159 N.Y.S. 714 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1916
The plaintiff in this action seeks to recover from the defendant the amount of certain moneys erroneously paid the town upon a distribution of certain moneys collected for bank taxes on the stock of a bank located in the city of Tonawanda. -
The complaint alleges that during the years 1909 to 1913, inclusive, the assessors of the city of Tonawanda assessed the capital stock of the First National Bank of the city of Tonawanda in the manner prescribed by law, and thereafter pursuant to law the board of supervisors of Erie county fixed the amount of taxes payable on said shares of stock in each of said years, and issued their warrant to the county treasurer as prescribed by law, commanding said treasurer to collect said taxes imposed upon said shares of stock; that said taxes so levied were collected for each of said years and secured by the county treasurer; that the board of supervisors of said county thereupon issued each year to the county treasurer their warrant directing him to pay
The defendant demurs to the complaint on the ground: first, that the plaintiff has no legal rigid to sue for the recovery of this amount in that on the face of the complaint the moneys in question belong to the city of Tonawanda and not the plaintiff; and, second, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The statute providing for the assessing and collecting of taxes on shares of bank stock is section 24 of the Tax Law.
Prior to the decision in the case of City of Utica v. Board of Supervisors, 109 App. Div. 189, it was supposed by many that the moneys received from bank taxes were to be. distributed as they were in this case, but it was held in the case cited that the city alone was entitled to the bank taxes paid. This case was followed in later cases. City of Buffalo v. County of Erie, 88 Misc. Rep. 596; People ex rel. Village of Cobleskill v. Board of Supervisors, 140 App. Div. 769; People ex rel. Lawyer v. Board of Supervisors, 39
There remains no question therefore but that the city of Tonawanda under the decisions of the court is entitled ultimately to recover payment of the moneys sought to be recovered in this action. The defendant here, however, contends that inasmuch as it is alleged in substance in the complaint that these moneys were paid the town voluntarily through inadvertence and mistake of law they cannot now be recovered back.
The general rule of law is stated by Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence and is in these words: “ The. doctrine is settled that, in general, a mistake of law, "pure and simple, is not adequate ground for relief. Where a party with knowledge of all the material facts, and without any other special circumstances giving rise to an equity in his behalf, enters into a transaction affecting his interests, rights and lia-' bilities, under an ignorance or error with respect to the rules of law controlling the case, courts will not in gen- • eral relieve him from the circumstances of his mistake.” See also Newburgh Sav. Bank v. Town of Woodbury, 173 N. Y. 55; Payne v. Witherbee, Sherman & Co., 200 id. 572.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule, and one of these exceptions arises in cases where unauthorized payments are made or acts are done by municipal or governmental authorities. It has been held repeatedly in well considered cases that the doctrine of voluntary payment cannot be invoked by a defendant to enable him to retain money of a municipality illegally paid to him. As was said by the court in Village of Fort Edward v. Fish, 156 N. Y. 374: ‘ ‘ That doctrine applies to individuals who have power to do as they wish with their own, but it does not apply to an agent of a municipal corporation, who pays out
Cases might be multiplied — it is entirely unnecessary. The distinction in cases of voluntary payments between individuals and municipalities is too well recognized. We must, therefore, overrule the contention that the payment to the town was in law a voluntary one, and for that reason the moneys secured by it cannot be recovered in this action.
We now address- ourselves to the further ground of demurrer urged by the defendant town that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to maintain this action for the reason that the moneys sought to bé recovered are the property of the city of Tonawanda and not of the county of Erie, and, therefore, the action should be prosecuted by the real party in interest and not by this plaintiff. It would seem that under the provisions of the Tax Law relating to the taxation of bank shares the county in a certain sense acts as the collecting agent of the taxes assessed and paid, and when paid holds the moneys collected in trust for the benefit of those to whom they should go under the provisions of the act. The county treasurer acts as the custodian of
We think the county had such a special interest in the fund that it can maintain this action. The case
If this view be correct, it disposes of the contentions of the defendant. The county was the technical owner of the fund, holding it as trustee and charged with the duty of properly distributing it to others entitled ultimately to receive it pursuant to the direction of the statute. Thus the county became and remained the real party in interest and the one entitled and obligated to bring and prosecute this action.
These considerations clearly distinguish this case from that of People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the defendant’s demurrer must be overruled, with costs, with the right of said defendant to answer within twenty days after service of the interlocutory judgment to be entered hereon and the payment of the costs taxed.
Ordered accordingly.