COUNTY EXEC., PRINCE GEO'S CTY. v. DoeCOUNTY EXEC., PRINCE GEO'S CTY. v. Doe
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- Before:
- Eldridge
The issue in this case concerns the circumstances under which a Maryland court may award an attorney’s fee under
I.
In County Exec., Prince Geo’s Co. v. Doe, 291 Md. 676, 436 A.2d 459 (1981) (hereafter referred to as County Executive I), this Court held that an executive order promulgated by the County Executive of Prince George’s County, which prohibited the performance of abortions at hospitals owned or operated by the County, exceeded the County Executive’s authority under the Prince George’s County Charter and was therefore invalid. A brief review of the pertinent facts underlying County Executive I is in order.
*449 Lawrence Hogan, then the County Executive of Prince George’s County, issued an executive order on August 11, 1980, which prohibited the performance of abortions at all county-owned or county-operated hospitals, except those abortions necessary to save the life of the mother. 2 On October 7, 1980, a bill of complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County by two licensed obstetrician-gynecologists with staff privileges at the Greater Laurel-Beltsville Hospital and by a pregnant woman referred to as Jane Doe, who desired an abortion at that hospital. Named as defendants were Hogan and Prince George’s County. Shortly thereafter, a second suit was filed against the same defendants challenging the validity of the executive order. The plaintiffs in this second suit were the Executive Committee of the Medical Staff at Prince George’s General Hospital and individual members of the Committee. The two suits were consolidated by order of the circuit court on November 21, 1980, and were each resolved by the same opinion and order of the circuit court.
The relief sought in the consolidated action was that the court declare the executive order null and void and enjoin the defendants from enforcing it. The attack upon the executive order was grounded upon alternate legal theories. The plaintiffs claimed that the order violated the federal constitutional right to choose an abortion, recognized in
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Consequently, according to the plaintiffs, they were entitled to relief under
On December 17, 1980, the circuit court declared the executive order “null and void” and enjoined its enforcement, holding that the County Executive lacked authority under the County Charter to issue the order. The defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and we issued a writ of certiorari prior to a decision by the intermediate appellate court. In an opinion by Chief Judge Murphy, this Court affirmed the declaratory judgment and injunction.’ After a detailed analysis of the respective powers of the County Council, the County Executive and the County Hospital Commission under the Charter of Prince George’s County, we held (291 Md. at 685, 486 A.2d 459):
“Under the circumstances of this case, the executive order constitutes an unlawful encroachment upon the validly delegated authority of the Hospital Commission and the Boards of Directors and was beyond the authority of the County Executive to promulgate under the Charter; it simply cannot be reconciled with the exercise by the County Council of its power to make laws governing the operation and administration of county hospitals.”
Because of our holding in
County Executive I
that the executive order exceeded the authority of the County Executive under the County Charter, we expressly declined to reach the federal constitutional issue which formed the
*451
basis of plaintiffs’
After our affirmance in
County Executive I,
the plaintiffs filed a motion in the circuit court for an attorney’s fee award pursuant to
The defendants, Prince George’s County and the County Executive, took an appeal from the court’s fee award, and we issued a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court.
The defendants’ principal contention is that the circuit court should not have awarded any attorney’s fee. The defendants also argue that, if an attorney’s fee award was permissible, the amount of the award in this case was “excessive and unreasonable.”
In support of their position that no fee award should have been made, the defendants make two arguments. Their
*452
chief argument is that, when á plaintiff in a state court asserts a cause of action under
II.
First, we flatly reject the defendants’ argument that we should decline to follow the federal law standards with respect to an award of an attorney’s fee under
*453
The Civil Rights Act of 1871,
It has long been settled that when an action is brought in a state court to enforce rights or claims under federal law, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that federal law and policy be applied by the state court. Maine v. Thiboutot, supra, 448 U.S. at 11, 100 S.Ct. at 2508; Martinez v. California, supra, 444 U.S. at 284, 100 S.Ct. at 558; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967, 172 A.L.R. 225 (1947); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239 (1942); Pine Street Trading v. Farrell Lines, 278 Md. 363, 379-380, 364 A.2d 1103 (1976); Frazier v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 206 Md. 434, 448, 112 A.2d 221 (1955); Standard, Etc. v. Rukert Ter. Corp., 193 Md. 20, 24, 65 A.2d 304 (1949); Albright v. P.R.R. Co., 183 Md. 421, 426-431, 37 A.2d 870, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735, 65 S.Ct. 72, 89 L.Ed. 589 (1944). As explained by the Supreme Court in Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57, 32 S.Ct. 169, 178, 56 L.Ed. 327 (1912):
“The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the state . . . is quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.”
