*1 COUGHLIN, Appellant, Colleen EMPLOYEES
GOVERNMENT COMPANY
INSURANCE
(GEICO), Appellee.
No. S-10072. Alaska. Court
Supreme 18, 2003.
April 9, 2003. June
Rehearing Denied
*2
Vаcura,
Allen
Stepovich
Office,
Law
Fair-
and prejudgment
interest. Babosky rejected
banks,
Appellant.
for
the offer
parties
and the
settled on different
terms
year.
later that
Under the terms of
Susan D. Mack
Wilkerson,
and Mark E.
the settlement, Coughlin released
Associates,
Babosky
Wilkerson &
Ap-
for
Anchorage,
and Colonial from all liability in
pellee.
exchange for
$40,000"and the assumption of responsibility
FABE,
Justice,
Before:
Chief
for the subrogation claim of Geico Insurance
MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, BRYNER, and Company,
in the amount of TEN THOU-
CARPENETI,
Justices.
SAND DOLLARS." Before signing the set-
agreement,
tlement
Coughlin's
attorney
OPINION
faxed a letter to a GEICO
adjuster,
claims
Colrain Ingersoll,
3,
on July
1996 asking for
FABE, Chief Justice.
GEICO's consent
to Coughlin's settlement
I.
INTRODUCTION
with Colonial. The letter stated that Cough-
Colleen Coughlin
$10,000
received a
pay-
lin was "receiving policy limits from Colonial
ment for
expenses
medical
injuries
she
$50,000."
[of]
Ingersoll signed the consent
sustained in a two-сar accident. Her insur-
request from Coughlin and faxed it back to
ance company, by terms of the insurance
Coughlin's
counsel on July
1996. Cough-
policy, acquired a lien on any recovery lin then signed the settlement
agreement
Coughlin obtained from the other driver. with
Colonial
July
Coughlin settled with the other driver's in-
GEICO settled its subrogated claim for
$40,000
surance company for
and assumption
Coughlin's medical expenses with Colonial
of responsibility
payment
$10,000
$5,000.
It is unclear from the record on
for medical coverage. Coughlin asserted she
what date this claim
settled,
was
though
$50,000
had
exhausted the
facial limit of the
representative
for GEICO
other
stated she
policy
driver's
and that
she could
believed the claim was settled
therefore
"several
upon
draw
her own underinsured
months" before Coughlin settled
Colo-
motorist
coverage.
Coughlin's
However,
nial.
a letter
company claims
counsel for
thаt she failed to exhaust the
Colonial
July
dated
implies
policy
limits of
the other
driver's insurance.
matter was as of that
time
by
conclude that
unresolved
Coughlin did exhaust
stating that "Colonial
agreed
has
address
limits of
the other
driver's insurance
the Geico
directly."
lien
policy and therefore
reverse
superior
grant
court's
of summary judgment
in favor
Coughlin sent a letter to
GEICO March
Coughlin's
insurance company.
1998 requesting that
pay $50,000
it
under
Coughlin's underinsured motorist coverage.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The letter asserted that
paid
Colonial had
Colleen Coughlin
injured
was
in an auto-
$50,000
limits of
requested
attor-
mobile accident
in August 1998. She was
ney's fees and interest
from GEICO. GEI-
by
insured
Employees
Government
Insur- CO
denied
underinsured
pay-
motorist
ance Company (GEICO), and the driver of ment, claimingthat Coughlin did not receive
car,
the other
Kevin Babosky, was
insured
policy limits from Colonial because she set-
Colonial Insurance. Babosky's policy hаd a
$40,000
tled for
and GEICO settled for
$50,000
facial limit of
per person. Coughlin's
$5,000 for
lien,
the medical
totalling only
$10,000
covered
in medical payments
$45,000on a
facial limit of
GEICO
in underinsured motorist cover-
responded that even if Colonial
paid
had
(UIM).
age
paid
GEICO
Coughlin $10,000 $50,000, Coughlin still would not have re-
expenses,
medical
resulting in a medical
ceived
limits because she did not re-
against
lien
any recovery Coughlin made.
ceive
fees or interest. GEICO
Coughlin filed suit against Babosky and
Coughlin
maintained that
should have known
in April
offered
1996 to settle the case for the
that Alaska law defined policy limits to in-
$50,000,
limits of
plus attorney's
fees
clude attorney's
fees and interest because
advised
court
pay.
