180 Mo. 709 | Mo. | 1904
This is a suit in equity to set aside a deed made by the plaintiffs ’ mother in her lifetime. The ground on which the validity of the deed is assailed is that it was not delivered, the ground on which equity jurisdiction is invoked is that the deed, being on record, clouds the title of the plaintiffs.
The land covered by the deed is a farm of 100 acres in Macon county; it was the property of the plaintiffs ’ mother who died intestate, leaving these two plaintiffs her only heirs. The deed is in the words following :
“This deed witnesseth — That Margaret A. Coulson, single, party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of one dollar to her paid, do hereby grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto J. A. Coulson and W. B. Coulson, parties of the second part, of the following described real estate, situated in the county of Macon and State of Missouri, to-wit: the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter, and the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter and the south half of the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section twenty-four (24), township sixty-one (61), range fifteen (15), Adair county, Missouri, containing in all one hundred acres more or less.
“Hereby covenanting that she will warrant and defend the title to said premises against the claims of every person whomsoever — except all taxes that are due or may become due. It is also agreed and understood that the said above described land shall not be subject to or used in any way as security for notes or other debts by said parties of the second part. It is agreed to and a part of the consideration herein that
“Witness my hand this day of--A. D., 190-.
“Margaret A. Coulson.”
It was duly acknowledged on May 1st, and recorded on May 7th, 1900.
At the time of making the deed Mrs. Coulson lived in La Plata, her two sons, the plaintiffs, who were then aged 44 and 46 years respectively, did not live with her; the only person, so far as the evidence shows, who did live with her was the defendant, whom she described in the deed as “my daughter Myrtle Bridges Coulson.” Myrtle was not in fact her daughter, but had been taken
There was testimony on the part of the defendant tending to show that the plaintiffs knew that the deed had been executed and had seen the record of it; also that shortly after the death of their mother, in a suit relating to the rents, they claimed title under the deed. There was also evidence of a conversation between the mother and one of the plaintiffs in which he spoke angrily to her about her having made the deed, and she replied that he had never done anything' for her and that she intended the child to have the farm.
The court found the issues in favor of the plaintiffis, and decreed that the deed “be set aside and held for naught as to plaintiffs wherein any interest is attempted to be created in defendant, and the title in fee is absolutely decreed and adjudged in plaintiff.” From that judgment the defendant appeals.
The plaintiffs make no claim as purchasers of this land; they set up no contract title to it. They did in the beginning, in their petition, set up a claim by contract, but at the opening of the trial they expressly abandoned it.
The only title they claim is that by inheritance from their mother, whose deed they seek to set aside.
The only ground on which the deed is assailed is its alleged non-delivery, and the only estate that is sought to be destroyed is that granted to the infant defendant.
The delivery of a deed so far as the grantor is concerned is a matter of intention, and where the intention clearly appears the act in pursuance thereof will be construed to constitute a delivery. [Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104 Mo. 201; Standiford v. Standiford, 97 Mo. 231; Tobin v. Bass, 85 Mo. 654.]
Tested by that rule there can be no doubt that this deed was delivered in so far at least as it affects the rights of the infant grantee. Mrs. Coulson intended by her act to do everything that was necessary to accomplish the deed of gift to her foster child. She took the child with her to the notary, dictated the deed, and when it was written she signed, sealed and acknowledged it, and delivered it to the notary to send to the recorder of deeds that it might be placed on record and thus proclaimed to the world. She intended the deed to operate as a present transfer of the interests therein specified and to place it beyond her power to recall. Her acts a.t the time and her conduct thereafter showed that to be her intention. Under those circumsances the law will imply a delivery and an acceptance by the infant.
We think, also, that the evidence shows that these plaintiffs knew that their mother had made this deed,: that they had seen the record of it before her death and had claimed title under it shortly after her death. Prom those facts the law will imply an acceptance on their part.
The point is made by respondents that the record does not show that a guardian ad litem was appointed for the infant defendant. The duty of having a guardian ad litem appointed by the court devolved on the respondents an.d they should not be heard to say that that was not done while they are attempting to maintain a decree which they could not have lawfully obtained until such a guardian had been appointed. But the respondents are mistaken in point of fact in that particular. The decree recites, and its recitals of such facts import verity, that a guardian ad litem was appointed and that the infant appeared, and defended by her guardian ad litem and by him prosecutes this appeal. The record also shows that the infant by such guardian took all the necessary steps subsequent to the decree to bring the cause properly before this court for review.
The trial court reached an erroneous conclusion on the question of the delivery of the deed. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter judgment for the defendant and dismissing the plaintiffs’ bill.