*455
See Reynolds Elec. v. United Bhd.,
81 Nev. 199, 207, 401 P.2d 60,
cert. denied,
382 U.S. 905, 86 S.Ct. 242, 15 L.Ed.2d 158 (1965) (state court suit under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
Moreover, and contrary to the defendants’ argument in the present case, a state court exercising jurisdiction in a federal cause of action may not refuse to apply federal law in one particular respect where such law is deemed inconsistent with “state policy.” Instead, the entire federal substantive law is applicable. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., supra, 317 U.S. at 243, 63 S.Ct. at 249, where a state court action is brought to enforce “asserted rights granted by federal law,” the state court is “required to give to [the plaintiff] the full benefit of federal law.” (Emphasis added.) The “state court [is] bound to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law would be protected.” Id. at 245, 63 S.Ct. at 251, emphasis added.
These principles are reflected in the Supreme Court case dealing with attorney’s fee awards in state court actions under
“Several States, participating as amici curiae, argue that even if§ 1988 applies to§ 1983 claims alleging *456 deprivations of statutory rights, it does not apply in state courts. There is no merit to this argument. As we have said above, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 [100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481] (1980), held that§ 1983 actions may be brought in state courts. Representative Drinan described the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act as ‘authorizing] the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in actions brought in State or Federal courts.’ 122 Cong.Rec. 35122 (1976). And Congress viewed the fees authorized by§ 1988 as ‘an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain’ compliance with§ 1983 . S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976). It follows from this history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the§ 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
If the
Notwithstanding the above-discussed cases, the defendants urge that, because the plaintiffs asserted a state law cause of action and because they obtained relief on that state law ground, “[t]his case remained throughout its course a .state law action . . . [and] was not an action vindicating broad civil rights under
*458
Finally the defendants rely on four cases in support of their position:
Still v. Personnel Bd. of Jefferson County,
406 So.2d 860 (Ala. 1981),
cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1718, 72 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982);
Zorick v. Tynes,
372 So.2d 133 (Fla.App.1979);
Application of Roberts,
291 Or. 21, 628 P.2d 714 (1981);
Boland v. City of Rapid City,
315 N.W.2d 496 (S.D.1982). These cases, however, furnish no support for the defendants’ position. In
Still,
an attorney’s fee award was denied because the trial judge ruled against the plaintiffs on the asserted federal law grounds. As Justice Jones stated in his concurring opinion, 406 So.2d at 862: “Our holding is
not
premised on the mere affirmative grant of Plaintiffs’ state grounds relief; rather, it is premised on the trial court’s affirmative denial of federal grounds relief.”
10
Zorrick v. Tynes, supra,
similarly involved a ruling against the plaintiff on the federal grounds for relief. While
Application of Roberts, supra,
may contain some language arguably favorable to the defendants’ position, that case was an original habeas corpus proceeding where the plaintiff had been represented by a state furnished attorney, where the plaintiff’s attorney had not petitioned for the compensation, and where the court “decline[d] to exercise our statutory discretion to award attorney’s fees in this case.” 628 P.2d at 715.
11
In the last case
*459
relied on by the defendants,
Boland v. City of Rapid City, supra,
the plaintiff expressly declined to assert a federal law claim in the state court action, stating that the federal law ground would be reserved for a later federal court suit. 315 N.W.2d at 502. Additionally the Court in
Boland
stated that, if
In conclusion, we find no basis for the defendants’ principal argument in this case.
III.
