36 Pa. 524 | Pa. | 1860
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Were we to hold, with the plaintiff in error, that the counties in this Commonwealth are not severally made liable for the quota of state tax assessed upon the property within them, we should do violence alike to the letter and the spirit of the Act of April 29th 1844. Every part of that act points to the county as the principal debtor. After having, in the earlier sections, made provision for ascertaining the subjects of taxation and their value, and established a rate, the legislature proceeded, in the 36th, to create a board of revenue commissioners to equalize the assessments and taxes for the use of the .Commonwealth in the different counties. The duty of this board, as defined in that and the two next following sections, is to determine and adjust the aggregate value of property made taxable by law, in the city of Philadelphia, and in the several counties, adjusting those aggregates, so as to make the taxes bear as equally as possible upon all the property in the Commonwealth. They have nothing to do with the property of the individual tax-payer. To assist them in the discharge of their duties, the county commissioners of the several counties are required to furnish for their use “ a statement, under oath, of the return made by the assessors of the value, in the aggregate, of all the property liable to state tax in the said counties respectively, distinguishing real from personal estate.” The board is then to make a valuation of the property in each county, and make a record of it, one copy of which shall remain in the office of the auditor-general, “ as the valuation of the said
Nor is it any valid.objection to this construction of the act, that the county treasurer is required by law to give bond for the faithful discharge of all duties enjoined upon him in behalf of the Commonwealth, and for the payment of all moneys received by him for the use of the Commonwealth. This was required by the Act of 1834, ten years before the passage of the Act of 1844, which directed the state tax to be charged to the county, and besides he is still a county officer, in whose election or appointment the Commonwealth has no voice, and he may be removed from office or compelled to give additional security at the instance of the county commissioners.
The state tax upon the adjusted valuation being then legally chargeable to the county, the next inquiry is, whether the unpaid taxes of the years 1856 and 1857 could be charged to the county after the second Tuesday of January. The fortieth section of the Act of 1844 makes it the duty of the state treasurer to charge on his books against the county the amount remaining unpaid, if the quota of the county be not paid over before the second Tuesday in January in each year, and it is thenceforth to bear interest until paid. The act does not expressly declare when the charge on the state treasurer’s books shall be made, though it is undoubtedly a reasonable implication, that it is to be made immediately after default of payment. In this case it was not made until the 26th of November 1858, and thus the state treasurer failed to discharge his duty. But the Commonwealth is not to suffer by the laches of its agent, nor can the County of Schuylkill obtain a discharge from its liability because the state treasurer was not vigilant: United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheaton 720; 3 Mason 446; 1 Peters 325; 1 Harris 617. At most, the implied direction to charge the unpaid balance against the county immediately after the second Tuesday in January of each year, must be regarded as directory, and. especially ought it to be so held, when it does not appear that the county lost anything by the state treasurer’s delay, and when probably it has been a gainer thereby.
Nor can the fact that the bond of the county treasurer, approved by two of the judges of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Schuylkill county, was altogether insufficient in amount, either negative the liability of the county, or release it from its obligation. The liability is fixed, as has been seen, by the Act of 1844, and enough has already been said, to show that the negligence of the agents of the state cannot prejudice her, even if the judges, in taking the
It remains only to add that, in our opinion, there was no error in the instruction given to the jury respecting the appropriation of the amount recovered by virtue of the county treasurer’s bond. He had collected money belonging to the Commonwealth for which the county was not liable; more than the whole amount of his bond. When that bond was paid, it made no difference to him upon which claim of the Commonwealth it was applied. Still he had a right to direct its application. It was not contended, that he had given any direction. It was, therefore, the right of the Commonwealth to apply it as she chose, either to the payment of the state tax, or to the other indebtedness of the treasurer. The jury have found that she did not apply it to the state tax. If no application was made, either by the treasurer or the officers of the Commonwealth, then the law applied it as was most advantageous for the state, that is, to the payment of the indebtedness for which the county was not liable. This is clearly so, unless the county is to be regarded as a surety for the defaulting treasurer, and such she certainly is not. She, therefore, had no equity to interpose in the way' of either appropriation. The question, however, hardly arises, because the uncontradicted evidence on the trial was, that an appropriation was in fact made, when the money was paid, and the verdict of the jury establishes that it was not in payment of the state tax. Of course, it could not afterward be changed.
The judgment is affirmed.