COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee.
unknown
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Dec. 7, 1987.
Reargument Denied Jan. 19, 1988.
534 A.2d 760
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
ORDER
PER CURIAM:
Order affirmed.
MCDERMOTT, J., dissents.
Donald Minahan, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
FLAHERTY, Justice *.
The question raised by this appeal is whether the various counties of Pennsylvania are required by statute to fund the common pleas court system, and if they are, whether such a funding scheme is constitutional.
On March 16, 1985 Allegheny County filed an Application for Declaratory Judgment in Commonwealth Court addressed to that court‘s original jurisdiction,
In its Application the County alleged that for the fiscal year 1984 it expended $22,327,415 for personnel, facilities, and services necessary for the operation of the county court system and that it employed over 800 persons who were necessary for the court‘s functioning. It further alleged that because the number and compensation of employees necessary for the functioning of the court are controlled by county officials other than judges of the Court of Common Pleas, there are continuing disputes between the County and the Court of Common Pleas concerning the funding of these employees. Similarly, according to the County‘s application, there are recurrent disputes over the level of funding necessary for supporting facilities and services, which the County acknowledges it is required by statute to provide.
In response to the County‘s Application for Declaratory Judgment, the Commonwealth filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, alleging, inter alia, that the County failed to set forth a cause of action upon which
Citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), Commonwealth Court reasoned that the issues raised in this case are non-justiciable because there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate governmental branch and impossibility of an appropriate judicial remedy.” 93 Pa.Comwlth Ct. 112, 114, 500 A.2d 1267 (1985). In other words, in the view of Commonwealth Court, the matter was not capable of resolution by the courts since it had been constitutionally assigned as being within the sole province of another branch of government. In support of this view, the court made reference to this Court‘s decision in Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 469, 391 A.2d 595 (1978) in which we held that the General Assembly “has been given the constitutional power to determine what [governmental] programs will be adopted and how they will be financed.”
We disagree that the issues raised in this case are non-justiciable. The United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr defined “non-justiciability” as follows:
In the instance of non-justiciability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court‘s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.
369 U.S. at 198, 82 S.Ct. at 700, 7 L.Ed.2d at 674. Since this is a declaratory judgment action, the court‘s inquiry concerns the ascertainment of the rights of the parties and whether protection for the asserted right can be judicially
In Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), this Court recognized the authority of the General Assembly to control the state‘s finances, but the Court also recognized that the General Assembly‘s control of fiscal matters might, in particular circumstances not present in that case, be limited by the constitution. Shapp v. Sloan, therefore, is no authority for the proposition that control of the state‘s finances has been incontrovertibly and in all instances assigned to the authority of the General Assembly. Moreover, in Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 145, 439 A.2d 638 (1981), we reaffirmed the holding of Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577, 579 (1949), that although control of state finances rests with the legislature, that control is subject to constitutional limitations.
Essentially, this is a case in which Commonwealth Court was called upon to determine, by way of familiar principles of constitutional and statutory construction whether the General Assembly has imposed any obligations on the County to fund Pennsylvania‘s court system, and if it has, whether these obligations are constitutional. Since, as we have seen, the financing of state institutions has not been incontrovertibly and in all cases relegated to the direction and control of the General Assembly, and since the rights of the parties were able to be determined by construction of the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions, it was error for Commonwealth Court to hold that the case is non-justiciable and to enter judgment upon preliminary objections.
Ordinarily, we would remand for trial a case erroneously decided upon preliminary objections, but in this case Commonwealth Court also addressed the merits and resolved them against the County. Since the record is complete and we are required only to address legal, not factual questions, we will treat the case as having been decided upon the merits below.
The Judicial Code requires that County officials provide adequate staff for the courts:
Whenever necessary, it shall be the duty of county officers to appoint or detail such county staff as shall enable the judges of the courts embracing the county to properly transact the business before their respective courts.
- Salaries, fees and expenses of:
- Appointive judicial officers.
- Other system and related personnel which by statute are required to be paid by the political subdivision.
- Salaries, fees and expenses of jurors, witnesses and all other persons paid under authority of law by the political subdivision for the maintenance of judicial and related functions.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, each county shall continue to furnish to the court of common pleas and community court embracing the county, to the minor judiciary established for the county and to all personnel of the system, including central staff entitled thereto, located within the county, all necessary accommodations, goods and services which by law have heretofore been furnished by the county.