let-
in her
had
add-ons
those
requested
Coughlin
what
about
confused
Coughlin
requesting
to GEICO
ter
pursued
she should
limit would
payment.
it
posited
declaratory action.
in Au-
GEICO
suit
filed
*3
that
knowledge"
"common
was
and
fraud
and
faith
bad
allеging
gust
on
claims based
not resolve
companies
underinsured
under
damages
seeking
the lien
of
value
the face
for
liens
medical
Septem-
policy.
her
of
provision
motorist
that
known
should
Coughlin
that
and
summary
for
moved
sides
both
2000
ber
$50,000.
than
less
much
settling for
was
she
Ingersoll's
that
argued
Coughlin
judgment.
sig-
Ingersoll's
that
concluded
court also
The
re-
Coughlin
that
established
letter
consent
an
not
was
letter
consent
on the
nature
Coughlin
from Colonial.
limits
policy
ceived
with Co-
agreement
Coughlin's
of
acceptance
then
not
could
that GEICO
argued
further
Rather,
limits.
policy
one for
lonial
liability by set-
motorist
underinsured
avoid
only allowed
signature
her
held that
court
than
for less
claim
subrogated
its
tling
It was
coverage;
pursue
Coughlin
if
and that
lien
medical
of
value
coverage.
such
provide
commitment
not a
underin-
just to avoid
for less
settled
GEICO
commit-
such
that
stated
Finally,
faith.
in bad
it acted
paymеnt,
sured
exist, was
found
ment,
if it were
even
motion.
Coughlin's
opposed
GEICO
Coughlin be-
misrepresentations
based
summary
for
motion
in its
argued
GEICO
lim-
actually received
never
she
cause
for
not settle
did
Coughlin
judgment
result,
the court
As a
from Colonial
its
only
she
because
Colonial
with
limits
the set-
to characterize
to allow
refused
$50,000.
of
liability limit
$45,000on a
received
for
eligible
to be
way as
a
in such
tlement
not
Coughlindid
argued
further
GEICO
appeals
Coughlin
recovery.
additional
not
she did
limits because
for
settle
summary judgment.
grant of
attorney's
or
receive
for
counsel
asserted
GEICO
fees.
III. DISCUSSION
sub-
that the
experience
knew
Coughlin
Review
of
A. Standard
for
settle
lien would
$10,000 medical
rogated
summary
of
grant
responded
a
Coughlin
review
We
that amount.
than
less
indepen
apply our
settlement
de novo.1
judgment
of GEICO's
not told
that she
int
statutory
questions
the med-
Colonial,
judgment
the settlement
dent
with
"that
of law
the rule
adopting
Coughlin's settlement
after
occurred
erpretation,2
ical lien
rea
precedent,
light
she
in
Colonial,
persuasive
the settlement
is most
and
with
statutory
son,
policy."3 When
re-
$40,000 plus
reviewing
Colonial-for
reached
$10,000
sliding scale
medical
apply a
GEICO's
interpretation,
sponsibility
lan
meaning of the
limits.
plainer
lien-constituted
"[the
which
convincing
statute,
more
guage
R.
court, Judge Charles
superior
Pen-
must be.4
history
legislative
contrary
motion
GEICO's
granted
presiding,
gilly
held
The court
summary judgment.
Policy
Full
Coughlin Settled
B.
$50,000 from
received
had
Coughlin
even
Limits.
limits
Colonial,
not settle
did
she
AS
dispute that
not
parties do
the at-
include
did
this amount
because
ex
claimant
445(e)(1)5
requires
28.20
otherwise
that Colonial
torney's fees
Co., 29
Ins.
Progressive Northwestern
Borough, 50 P.3d
v.
4. Curran
Peninsula
v. Kenai
1. Cabana
2001).
(Alaska
829, 831-32
P.3d
2002).
(Alaska
798, 28.20.445(e)(1) provides:
State,
Corp.
v.
Petroleum
2. Tesoro
motorists
(e)
Uninsured
2002);
Sim
Progressive
Co. v.
(Alaska
(Alaska 1998).
510, 512
P.2d
bodily injury,
mons, 953
(1) may
apply tо
damage to or
disease,
or
of an insured
death
until
insured
(quoting
property
of an
Guin
P.2d at 512
destruction
Progressive, 953
prop-
injury
1979).
