28 Minn. 503 | Minn. | 1881
This was an action for damages for an alleged trespass by defendant, in building and operating a railroad upon the premises of plaintiff. The defendant, by its answer, converts the action into one for the condemnation of the premises for the purposes of its road, pursuant to the provisions of Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, §§ 33, 34, thus rendering the amount or measure of compensation which plaintiff was entitled to recover the main question of the case. The controlling consideration in the determination of this question is the nature and extent of plaintiff’s interest and estate in “Court-House Square,” in the city of Mankato, of which the locus in quo is a part. The plaintiff’s contention is that the fee-simple absolute is vested in the county of Blue Earth, while that of defendant is that the county holds under a dedication of the premises by the owners, for the special and sole purpose of a site for a court-house, and hence that it has only a limited and qualified interest in the property, without any power of alienation, and that it is a mere trustee for a certain limited and special public use, and no other.
The material facts bearing upon this question are as follows:
In 1852, ten persons, pursuant to a common purpose, settled upon the lands embraced in the town-site of Mankato — some 320 acres— and made improvements on the same, and made and filed a plat thereof, showing a dedication to public use of the streets, alleys and squares marked for that purpose, on which plat the premises in controversy were marked “Court-House Square;” such settlement was
We think it clear that, under this state of facts, the county of Blue Earth is the owner in fee-simple absolute of the premises in question. There is nothing in the evidence to show that these so-called “town proprietors” ever acquired or had any interest or estate whatever in this square, or that they ever were occupants of it, within the meaning of the “Town-Site Act;” nor, in fact, that they ever dedicated it to public uses. Neither is there anything tending to show that the county ever entered or held under any dedication. According to the evidence in this case, the county was the actual and only occupant of the square, and claimed and received from the trustee a deed in fee-simple absolute, under the provisions of the act of congress, which it could only do as an actual occupant. This vested the
This, in effect, disposes of all the points made by defendant, except, perhaps, the following: Certain witnesses in behalf of plaintiff testified, in chief, as to how much, in their opinion, the block would be worth without the railroad, and then how much it would be worth with the railroad constructed. Upon cross-examination by defendant, as to the basis upon which they arrived at these estimates, it appeared that, in arriving at these values and differences in values, they adopted in their own minds, as a basis for their calculations', the process of dividing the block into lots for residence purposes, and then calculating the market value of the property by lots. On this appearing, defendant moved to strike out their evidence as incom
The fact that the county could only hold and use its property for county purposes, and could not itself devote it to residence purposes, does not affect the case. It has the right to sell it, and is entitled to receive as the measure of its compensation the same as any other owner, which would be whatever the property would be lessened in market value, not simply for the use to which it was then actually put, and upon the assumption that it would always continue to be put to that use and no other, but whatever it would be diminished in market value for any purpose to which it might ordinarily be put and for which it was suited. An owner is entitled to such sum as the property is worth in the market; — that is, to persons generally. Mills, Eminent Domain, § 168.
The court, in its charge to the jury, instructed them that this evidence informed them how witnesses made their estimates in arriving at market values, and which may or may not have been the best methods, which was a matter for the jury to consider; but that they must bear in mind that the ultimate question for their consideration and finding was the value of the entire block as it stands, and the extent to which that value has been diminished. This put the question clearly and correctly before the jury, so as to prevent any misconception on their part as to the basis of their verdict.
The defendant also excepted to the admission of evidence as to the noise, etc., of passing trains, and the inconvenience and inter
The defendant also objects to the rule adopted by the court below, in fixing the time of trial as the date at which the value of the property and the amount of plaintiff’s compensation should be fixed, instead of the date of the entry and construction of their road some ten years previously. We do not think the record shows that any such point was made in the court below; but assuming that it was, the rule adopted was the correct one. The universal rule laid down in the books is that when property is taken for public uses by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the compensation must be fixed as of the date of taking of the property; that is, at the time the public make the appropriation. Isom v. Miss. Cent. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300. That this means the time of taking and appropriating the property by appropriate legal proceedings, and not. the time of some-previous wrongful and tortious entry, necessarily follows from the constitutional provision which requires compensation to be first made. Until that time the property still belongs to the original owner. The fact that a railroad company has, in advance of proper condemnation proceedings, committed a trespass, and wrongfully taken possession of the land, gives it no right to insist that such proceedings, subsequently
Order affirmed.
Dickinson, J., having presided at the trial in the district court, took no part in the decision of this appeal.