We now turn to the defendants’ alternate contention that the plaintiffs’ asserted 1983 cause of action failed to meet the federal law standards for an attorney’s fee
*460
award under
“Substantiality,” of course, is often a matter of degree. The standard for determining substantiality referred to in the previously quoted Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
supra,
n. 9, is the standard used by the Supreme Court in
Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), for deciding whether a federal constitutional issue is sufficiently meritorious to confer jurisdiction on a federal court under
In the present case, however, it is unnecessary for us to explore further the appropriate standard for determining the substantiality of an unresolved
*462
The theory of the plaintiffs’ asserted
In
Poelker v. Doe,
an indigent woman sought unsuccessfully to obtain a nontherapeutic abortion at one of two city-owned hospitals in St. Louis, Missouri. The hospital’s refusal to perform the abortion was both because of a directive of the Mayor of St. Louis, which prohibited the performance of abortions in city hospitals in the absence of a threat of grave physiological injury or death to the mother, and because of the practice of staffing the hospital with students and faculty from a Jesuit-operated institution opposed to abortion. The woman brought a class action under
The United States Supreme Court, pointing out that the Eighth Circuit had relied both on Roe v. Wade and on an equal protection analysis, 432 U.S. at 520, 97 S.Ct. at 2392, reversed. The Supreme Court stated (id. at 521, 97 S.Ct. at 2392):
“[W]e find no constitutional violation by the city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions.”
Turning to the Eighth Circuit’s emphasis on the Mayor’s position against the performance of any nontherapeutic abortions in the two city-owned hospitals (whether the woman was indigent or not), the Supreme Court explained (ibid.)\
“Although the Mayor’s personal position on abortion is irrelevant to our decision, we note that he is an elected official responsible to the people of St. Louis. His policy of denying city funds for abortions such as that desired by Doe is subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at the polls. We merely hold, for the reasons stated in Maher, that the Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from *464 expressing a preference for normal childbirth as St. Louis has done.”
The Court’s holding in
Poelker,
that the Constitution does not forbid a state or local government from expressing a preference for normal childbirth instead of nontherapeutic abortions at government-owned hospitals, was absolutely dispositive of the plaintiffs’
The plaintiffs, at oral argument before us (although not in their brief), asserted two factual distinctions between the instant case and Poelker. First, the plaintiffs pointed out that the pregnant woman in Poelker was indigent, whereas Jane Doe was not indigent and was willing to pay for her abortion at the hospital owned and operated by the County. The only significance of this distinction is that the particular equal protection argument adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Poelker, but rejected by the Supreme Court, may not have been available to the plaintiffs in this case. The asserted distinction, however, is entirely irrelevant to the alternate basis for the Eighth Circuit’s decision that the policy of the Mayor and hospital prohibiting all nontherapeutic abortions at city-owned hospitals was a violation of the constitutional right of privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court, in its opinion in Poelker and its reversal of the Eighth Circuit, clearly rejected this alternate ground for the Eighth Circuit’s decision.
The other distinction which the plaintiffs pointed to between the present case and Poelker relates to an alleged difference in the funding of the government-owned hospitals involved in these two cases. The plaintiffs argued that the Poelker decision was based on the theory that the government need not fund abortions. They contended that this theory would be inapplicable in the present case because the revenues of the two hospitals owned and operated by Prince George’s County are sufficient to meet the hospitals’ operating expenses and, therefore, no county general funds are appropriated for the hospitals. In our view, there is no real distinction between the cases based on a differ *465 ence in funding. While there appears to have been some controversy in the present case concerning the degree of self-sufficiency of the two county hospitals, it is undisputed that the Prince George’s County treasury provided money for constructing the hospitals, and continues to provide funds necessary to amortize bond interest and principal. In addition, it appears that the County would have to appropriate general funds for any operating deficits the hospitals may have. Moreover, because Prince George’s County owns and operates the two hospitals involved, 15 any financial transactions of the hospitals are, in reality, those of the County. When a woman pays for an abortion, those moneys become “county funds”; when staff is paid from operating revenues, they are paid out of “county funds.” The two hospitals owned and operated by Prince George’s County are clearly government-funded institutions. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s Poelker opinion remotely suggests that a pregnant woman would have a constitutional right to have an abortion performed at a government-owned hospital if the hospital’s fees were sufficient to meet operating costs but would have no such constitutional right if the hospital operated at a deficit and thus needed some general fund appropriations.
