95 U.S. 360 | SCOTUS | 1877
COUNTY OF CASS
v.
JOHNSTON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*364 The case was argued by Mr. Willard P. Hall and Mr. John C. Gage for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. John B. Henderson for the defendant in error.
*365 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question presented for our determination in this case is, whether the "Township Aid Act" of Missouri is repugnant to art. 11, sect. 14, of the Constitution of that State, inasmuch as it authorizes subscriptions by townships to the capital stock of railroad companies whenever two-thirds of the qualified voters of the township, voting at an election called for that purpose, shall vote in favor of the subscription, while the Constitution prohibits such a subscription, "unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of the ... town, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall assent thereto."
In Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569, we incidentally decided the act to be unconstitutional; but the point then specially in controversy was as to the applicability of this constitutional prohibition to township organizations. It was impliedly conceded upon the argument that, if the Constitution did apply, the law could not be sustained; and we accepted this concession as truly stating the law of Missouri. Now, however, the question is directly presented, whether the provisions of the Constitution and the statute are not substantially the same. On the one hand, it is contended that the Constitution requires the actual vote of two-thirds of the qualified voters of the township in favor of the subscription; and, on the other, that the requisite assent is obtained if two-thirds of those voting at the prescribed election shall vote to that effect.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has often been called upon to construe and give effect to this statute, and has never in a single instance expressed a doubt as to its validity. The first *366 case was that of The State v. Linn County, 44 Mo. 504, decided in 1869, the year after the law was passed. That was an application for a mandamus to compel the county court to issue bonds upon a subscription made pursuant to a vote under the law; and it was contended that the act was repugnant to art. 11, sect. 14, of the Constitution, because the bonds to be issued were the bonds of the county and not of the township, and the voters of the county had not given their assent; but the court held that they were the bonds of the township, and granted the writ. Following this are the cases of Ranney v. Baeder, 50 Mo. 600; McPike v. Pen, 51 id. 63, decided in 1872; State v. Cunningham, 51 id. 479; Rubey v. Shain, 54 id. 207, decided in 1873; State v. Bates County, 57 id. 70, decided in 1874; State v. Clarkson, 59 id. 149, decided in 1875; State v. Daviess County, 64 id. 31; and State v. Cooper County, id. 170, decided in 1876, in all of which the act was in some form brought under consideration, and in no one was there a suggestion of its unconstitutionality by either court or counsel.
It is true that the objection now made to the law was in no case presented or considered; but this is sufficiently explained by the fact that in other cases a construction adverse to such a position had been given to language similar to that employed in the constitutional prohibition. In State v. Winkelmeier, 35 id. 103, decided in 1864, just previous to the adoption of the Constitution, under a law which empowered the city authorities of St. Louis to grant permission for the opening of establishments for the sale of refreshments on any day in the week, "whenever a majority of the legal voters of the city" authorized them to do so, it was held that there must be a majority of the voters participating in the election at which the vote was taken, and not merely a majority of those voting upon that particular question. The judge who delivered the opinion of the court did, indeed, say, "The act expressly requires a majority of the legal voters; that is, of all the legal voters of the city, and not merely of all those who at a particular time choose to vote upon the question." But this must be read in connection with what follows, where it is said that "it appeared that more than thirteen thousand voters participated in that election, and that only five thousand and thirty-five persons *367 voted in favor of giving to the city authority, ... and two thousand and one persons voted against it... . It is evident that the vote of five thousand out of thirteen thousand is not the vote of a majority." Taking the opinion as a whole, it is apparent that there was no intention of deciding that resort must be had elsewhere than to the records of the election at which the vote was taken to ascertain whether the requisite majority had been obtained. But, however this may be, in 1866 a similar question was presented to the same court in State v. Mayor of St. Joseph, 37 id. 270. There it was provided that the mayor and council of St. Joseph should cause all propositions "to create a debt by borrowing money," to be submitted "to a vote of the qualified voters of the city," and that in all such cases it should require "two-thirds of such qualified voters to sanction the same." A proposition to borrow money for the improvement of streets was submitted to a vote of the voters at an election called for that purpose, and resulted in a majority in favor of the measure. The mayor declined signing the necessary bonds, because "he was in doubt whether the matter was to be determined by two-thirds of all the votes polled at the special election, or by two-thirds of all the voters resident in