Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOSEPH PAUL COUNTS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) v. ) No. 1:24-cv-00361-JAW )
STATE OF MAINE , et al., )
)
Defendants. ) ORDER AFFIRMING RECOMMENDED DECISION OVER OBJECTION
A federal magistrate judge recommends the dismissal of a complaint brought by an incarcerated individual against the state of Maine, the state attorney general, and a district attorney, challenging a state court conviction. Having performed a de novo review, the federal district court affirms the magistrate judge’s recommended decision over the plaintiff’s objection.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 28, 2024, Joseph Paul Counts, who is currently incarcerated in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, brought a complaint against the state of Maine, Maine Attorney General Aaron M. Frey, and Washington County District Attorney Robert Granger, challenging a state court conviction. Compl. at 2-3 (ECF No. 1). Mr. Counts moved to proceed in forma pauperis on October 28, 2024, Mot. to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 2), and the next day the United States Magistrate Judge granted his motion and ordered Mr. Counts to notify the Court no later than November 19, 2024 whether he intended to incur the cost of the filing fee and proceed with this action, or whether he intended to forego litigation at this time. Order at 2 (ECF No. 3) ( Nov. 19, 2024 Order ).
Subsequently, on November 18, 2024, Mr. Counts filed a motion to alter or amend judgment or relief from order, asking the Court to relieve him of the obligation to pay the filing fee. Pl. Joseph Paul Counts’ Mot. to Alter or Amend Judgment Rule 59(e) or Relief from Order Under Rule 60(b)(1) (ECF No. 4). The Magistrate Judge denied Mr. Counts’s motion to amend or for relief from order on November 21, 2024. Order (ECF No. 5) .
On December 3, 2024, after the November 19, 2024 deadline had passed without an update from Mr. Counts, the Magistrate Judge ordered the Plaintiff to show cause in writing by or before December 17, 2024 as to why he had failed to comply with the Magistrate Judge’s October 29, 2024 order. Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 6). Mr. Counts responded in compliance on December 23, 2024, and moved to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs on the same day. Def. Joseph Counts’ Mot. to Show Cause and Reconsider with Updated Status (ECF No. 9); Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Aff. (ECF No. 10). The Magistrate Judge granted Mr. Counts’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on January 10, 2025. Order (ECF No. 14).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the statute that governs matters filed without the prepayment of fees, courts are authorized to conduct a preliminary review of a complaint when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On January 10, 2025, after performing such a preliminary review, the Magistrate Judge recommended the Court dismiss the complaint. Recommended Decision After Rev. of Pl.’s Compl. (ECF No. 13) ( Recommended Decision ). Because a Magistrate Judge reviewed Mr. Counts’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Mr. Counts had a right to de novo review by the district judge upon filing an objection within fourteen days of being served. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). On January 20, 2025, the Court granted Mr. Counts an extension until February 28, 2025 to file any objection to the Recommended Decision. Order (ECF No. 16). Mr. Counts filed an untimely objection on March 6, 2025, without requesting or being granted a further extension. Pl. Joseph Counts’ Objs. to Mag. J.’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 17).
Nevertheless, in line with the First Circuit’s instruction to district courts
reviewing pro se pleadings to construe these submissions liberally,
see Sanchez v.
Brown Univ.
, No. 23-1983,
II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss Mr. Counts’s complaint alleging he was convicted of a crime in state court, has “tried to remedy it several times to no avail,” was subsequently wrongfully charged with a crime based on the prior wrongful conviction, and while the wrongful conviction has ben corrected, he continues to experience consequences from the conviction, which he is attempting to address through a state court post-conviction relief proceeding. Recommended Decision at 2 (quoting and then citing Compl. at 3).
The Magistrate Judge characterizes Mr. Counts’s claims as “follow[ing] and
appear[ing] to challenge in some way a state court conviction,” and thus determines
that dismissal is warranted pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which
“divest[s] lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments that were rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and invite district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” at 3 (quoting
Klimowicz v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.
Co.
, 907 F.3d 61, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted by
Magistrate Judge)); citing
Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.
,
Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss the
Plaintiff’s complaint because his state court proceeding “is evidently ongoing as he
has initiated a post-conviction review proceeding,” and
Younger v. Harris
, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) generally requires abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction when a
plaintiff seeks relief in federal court from a pending state criminal prosecution or
analogous enforcement proceeding.”
Id.
Under the
Younger
doctrine, the Magistrate
Judge states that abstention is mandatory absent “extraordinary circumstances,”
none of which Mr. Counts alleges is present here and “[a]bstention, therefore, is
required.” at 4-5 (citing
Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie
,
Insofar as Mr. Counts’s complaint could be construed as raising a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Magistrate Judge determines this warrants dismissal based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), “because an award of damages on such a claim would implicitly invalidate the conviction.” Id. at 4. The Magistrate Judge explained that “the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff [challenging his state-court conviction] must first obtain relief from the conviction through state or federal habeas proceedings . . .before seeking a remedy under § 1983.” (citing Heck , 512 U.S. at 487). Thus, in this case, “to the extent Plaintiff’s claims attack the validity and consequences of a state court criminal judgment, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims.” Id.
