128 Pa. 593 | Lancaster Cty. Ct. Qtr. Sess. | 1889
Opinion,
The question in this ease turns upon the true and proper construction of the act of April 13, 1854, P. L. 352, entitled “ An act relative to the opening of streets in the city of Lancaster.”
Prior to the year 1850 the city of Lancaster would seem to have been subject to the provisions of the general road law of the state, and damages arising from the opening of streets therein, were payable out of the county treasury. By the eighth section of the act of May 8,1850, P. L. 751, however, it was provided: “ That* no damages whatsoever, which shall hereafter occur to any person by reason of laying out any road, street, alley, or way in the city or any of the boroughs of the county of Lancaster, shall be paid out of the county treasury, but the same shall be paid by such city or borough, or by the persons whose property is benefited by the opening of such streets, roads, alleys, or ways.” This act remained in force until April 13, 1854, the date of the passage of the act first above mentioned, when the eighth section of the act of May 8, 1850, was expressly repealed, and from thenceforth damages for the opening of streets have been assessed and paid under the provisions of the act of 1854. By the act of April 18, 1873, P. L. 811, provision is made for the manner of laying out, opening and grading of the streets in the city of Lancaster, but, as it is provided therein that the damages accruing to the property owners “ shall be paid by the said city of Lancaster and the county of Lancaster in the manner and in the proportions directed by existing laws,” the rule regulating the extent of the liability of each is not thereby changed.
It is conceded that, by force of the second section of the act of 1854, all sums awarded for damages for the opening of streets in the city of Lancaster are to be. paid out of the county
“ That the commissioners of Lancaster county shall open an account with the city of Lancaster, showing the amount contributed by said city, within the past two years, towards opening roads and erecting and repairing bridges in said county, and the amount drawn from the county treasury, within the same period, for opening streets or alleys in said city; to which amount shall be charged or credited, from time to time hereafter, the sums contributed or received by said city for said purposes; and any damages that may be incurred by the opening and extending of streets and alleys, while the balance on said amount is against the city, shall be payable out of the treasury of said county, and be reimbursable out of the county treasury, only when the balance shall be in favor of said city, and to the extent of such balance.”
It is perfectly manifest that the word “ county,” the one hundred and eighteenth word in the third section, is a mere clerical error in the transcribing of the act. That the damages should be paid out of the treasury of the county and be reimbursable out of the county treasury, etc., is a manifest misuse of words. No such thing could have been in the mind of the
In making this correction we are not to be understood as correcting the act of the legislature. We are enabled to carry out the intention of the legislature, from the plain and obvious meaning of the context, in which the real purpose or intention of the legislature is manifest. It falls within the province of the courts to correct a merely clerical error, even in an act of assembly, when as it is written it involves a manifest absurdity, and the error is plain and obvious. The cases in which this power has been exercised are collected in Endlich on Statutes, § 319; and it is unnecessary to refer to them in detail. The power is undoubted, but it can only be exercised when the error is so manifest, upon an inspection of the act, as to preclude all manner of doubt, and when the correction will relieve the sense of the statute from an actual absurdity, and carry out the clear purpose of the legislature. There can be no doubt upon an inspection of this statute that the word “ county,” already referred to, should read “ city.” The section is senseless and absurd as it is written, whilst the purpose of the legislature is perfectly obvious and certain, that the ultimate obligation was intended, in the event stated, to rest on the city. It is certainly true that the enrolment of an act of assembly in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth, after its passage, and after it has received the approval of the governor, is the highest evidence of its authenticity as a law, and to this rule we firmly adhere; but it is not unworthy of mention that in the original bill, as it passed the Senate and House of Representatives, it has been shown that the one hundred and eighteenth word of the third section was in fact “ city,” instead of “ county,” and the statute, after its passage, was so published in the newspapers of Lancaster county. We mention this fact, not because it has any legal significance whatever, but because it is part of the admitted history of the case.
But this obligation of the city was to the county, upon which,
We are of opinion that the question of the liability of the city, in each case, can only be raised in a proceeding between the county and the city; that the property holder must
Upon the grounds stated,
The proceedings of the Quarter Sessions are affirmed.