the city, absolutely, whether voting or not." Thereupon a suit was instituted to settle this question, and to compel the mayor, by mandamus, to issue the bonds. In giving its decision, the court said: "We think it was sufficient that two-thirds of all the qualified voters who voted at the special election, authorized for the express purpose of determining that question, on public notice duly given, voted in favor of the proposition. This was the mode provided by law for ascertaining the sense of the qualified voters of the city upon that question. There would appear to be no other practicable way in which the matter could be determined." The writ of mandamus was accordingly issued. The same year the question came up again in State v. Binder, 38 id. 450. In that case the point arose under the refreshment act of St. Louis, which was considered in State v. Winkelmeier. It appeared that the authority to grant the permission in question was given at a special election called for that purpose, and that out of a vote of seven thousand and eighty-five, five thousand and fifty-one *368 were in favor of the grant, and two thousand and thirty-four against it. The cases of State v. Winkelmeier and State v. St. Joseph were both referred to; and, after quoting from the opinion in the latter case, it was said: "We think the case made here comes within the reasoning and the principles of that decision, namely, that an election of this kind, authorized for the very purpose of determining that question, on public notice duly given, was the mode contemplated by the legislature, as well as by the law, for ascertaining the sense of the legal voters upon the question submitted, and that there could not well be any other practicable way in which such a matter could be determined." These decisions had all been made, and had never been questioned, when the act of 1868, now under consideration, was passed. They were also in force, as evidence of the law of the State, when the bonds in controversy were issued; and, so far as we are advised, there has been no disposition since on the part of the courts of the State to modify them. In State v. Sutterfield, 54 id. 391, the question was as to the construction of another clause in the Constitution; and the decision was placed expressly on the ground of a difference between the two provisions. That court has in the strongest language intimated its unwillingness to interfere with its previous adjudications when property has been acquired or money invested under them. Smith v. Clark County, id. 58; State v. Sutterfield, supra.
In St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, this court gave the same construction to the phrase, "a majority of the legal voters of a township," as used in an Illinois municipal aid statute; and Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the opinion, uses this language: "It is insisted by the plaintiff that the legislature, in adopting the phrase, `a majority of the legal voters of the township,' intended to require only a majority of the legal voters of the township voting at an election notified and held to ascertain whether the proposition to subscribe for the stock of the company should be accepted or rejected; and the court is of the opinion that such is the true meaning of the enactment, as the question would necessarily be ascertained by a count of the ballot." Among other authorities cited in support of this proposition is the case of State v. Mayor of St. *369 Joseph, supra. This we understand to be the established rule as to the effect of elections, in the absence of any statutory regulation to the contrary. All qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting, unless the law providing for the election otherwise declares. Any other rule would be productive of the greatest inconvenience, and ought not to be adopted, unless the legislative will to that effect is clearly expressed. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. The County Court of Davidson et al., 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 638; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; People v. Warfield, 20 Ill. 159; People v. Garner, 47 id. 246; People v. Wiant, 48 id. 263. We conclude, therefore, that the Supreme Court of Missouri, when it decided the case of The State v. Linn County, and held the law in question to be constitutional, did not overlook the objection which is now made, but considered it settled by previous adjudications. That case is, therefore, to be considered as conclusive upon this question, as well as upon that which was directly considered and decided, and, as a rule of State statutory and constitutional construction, is binding upon us. It follows that our decision in Harshman v. Bates County, in so far as it declares the law to be unconstitutional, must be overruled.
It is further insisted that the bonds sued upon are invalid, because the railroad company to which the subscription was voted was not incorporated until the day of the election; and Rubey v. Shain, 54 Mo. 207, is cited in support of this objection. That case only decides, if it is to be regarded as authority, that a subscription cannot be made by a township until the company is incorporated, or, rather, that township subscriptions cannot be used to bring the company into existence. They are, to use the language of the judge in his opinion, not to be made the "nucleus around which aid is to be gathered." Here the company had been incorporated when the subscription was made. The decision relied upon, therefore, does not apply, and we are not inclined to extend its operation. This makes it unnecessary to inquire whether this defence could be maintained as against an innocent holder.