The Supreme Court in
Poelker v. Doe
flatly decided that the Constitution of the United States did not require a state or local government to provide nontherapeutic abortion services at a hospital owned and operated by the government. In light of this Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs’
*466 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY REVERSED. COSTS TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED.
Notes
. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, codified as the final sentence of
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
. At the time there were two hospitals in Prince George’s County which the County owned and operated. These were Prince George’s General Hospital and the Greater Laurel-Beltsville Hospital. In addition, there were nine other hospitals and thirteen abortion clinics in Prince George’s County, and neighboring Montgomery County and Washington D.C., at which a woman could receive an abortion, including one other hospital and three clinics in Prince George’s County itself.
. The Civil Rights Act of 1871,
*450 ”§ 1983 . Civil action for deprivation of rights
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”
. After final judgment in a declaratory judgment action, the prevailing party may then maintain a separate action for an attorney’s fee where such fee is authorized by law.
Bankers & Ship. Ins. v. Electro Enter.,
287 Md. 641, 646, 415 A.2d 278 (1980).
See also Pappas v. Pappas,
287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549 (1980). Additionally, under
. Very recently the Supreme Court set forth an additional “requirement that a [
. The Court in Martinez quoted from Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391, 67 S.Ct. 810, 813, 91 L.Ed. 967, 172 A.L.R. 225 (1947), which in turn quoted from Claflin v. Houseman, 3 Otto 130, 93 U.S. 130, 137, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876), that where
“’ “an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court.” ’ ”
The opinion in Claflin continued as follows (93 U.S. at 137):
“The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to recognize the State laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are . . . courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.”
The Supreme Court in
Martinez
did not decide whether state courts must entertain
“notefd] that where the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.” 444 U.S. at 283 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 558 n. 7.
See also The Federalist, No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton, 1788).
. Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.VoL), § 1-501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1 (1976), sets out the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 as follows:
“The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts. In authorizing an award of reasonable attorney‘s fees, H.R. 15460 is designed to give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their grievances can be resolved according to law.”
See also S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, 5908, 5909-5911.
. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, supra, p. 4 n. 7, states:
“To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of the statutes enumerated in FI.R. 15460 with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.1973). In some instances, however, the claim with fees may involve a constitutional question which the courts are reluctant to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is dispositive. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). In such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded meets the ‘substantiality’ test, see Hagans v. Lavine, supra; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), attorney’s fees may be *458 allowed even though the court declines to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the non-fee claim arising out of a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’ United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra at 725 [86 S.Ct. at 1138].”
.
See Davis v. Everett,
443 So.2d 1232, 1235 (Ala.1983), and
Canterbury Nur. Home v. Ala. Health Etc. AG.,
425 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Ala. 1983), in which the Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed the basis for the
Still
decision. In both the
Davis
case and the
Canterbury
case, the plaintiffs had prevailed on state law grounds; there was no ruling on their
. Where a plaintiff prevails on his federal civil rights ground, or where he prevails on a different ground but the unresolved federal civil rights ground is based on the same facts and is substantial,
*459
discretion to deny any attorney’s fee award under
. We have discovered one opinion, in an intermediate state appellate court, in which the court rejected the federal law standards and formulated its own test for the award of attorney’s fees where a
. It should be emphasized that, in dealing with a request by a plaintiff for an attorney’s fee award under
Consequently, in future cases where the federal civil rights issue can be resolved relatively easily in light of decisions of the United States Supreme Court or of this Court, Maryland circuit courts should consider deciding such issue even though a state law ground providing the requested relief is also being adjudicated in the plaintiff’s favor. The decision on the federal civil rights issue will then ordinarily govern the entitlement to an attorney’s fee award under
. See also Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 667 F.2d 754 (8th Cir.1982), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3102, 77 L.Ed.2d 1358 (1983).
. The management of the hospitals is the responsibility of the Department of Hospitals and Health Services and the Prince George’s County Hospital Commission. Both of these are agencies of the executive branch of the Prince George’s County government. See County Exec., Prince Geo‘s Co. v. Doe, 291 Md. 676, 682-685, 436 A.2d 459 (1981).