Liability
all
Ha,
n. 6
P.2d
haust the underlying liability policy limits haust' or 'use up' all underlying lability cov
pursuing
before
underinsured motorist benefi erage before recovering under
[an underin-
ts.6 What is in dispute is
whether
sured
policy."7
motorist]
argues
GEICO
received
limits from
Repeat
Colonial.
that Curran defeats Coughlin'sclaimbecause
ing
argument
before
superior court,
Coughlin did not exhaust her underlying lia
GEICO asserts
that Coughlin did not ex
bility coverage and thus cannot draw on her
haust Babosky's policy limits because Colo underinsured motorist policy.
nial only paid
out
argues
GEICO
But
pattern
neither fact
Curran,
a con
alternately that Colonial's"actual" policylim
solidation of
cases,
two
pres
resembles the
it exceeded
because Colonial was re
ent case.
In the first
pattern
fact
Curran,
quired
costs,
pay
interest,
*4
injured
the
party, who suffered
inju
serious
fees and Coughlin received none of these.
ries in
single-vehicle
accident while riding
reject
both of
arguments.
these
We hold
as a passenger with
husband,
her
both that Coughlin exhausted
offered to
poli
Colonial's
give both her own insurance company and
cy limits when
$40,000
she received
in cash
that of her
$50,000
husband a
"credit"
plus
agreement
Colonial's
to
respon
assume
against her
prior
claims
to seeking underin-
sibility
$10,000
for her
medical lien and that
sured motorist coverage.8 But
costs,
because
interest,
this
and attorney's fees are not to
proposed "credit" was
settlement,
not a
judg
be included in determining whether policy
ment, or payment from her husband's insur
limits have been exhausted for
purpose
the
er, we held
injured
drawing upon
the
party
underinsured motorist cover
had not
satisfied
the
requirements
age.
of AS
28.20.445(e)(1).9 In the
pattern
second fact
Curran,
addressed in
1.
injured
subrogated
The
the
party in a
medical
lien
two-vehicle accident was
$60,746.03
offered a
In exchange for signing a settlement
re-
$50,000
settlement for a
leasing Babosky and Colonial from future
by the insurance company for the driver of
legal
lability, Coughlin
$40,000
received
the other car.11
injured
The
party refused
cash from Colonial and
agreed
Colonial
this settlement offer but eventually settled
assume responsibility for
subrogat-
GEICO's
$25,000.12
for
This amount was far less than
$10,000
ed
medical lien. GEICO at some
the
limits and consequently
precluded
point
settled this medical lien with Colonial
the applicability of underinsured motorist
for
result,
As a
Colonial in actuality
coverage.13 Curran,
therefore, is of little
only paid
$45,000
out
on Coughlin's claim
assistance in resolving
present
the
issue oth
against Babosky.
er than to affirm that policy limits must be
According 28.20.445(e)(1),
uninsured
exhausted before underinsured motorist cov
and underinsured motorist coverage cannot
erage can be
upon.
drawn
be
upon
drawn
"until the limits of liability of
all
injury and property damage
present
liabili
The
case does not
Coughlin
involve
ty
policies
bonds and
that apply
offering
have been
GEICO a
credit
her underin-
up by
used
payments,
judgments or settle
sured
coverage,
whereby she would
ments."
In Curran
Progressive
North
be able to
upon
draw
her underinsured mo
western Insurance
we interpreted this
torist coverage but reduce her recovery by
"
statute to mean that the insured must
'ex
the amount necessary to exhaust her other
erty damage liability
policies
bonds and
10. The settlement amount
pay-
included a base
apply have
up by
been
payments,
used
judg-
$40,000
ment of
$20,746.03
and an additional
ments or settlements.
for
interest fees. Id.
at 831 n. 3.