It is finally objected, that, as the bonds are in fact the bonds of *370 the township, no action can be maintained upon them against the county. Without undertaking to decide what would be the appropriate form of proceeding to enforce the obligation in the State courts, it is sufficient to say that in the courts of the United States we are entirely satisfied with the conclusions reached by the court below, and that a judgment may be rendered against the county, to be enforced, if necessary, by mandamus against the county court or the judges thereof, to compel the levy and collection of a tax in accordance with the provisions of the law under which the bonds were issued. The reasoning of the learned circuit judge in Jordan v. Cass County, 3 Dill. 185, is to our minds perfectly conclusive upon this subject, and we content ourselves with a simple reference to that case as authority upon this point.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting.
I feel obliged to adhere to the opinion given in Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569. If the Missouri convention which framed the Constitution of 1865 desired to prevent municipal subscriptions to railroad and other enterprises, except by the consent of a majority of the people qualified to vote in the district to be affected, I do not see what language could have been adopted more apt for the purpose than that which is actually used in the fourteenth section of art. 11: "The General Assembly shall not authorize any county, city or town to become a stockholder in, or to loan its credit to, any company, association, or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city, or town, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall assent thereto." The literal meaning of this clause seems to me unmistakably to require two-thirds of the qualified voters, whether they vote or not. The language is just as strong as that of the twenty-fourth section of art. 4, which declares that "no bill shall be passed unless by the assent of a majority of all the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly." This clause has always been construed to mean that no law can be passed unless a majority of the members vote for it, whether all are *371 present or not. And the reason of the requirement in the former case is as strong as in the latter. The people who are to pay the taxes for raising a subscription to a railroad ought not to be subjected to that burden, unless the requisite majority of the class named, that is, the qualified voters, can be induced to give their assent to it. In the one case, as in the other, absence and failure to vote is equivalent to a dissent. I concede that if the Supreme Court of Missouri has given a contrary construction to the clause, which has become the settled law of the State, we should be governed by it. But I do not understand that this has been done. In State v. Winkelmeier, 35 Mo. 103, which was decided just before the adoption of the Constitution, the question arose upon the act of 1857, which declared that "the corporate authorities of the different cities in the county of St. Louis shall have the power, whenever a majority of the legal voters of the respective cities in said county authorize them to do so, to grant permission for the opening of any establishment within the corporate limits of said cities for the sale of refreshments on any day in the week." At an election in St. Louis, five thousand persons voted in favor of giving to the city authority to grant permission to open establishments for the sale of refreshments on Sunday, and two thousand voted against it. The court held, that, in order to confer the requisite authority under the act, it required "a majority of the legal voters, that is, of all the legal voters, of the city, and not merely of all those who might, at a particular time, choose to vote upon the question." This was the express language of the court; and as at that election more than thirteen thousand voters participated in voting for the officers to be elected, it was apparent from the election returns themselves, without looking further, that a majority of the legal voters of the city had not voted for the authority; and hence it was decided that no authority had been given. It is evident that the court would have come to the same conclusion had it been shown in any other way that less than a majority of the legal voters voted for the authority. The mode of ascertaining the whole number of legal voters was not prescribed by the law. In that case, it sufficiently appeared from the election returns themselves. There is no valid reason why the same conclusion should not *372 be deduced from a registry of the legal voters. The objection that some persons not entitled to vote may be registered has no force to my mind. If any one choose to raise that issue, it might be open for him to do so; but the registry would certainly furnish prima facie evidence of the number of legal or qualified voters.
After the Constitution was adopted, a case arose on that clause of the Constitution which declares, art. 4, sect. 30, "that the General Assembly shall have no power to remove the county seat of any county, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of the county, at a general election, shall vote in favor of such removal. This was the case of State v. Sutterfield, 54 id. 391; and the court, in an elaborate argument, again held that these terms require a positive vote in the affirmative of two-thirds of the qualified voters of the county; and the court expressly says, "There is no difficulty in ascertaining what that number is, since the same Constitution provides for a registration, and points out who the qualified voters are."
In the cases relied on by the defendant in error, the precise question now under consideration was not presented to the Supreme Court of Missouri. They mostly related to forms of phraseology different from that under consideration, and are distinguishable therefrom in several particulars, which it is unnecessary now to examine. The leading case of The State v. Linn County, 44 id. 504, was cursorily examined in Harshman v. Bates County. But, not desiring to prolong this opinion by entering into a critical examination of those cases, I will simply remark, that, taking them all together, the weight of authority in Missouri is, in my judgment, on the side of the interpretation which I still feel constrained to give to the constitutional clause in question.