Observing that the Plaintiff joined the state of Maine as a Defendant, the
Magistrate Judge additionally determines that the state of Maine is immune from
this suit under the Eleventh Amendment’s doctrine of sovereign immunity, which the
State has not waived here.
Id.
at 5 & n.2 (citing, e.g.,
Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.
,
558 F.3d 92, 97 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009)). Similarly, to the extent Mr. Counts seeks
monetary compensation from a district attorney and the state attorney general, each
of whom Mr. Counts names as Defendants in this suit, both are entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity regarding charging decisions or other similar roles in the
state proceedings against the Plaintiff “because the alleged facts do not support a
plausible inference of conduct exceeding traditional prosecutorial duties.”
Id.
at 6
(citing
Imbler v. Pachtman
, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Further, to the extent Mr.
Counts seeks monetary relief from these individuals in their official capacities, the
Magistrate Judge concludes the claim would in essence be a claim against the State
which is barred by sovereign immunity. (citing
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police
,
For all these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the Court dismiss Mr.
Counts’s complaint in its entirety.
B. Joseph Paul Counts’s Objection
Mr. Counts provides seven grounds for his objection to the Recommended Decision, one of which is a blanket objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that his complaint be dismissed. Pl.’s Obj. ¶¶ 1-7.
First, the Plaintiff objects to the recommendation of dismissal based on “factual omissions,” id. ¶ 1 (capitalization altered), alleging the Magistrate Judge “completely omits all the facts that give this court jurisdiction [and that] precedent has already permitted.” Id. (citing Recommended Decision at 2). Mr. Counts rejects the Magistrate Judge’s application of Rooker-Feldman , claiming the Court maintains jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.
Second, Mr. Counts objects on the grounds of “improper court procedure,” claiming “[g]iven the amount of fact[s] [he] provide[d] in his initial filing, the defendants should be left to file a motion under Me[.] Rule Civ. P. 12 for a more definitive statement versus the magistrate acting as ward over the state and county in the instant action.” Id. ¶ 2 (capitalization altered).
Third, Mr. Counts objects to the form he used to file his complaint, saying the
Court provided him this form and it indicates a claimant should not “give any legal
arguments or cite any cases or statutes” and should state the facts “as briefly as
possible.” ¶ 3. He claims that following these instructions caused him to omit
particular facts which may have resulted in a more favorable decision from the
Magistrate Judge, citing a Seventh Circuit decision which Mr. Counts claims “plac[e]s
the magistrate in the wrong hemisphere with his recommended decision.” (citing
Tate v. SCR Med. Transp.
,
Fifth, Mr. Counts objects to recommendation that the Court dismiss the state of Maine as a defendant pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity. Id. ¶ 5. Referencing the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the Supreme Court’s recent overturning of the doctrine of Chevron [1] deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo , 603 U.S. 369 (2024), Mr. Counts suggests that the Magistrate Judge only came to his recommendation of dismissal by overlooking the substantive rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights and by overstepping the new balance of separation of powers as outlined by the Supreme Court in Loper Bright .
Mr. Counts objects on the sixth ground that the Magistrate Judge
misunderstood who the Plaintiff intended to name as Defendants to his suit. ¶ 6.
As to the Magistrate Judge’s statement that a state attorney general and a county
district attorney are protected by prosecutorial immunity, Mr. Counts says “it was
claimant’s intention merely to name them as responding parties as they are not listed
on the cover of the complaint as defendants” and the Magistrate Judge should have
given him the opportunity to amend his complaint “specifically to address the
personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction this court has over the State and County”
pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Tate
,
Finally, at bottom, Mr. Count objects to the Recommended Decision in its entirety and “demands it be disregarded[] while jurisdiction under 28 [U.S.C.] [§] 1331 be applied.” ¶ 7.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Mr. Counts objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision, which
the Court in its discretion construes as timely filed, and the Court thus “shall make
a de novo determination of those portions of the . . . recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
see also
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). At the
same time, the Court is “only obliged to perform de novo review of disputed portions
of the report and recommendation.”
United States v. J.C.D.
,
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision, together with the entire record. Having made a de novo determination of “disputed portions of the report and recommendation,” the Court affirms the *10 Case 1:24-cv-00361-JAW Document 18 Filed 03/11/25 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:
63
Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge over the Plaintiff’s objection and
determines that no further proceedings are necessary.
See J.C.D.
,
Mr. Counts’s first objection to the Recommended Decision appears to be that
the Magistrate Judge erred in applying the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine because this
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Pl.’s Obj.