The board, subject to limitations imposed by law, shall fix the compensation of all appointed county officers, and the number and compensation of all deputies, assistants, clerks and other persons whose compensation is paid out of the county treasury, and of all court criers, tipstaves and other court employes, and of all officers, clerks, stenographers and employes appointed by the judges of any court and who are paid from the county treasury.
Next the County claims that the current system of requiring the counties to fund the respective court systems within their judicial districts is unconstitutional in that it does not create a unified court system, as is mandated by Article 5, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That provision states:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the
peace. All courts and justices of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.
(Emphasis added). Whether the county‘s claim has merit will depend, in large part, upon the meaning of “unified.”
Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary defines “unify,” in pertinent part, as follows:
to cause to be one: make into a coherent group or whole: give unity to: HARMONIZE
The County‘s claim, in essence, is that the current method of funding is inimical to a “unified judicial system,” and indeed, is fraught with dissention and conflict which produces fragmentation. In support of this claim, the County points out that because it determines the number of employees who are necessary to the functioning of the Court of Common Pleas,
Moreover, in addition to matters related to collective bargaining and pension funds, there is a history of strife between the various judicial districts and the counties regarding funding. To cite only three examples, in the leading case of Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
It goes without saying that when relations between the judicial branch and the county governments deteriorate to the point where litigation is required to settle disagreements as to funding, the relationship is neither harmonious nor unified, but rather, fragmented. The Commonwealth argues that however this may be, the framers of the 1968 Constitution did not address the question of funding, and intended, therefore, that the courts should continue to be funded as they had in the past.
While it is true that the 1968 Constitution of Pennsylvania does not specify the manner in which courts are to be funded, the constitution does require that the judicial system shall be unified. It is inconceivable that unity, in any meaningful sense of that word, can be attributed to a court system characterized by management and fiscal disagreements which periodically culminate in litigation in which the various counties and the courts within them are set off against each other as antagonists.
Although the dissent argues that the county court system is currently funded by an exercise of the taxing power delegated to the counties by the state, and that there is, therefore, no absence of unity in the system, this argument is illusory. While it may be true that the county derives its taxing power from the state, it is also true, nevertheless, that these “state” funds are being administered by local
Our interpretation of the concept “unified judicial system” depends, as does virtually all constitutional construction, not only upon a literal meaning of words, but also upon an awareness of the legal and constitutional implications of those words. In addition to the concerns already discussed, two additional matters should be mentioned.
First, the employment of staff. The purpose of a unified judicial system is to provide evenhanded, unbiased and competent administration of justice. The expectation is that cases will be processed as well in one county as another. In order to meet this expectation, however, judicial resources and staffing must be proportionately similar in all judicial districts. There must be uniform hiring practices and standards, and judges must be free to hire competent staff, not merely those referred by local political figures. If the staffing of court-related positions is treated as an opportunity to repay political debts rather than as an opportunity to serve the public by hiring qualified people who are able to make the system work efficaciously, the system will be neither evenhanded nor competent.
A second matter is the public‘s perception of the judicial system. The citizens of this Commonwealth have a right not only to expect neutrality and fairness in the adjudication of legal cases, but also, they have a right to be absolutely certain this neutrality and fairness will actually be applied in every case. But if court funding is permitted to continue in the hands of local political authorities it is likely to produce nothing but suspicion or perception of bias and favoritism. As the framers of our constitution recognized, a unified system of jurisprudence cannot tolerate such uncertainties. All courts must be free and independent from the occasion of political influence and no court should even be perceived to be biased in favor of local political authorities who pay the bills.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that the statutory scheme for county funding of the judicial system is in
However, because this order entails that present statutory funding for the judicial system is now void as offending the constitutional mandate for a unified system, we stay our judgment to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to enact appropriate funding legislation2 consistent with this holding. Until this is done, the prior system of county funding shall remain in place.3
HUTCHINSON, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
NIX, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion which MCDERMOTT, J., joined.
NIX, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The majority relies upon a non-existent constitutional mandate, which they justify by the fiction of an insolubly disruptive relationship between county government and the court system, to intrude upon the province of an equal branch of government and thereby offend a doctrine that this Court has consistently held to be sacrosanct. See, e.g., Young v. Commonwealth, Board of Probation and Parole, 487 Pa. 428, 409 A.2d 843 (1979); In re 42 Pa.C.S. § 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 394 A.2d 444 (1978); Commonwealth v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 378 A.2d 780 (1977); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977); Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971). This unabashed interference with a legislative scheme clearly within the province of the General Assembly mandates my dissent.
