,” of claims that would otherwise be time-barred (Brothers v Florence,
We reject petitioner’s argument that the speсial facts exception applies here so as to require DOH to approve petitioner’s claims under the law as it existed prior to the 2012 amendment (compare Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v Town of Brookhaven, 21
Finally, Supreme Court did not err in directing DOH to identify, verify and pay the total unpaid overburden expenditures that petitioner incurred prior to 2006. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available to compel a рublic officer to perform an act that is mandatory and ministerial, not discretionary, where the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought (see New York Civ. Liberties Union v State of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 184 [2005]; Matter of Johnson v Fischer,
Ordered that the judgments are modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as declared L 2012, ch 56, § 1, part D, § 61 to be unconstitutional; it is declared that L 2012, ch 56, § 1, part D, § 61 is constitutional with a grace period of six months from the date of this Court’s decision for social services districts tо submit claims to respondent Department of Health for reimbursement of overburden expenditures incurred prior to 2006; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Notes
We are mindful of petitioner’s arguments that respondents have improperly withheld records that are necessary for reimbursement, or even to determine whether such a claim exists. Considering that petitioner and other similarly situated social services districts have had more than eight years to obtain such documentation and submit claims for pre-2006 reimbursement, including many years during that time when they were aware of respondents’ errors and failure to pay some reimbursements that were owing, we deem an additional six months a sufficient time for new claims.