¶ 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1331. While Mr. Counts is correct that federal question jurisdiction can provide a
federal court with subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute, he misunderstands that
this jurisdiction is not limitless, and that the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is one such
limit.
See Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills
,
64
Mr. Counts’s second objection appears to be that the Magistrate Judge should have sua sponte directed the Defendants to file a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12, rather than issuing his Recommended Decision after a preliminary review. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 2. However, as the Magistrate Judge explained to Mr. Counts more than once, by electing to bring his case without the prepayment of fees, an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) was the proper next step. Nov. 19, 2024 Order ; Order to Show Cause. That is what happened here.
Mr. Counts’s third objection is an objection to the form he used to submit his
complaint; it is not an objection to the Recommended Complaint.
Pl.’s Obj.
¶ 3. The
Plaintiff complains that the form he used instructed him to not provide legal
argument or cite cases or statutes, and argues that, but-for this form’s instructions,
he may have provided additional facts which could have resulted in a more favorable
ruling. In support, he directs the Court to a Seventh Circuit decision,
Tate v. SCR
Medical Transportation
,
65
briefly as possible the facts of your case,” Compl. at 3 (emphasis in original), and thus the Court does not see how remedying the proffered issue with the form’s language would have led to a different result. Insofar as Mr. Counts means to object to the form on the ground that, rather than instructing the omission of legal authority, it instructs claimants to state their factual allegations “briefly,” it is, in every case, the responsibility of the plaintiff to identify the facts they need to share to support their case. See F ED . R. C IV . P. 8(a)(2) (a complaint must contain, at minimum, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Further, the Court notes that the prompt Mr. Counts identifies proceeds to say “[u]se as much space as you need [and] attach extra sheet if necessary.” Compl. at 3 .
Mr. Counts’s citation to a Seventh Circuit decision does not convince the Court
otherwise. Indeed, in
Tate
,
66
form complaint than the one Mr. Counts takes issue with here, and is thus distinguishable on this important point.
Mr. Counts’s fourth objection to the Recommended Decision concerns the Magistrate Judge’s application of the Younger doctrine, seemingly on the ground that the form the Plaintiff filled out instructed the omission of legal authority, but the recognized exceptions for Younger require citations to legal authority. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 4. The Court does not credit this objection. The Magistrate Judge says “[a]bstention is mandatory absent ‘extraordinary circumstances’ such as: (1) an action ‘brought in bad faith . . . for the purpose of harassment,’ (2) ‘the state forum provides inadequate protection of federal rights,’ or (3) the challenged ‘state statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions’ or there is ‘a facially conclusive claim of [federal] preemption.’” Recommended Decision at 4-5 (quoting Sirva Relocation , 794 F.3d at 192, 197). By the Court’s reckoning, the first two “extraordinary circumstances” clearly rely on factual, not legal, allegations, and the third has no relevance to the present case. Younger is clearly applicable to this case, for the reasons explained by the Magistrate Judge.
Mr. Counts’s fifth objection complains that the Magistrate Judge’s focus on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is misplaced because it overlooks the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court’s recent overturn of the Chevron deference doctrine. Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 5. This objection is similarly unavailing. For the reasons explained by the Magistrate Judge, in some detail, the state of Maine has sovereign immunity from this suit.
Case 1:24-cv-00361-JAW Document 18 Filed 03/11/25 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
67
Mr. Counts’s sixth objection is that the Magistrate Judge misunderstood the
identities of the Defendants in this suit, and, further, that the Plaintiff should have
been given an opportunity to amend his complaint to address any defects with
jurisdiction pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Tate
,
Mr. Counts’s seventh objection is a blanket rejection of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation of dismissal on the ground that “jurisdiction under 28 [U.S.C.] [§] 1331 be applied.” Pl.’s Obj. ¶ 7. The Court discussed the limits of federal-question jurisdiction above in regards to Rooker-Feldman and does not repeat the same analysis here.
After reviewing Mr. Counts’s pleaded pathways to relief and the relevant legal authority de novo, the Court now affirms the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision for the reasons stated within the same and addressed in this order. Mr. Counts’s objections have not convinced the Court that the Recommended Decision errs in any way, and the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge, for the numerous reasons explained in detail in his Recommended Decision, that Mr. Counts’s complaint warrants dismissal.
V. CONCLUSION *15 Case 1:24-cv-00361-JAW Document 18 Filed 03/11/25 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
68
Having performed a de novo review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B), the Court AFFIRMS the Recommended Decision After Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 13), OVERRULES Plaintiff Joseph Paul Counts’ Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision (ECF No. 17), and accordingly DISMISSES without prejudice the Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1). No Certificate of Appealability should issue because there is no substantial issue that could be presented on appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 22 and Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 or Section 2255.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr. JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Dated this 11th day of March, 2025
Notes
[1]
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
,