383 Mass. 323 | Mass. | 1981
These cases, consolidated for trial, present the question, reported by the trial judge, whether a county to whose jail or house of correction a prisoner is directly sentenced has a claim for reimbursement for the expense of supporting the prisoner against the county in which the prisoner was sentenced. The parties disagree as to the proper construction of G. L. c. 127, § 125, as appearing in St. 1955, c. 770, § 63, which provides in relevant part as
The parties have agreed to the facts that are material to the question reported.
The relationship between Hampshire County and Hampden County is much the same as between Franklin and
Our task, of course, is to determine the Legislature’s intent. The defendant counties point to the provision in § 125 that states that they “may” pay the expense of supporting a prisoner sentenced to a jail or house of correction in another county. We must give particular recognition to the word “may” because it was substituted for the word “shall” in the 1946 amendment. We think it clear that the first sentence of § 125 authorizes but does not direct a county to pay for the support of a prisoner sentenced by a court in that county to serve a sentence in a county jail or house of correction in another county. If there were no further provision in § 125, that would end the matter.
The second sentence of § 125 cannot be ignored in our analysis. We must consider the entire statutory arrangement to determine the legislative intent. Boston v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 373 Mass. 819, 823 (1977). Section 125 provides that “[i]f the amount to be paid cannot be agreed upon,” it may be determined by the Superior Court. The plaintiff counties argue, we think correctly, that this language authorizes a “receiving” county to sue to collect expenses if the “sending” county declines to pay for the support of prisoners sentenced in the “sending” county
We are unwilling to attribute to the Legislature an intent to grant a county the unfettered discretion to refuse to pay one cent to another county for the support of prisoners sentenced to a jail or house of correction in that other county. The place where sentence is to be served is beyond the control of the “receiving” county. Barring some special problem (such as a prohibition against sentencing such a prisoner to a county facility at all), a master or keeper of a county jail or house of correction must accept a prisoner sentenced to serve in his jail or house of correction regardless of the county in which the sentence was imposed (G. L. c. 279, § 15), and he must maintain him at the expense of the county (G. L. c. 126, § 29). If a county has adequate or special facilities available, perhaps as a result of careful planning, it should not be punished because some other county may lack those facilities. It is preferable that a judge’s decision as to where a defendant is to serve time in a county jail or house of correction not affect the allocation of expenses among counties. The plaintiff counties do not argue that the apparent inequity in denying a “receiving” county reimbursement from another county presents a problem of constitutional dimensions. See Brookline v. County Comm’rs of Norfolk, 367 Mass. 345, 350-351 (1975). However, if we construed § 125 so as to deny reimbursement to a “receiving” county, the taxpayers of the “receiv
We conclude that G. L. c. 127, § 125, does provide a cause of action for one county against another and answer the reported question in the affirmative.
So ordered.
The reported question reads as follows: “Does G. L. c. 127, § 125 provide a cause of action for a county of the Commonwealth that has provided the expense of supporting a prisoner, sentenced directly to that county, against the county where the prisoner was sentenced?”
The 1946 amendment of § 125 served a practical purpose. The first sentence of § 125, as so amended, authorizes, but does not require, a county to make payments to other counties. It recognizes that because of offsetting claims or reciprocal arrangements concerning prisoners there may be no occasion for mandating an exchange of funds between counties.
We would grant as well that imposing such costs on a sentencing county may riot be equitable in all instances.
No question has been put to us concerning the source of funds to pay any judgment entered against a county in a case under § 125. Funds might properly be available to a county to satisfy such a judgment. See County Comm’rs of Middlesex v. Superior Court, 371 Mass. 456, 460-462 (1976). The ultimate answer must be a legislative one because of the Legislature’s control over county budgets (G. L. c. 35, §§ 32, 34) and its authority to determine what system should be used for paying for the care of prisoners in county institutions.