Curran,
9. Id. at 834-38. Id. at value more than potentially in Curran heldWe
claims.
able
they will be
hope thаt
28.20.445(e)(1)
be
of AS
purpose
defeat
than its
less
like
for
lien
claimant
assumed
a UIM
settle
"allow
it would
cause
alto
liability insurer
amount.
bypass
stated
Curran
coverage as
effectively use UIM
gether
could
Coughlin
it is true
While
however,is
Coughlin,
insurance.1
primary
payment
single
for a
Colonial
with
settled
Coughlinset
attempt here.
no such
making
paid GEICO
herself
$50,000 and then
worth
her was
what
claim
tled
pay-
medical
for the
$10,000 reimbursement
payment
plus
$40,000 payment
$50,000-a
with
through its
made
ments GEICO
lien. GEICO
$10,000medical
Cough-
requiring
nothing legally
her,
there
only worth
was
lien
$10,000 medical
reaching the
parties
this.
lin to do
settled
GEICO
is what
$5,000because
to settle
expected
be
cannot
agreement
However,
cannot
Colonial.
for with
face value
than
more
be
what
ulti
what GEICO
responsible
held
were
settlement
terms
if the
was
GEICO
claim.
mately does
value
collected.
fully enforced
claim
to settle
obligation
no
under
Colоnial
Coughlin and
to both
settlement
pursue
chosen
$5,000
could
agree-
the settlement
time
at the
necessary.
litigation
fall amount
*5
by
measure
reached;
is the
that
ment was
Coughlin
unlikely that
Furthermore,
it is
has
Coughlin
whether
determine
to
which
com
than the
more
for
settled
have
could
poli-
the Colonial
of
face value
exhausted
$10,000medical
$40,000payment
bined
cy.
the Colonial
limit of
facial
lien.
concluded
court
superior
$50,000. The
pre-
include
Policy
do not
limits
counsel,
legal
her
through
Coughlin,
attorney's
judgment
interest
lien
the medical
known
have
should
drawing
purpose of
fees for
value because
face
less than
for
settle
would
cover-
motorist
upon underinsured
true,
if
But even
knowledge.
common
this is
age.
that Colonial
to believe
reason
is no
there
Coughlin
if
that even
argues
GEICO
for a
settle
to
offered
have
would
full
her
$50,000,
than
this is less
for
settle
did
responsibility
assumption of
payment
at
not include
it does
limits because
lien, which
$10,000medical
of the
payment
interest
prejudgment
torney's
fees
reasoning would
according to GEICO's
Cough-
contends,
raise
would
which, GEICO
$50,000. In
of
payout
in a final
resulted
well above
limits
actual
lin's
superior
reasoning of the
effect, the
court
relies
GEICO
argument,
of this
support
settlements,
we
a result
discourage
would
insurers
have held
in which
assumption
on cases
avoid,15by preventing
towish
are
costs
litigation
pay all
to
contract
agreement.
a settlement
part of
of liens
who
Rule
Civil
pay Alaska
therefore
required
be
lien cannot
of
value
The ultimate
interes
prejudgment
fees and
beforehand, and insurance
definitively
known
cites
that GEICO
the cases
While
t.16
settle
unlikely to
companies are
which
contract
being
insurance
Id.
draw
she could
before
exhaust
need
would
News,
coverage from
Daily
Anchorage
upon
Anchоrage
v.
Dist.
Sch.
Na-
Farquhar v. Alaska
1989) ("'We recog
(Alaska
in
1191,
As we held
GEICO.
779 P.2d
prejudg-
of
the inclusion
by those
tional Insurance
public policy served
important
nize the
upon
dependent
policy limits
settlement.");
ment interest
Interi
encourage
which
measures
policy.
the insurance
of
terms
contractual
Bussing,
559 P.2d
Bureau,
Inc.
Credit
2001);
(Alaska
also
see
580-81
1977)
(Alaska
("Stipulations and settlements
Co., 754 P.2d
Indem.
v. Travelers
Schultz
they simplify, shorten
because
in law
favored
are
1988) ("In determining
consti-
what
taking up valuable
litigation without
and settle
coverage,
insurance
maximum
tutes the
resources.").
court
court
for the
it is
limits,
necessary
i.e., policy
obligations undertaken
the contractual
review
it is unclear
be noted
It should
question in
policy in
insurance
in the
insurer
below
proceedings
trial
and from
record
statutes, regulations and
applicable
light
was included
interest
payment of
this is-
addressed
which have
opinions
with Babosky,
contract
Colonial's
support
proposition,17
they are not dis- statute:
to ensure that UIM coverage is
positive
present
case. The
secondary
cases cited
rather
than primary
by GEICO and the dissent do
purport
while at
the same time making the benefit of
interpret
broadly available.19
the statutory
meaning
"policy
limits";
they simply consider what meaning
Given the
purposes
dual
of AS
the term
given
should be
particular
445(e)(1),
28.20.
it is difficult to believe that
is,
contractual setting-that
purposes
legislature
would use the term "limits" in
determining the amount that an insurer must
a sense that would engender litigation and
tender to satisfy an
unqualified
insured's
de
uncertainty in many cases.