The two issues raised in this appeal are whether the various counties are required by statute to fund the common pleas court system from their respective tax revenues and, if they are, whether such a directive is violative of the constitutional mandate providing for a Unified Judicial System in this Commonwealth. I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that the counties are statutorily required to maintain the courts of common pleas within their county,
Relying upon Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary definition of the word “unify“, the majority proceeds from this authoritative source to conclude that the second issue must be answered in the affirmative. The underlying premise of the majority‘s position is that Article V‘s mandate for a unified system requires that the General Assembly fund the entire system by direct appropriation from the general treasury. In reaching this result the majority ignores the distinction between the obligation to provide the funding and the discretion involved in determining an appropriate scheme of funding.
The majority ignores the fact that the county‘s taxing
The mandate for a Unified Judicial System requires the state to provide for the funding of that system, but this mandate cannot be construed as directing the method by which that financing must be accomplished. Such a judgment is the prerogative of the appropriating body, and that judgment cannot properly be intruded upon by a separate branch of government, Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697 (1932). Thus the Commonwealth Court responsibly rejected this claim in concluding that the issue raised was non-justiciable because of: (1) the textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate governmental branch, and (2) the impossibility of an appropriate judicial remedy. 93 Pa.Comwlth. 112, 500 A.2d 1267 (1985). Confirmation of the latter conclusion of the Commonwealth Court is manifested by the majority‘s attempt to fashion a mandate in the instant matter.
The majority in its effort to manipulate the facts of this lawsuit to justify its intrusion upon the discretion of its
The most transparently fallacious argument raised by the majority is the contention that the interjection of the county into the financing scheme has created an air of dissension that is incompatible with the concept of a unified system. While occasional disputes between the judges of a court of common pleas and county commissioners have given rise to litigation, in each case the particular problem has been resolved. In most of those cases the disputes resulted from uncertainties as to the relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. AFSCME, District 84, 515 Pa. 23, 526 A.2d 769 (1987). Our decisions in those matters have been primarily instructive, clarifying the parameters of an effective on-going relationship. See, e.g., Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 388 A.2d 730 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 479 Pa. 440, 388 A.2d 736 (1978); Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 479 Pa. 449, 388 A.2d 740 (1978); Board of Judges, Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Seventh Judicial District, v. Bucks County Commissioners, 479 Pa. 457, 388 A.2d 744 (1978). Thus, it is inaccurate to contend that the differences brought to light and resolved in those
The underlying public policy in the area of public employment in this Commonwealth has been to establish and maintain a harmonious relationship between the public employer and the public employee.2 It must be emphasized that the public policy in furthering the harmonious relationship between public employer and public employee is not here involved. In fact the judicial system has been unique in avoiding the disruptive disputes that so frequently plague other areas of public employment (e.g., the teachers strikes) and the private sector. The instant dispute is nothing more than an instrumentality of the sovereign attempting to challenge the judgment of that sovereign. In my judgment such a controversy clearly does not justify the unprecedented response that the majority today is willing to bestow.
Implicit in the majority‘s holding is the unstated judgment that direct funding would provide a greater benefit to the operation and maintenance of the system than the present system supplies. In addition to the fact that this is not a judgment to be made by the judicial branch, the validity of that assumption is far from clear. This state is unique in its economic diversity. The cost of living varies significantly throughout the state. Presently, the salaries paid through local funding are based upon the cost of living
The utilization of the delegated taxing power of the counties in financing the functioning of the local court systems has proven helpful in insulating the judiciary from direct involvement in labor disputes with their employees. This salutory effect of the present relationship is evidenced by the fact that since the passage of Act 195,4 there has not been a strike of any group of court employees. Again, it is to be noted that the instant complaint is not being made by court employees, nor is there a complaint against the judges. The squabble is between the county and its parent as to the former‘s responsibilities in this area.
Thus, I am constrained to conclude that the constitutional challenge raised herein is totally without merit. Moreover, even if we enjoyed the prerogative of questioning the wisdom of the General Assembly‘s financing scheme, which we do not, I cannot agree with the view that direct funding
I therefore must register my dissent.
MCDERMOTT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
PAPADAKOS, Justice, dissenting.
I believe that in the spirit of comity among equal branches of government that the Applications of the Governor and the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania should be granted and we should permit them to argue their positions (in Harrisburg) vis-a-vis the Constitutional argument that they provide full funding for the entire unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania.
NIX, C.J., and McDERMOTT, J., join this dissent.