127 Pa. 197 | Pa. | 1889
Opinion,
The duty to make repairs in a highway rests at common law on the township or other subdivision of the state on which the duty of opening and making the highway rests. The local road officers represent the district for which they are chosen, and must discharge the duty of opening and repairing the highways within it. Until the law-making power intervenes and separates the duty to open from that to repair, and imposes each upon different bodies or officers, the duty is one and rests on the officers of the township in which the road lies.
Such was the law in Pennsylvania until the act of 1843, as was clearly shown in Commonwealth v. Monroe County, 2 W. & S. 495. By the act of 1843 the duty of repairing county bridges was placed, upon the county, but by the terms of the proviso and by subsequent acts about one half the counties of the state were excepted from its provisions. The county of Erie was taken out from its operation by the act of April 6,
This proceeding is not under the act of 1876, nor is it alleged that this bridge has been blown down or destroyed by casualty. The question presented is over the duty to make repairs under the provisions of the act of 1836, and we are clearly of opinion that the duty rests on the township and not on the county. The case of Howe v. Crawford County, 47 Pa. 361, on the authority of which the learned judge of the court below ruled this case, is in conflict with the Commonwealth v. Monroe County, supra, and with the rule now laid down. If the condition of the bridge is such as to justify its rebuilding under the act of 1876, it is possible that upon a proper application a mandamus may yet issue. If it is not, but its dilapidation is such that a new bridge must be built, it will be necessary to resort to a proceeding under the act of 1836. If however the question presented is. as we understand it to be, one about liability for ordinary repairs, the townships in the county of Erie are liable, and for that reason this petition should be dismissed.
The decree made in this case is set aside and the record remitted for such further proceedings as may be necessary under the foregoing opinion.