In such cases as
mand for "policy limits."
Hughes,
Bohna v.
Thorsness, Gantz, Powell
Brundin,
&
"policy limits" is a concept that
We have considered items such as attor
describes the maximum amount that an in
ney's fees and prejudgment
inbe
surance company pay
have to
under a
addition to the
amount of policy limits.18
policy if it went to trial and received an
They can be considered incorporated into
adverse verdict.20 But the amount
overall
limits to the extent that insur
limits under
this definition is sometimes a
companies
ance
legally
obligated
pay
guess-as where attorney's
per
fees are a
them,
they
but
do not necessarily bear on the
centage
expected
verdiet rather than a
question of whether "limits
...
percentage
of the facial coverage-and
it
up"
been used
purposes
of AS
unlikely
in en
28.20.
acting
28.20.445(e)(1)
would have intend
We conclude that
the term "limits of
incorporate
ed to
such an
concept
uncertain
liability" as used in the statute refers
to in a context where
purpose
is not maxim
facial coverage, and not extras.
In reaching
ization
but the establishment of a
this conclusion we look
*6
purpose
definite
to the
readily
and
ascertainable threshold.21
sue.").
prejudgment
Because we hold that
astrophic
inter-
Safety
loss."
Corp.
Nat'l Cas.
v. Pacific
est is not
policy
included in the
Co.,
limits for the
Employers
748,
Ins.
(Alas-
927 P.2d
750 n. 1
purpose
determining
policy
of
1996).
limits had been
ka
coverage,
UIM
unlike excess cover-
exhausted,
this issue is moot and need not
be
age,
does not
extreme
or
contemplate
unusual
upon
addressed
remand.
circumstances,
but
rather
exists
to compensate
injured
an
insured "to the extent that the tortfea-
Safety
Corp.
See
Nat'l Cas.
Employ
v. Pacific
liability
sor's
is insufficient to
Co.,
(Alaska
ers Ins.
1996)
927 P.2d
compensate
injured person
fully for his or
("'Under Alaska law it is
primary
established that
Progressive
loss."" Curran v.
Northwestern
policy
include, among
limits
things,
other
facial
(Alaska 2001).
Indeed,
there
and
attorney's
fees
including
for not
sons
statutory con-
matter of
summary, as a
of
the determination
interest
prejudgment
inju-
all
liability of
struction,
of
"limits
satisfied
have been
whethеr
used AS
phrase is
ry
policies,"
...
motor
underinsured
invoking
of
purpose
amount
only to the
refers
28.20.
of
value
ultimate
As with
coverage.
ist
Colonial,
it
Moreover,
when
coverage.
of
fees
of
monetary value
liens, the
$40,000in addition
pay
agreed to
specula
quite
is
interest
prejudgment
$10,000 GEI-
for the
responsibility
assuming
concluded, may
it
is
matter
Until
tive.
$50,000 face
lien,
up the
used
medical
CO
to determine
impossible
if not
difficult
RE-
Accordingly, we
policy.
amount
inter
prejudgment
attorney's fees
what
judgment and
summary
grant of
VERSE
starting a new
wary of
areWe
est will be.
with
consistent
proceedings
REMAND
disputing at
industry centered
litigation
opinion.
agreements
for settlement
torney's fees
table.
on the
is left
no dime
making sure
Justice, dissenting.
EASTAUGH,
settlement
hinder
unjustifiably
This
pos
eliminating the
virtually
by
negotiations
Justice, dissenting.
EASTAUGH,
has settled
certainty that one
sibility of
disagree
respectfully
I
Introduction.
A.
limits. We
one's
value of
full face
It
opiniоn.
of the court's
III.B.2
Part
limit is exhausted
hold that
therefore
value"
the "face
payment
holds that
invoking
purposes
for the
his
policy exhausted
Babosky's
Kevin
value
full face
coverage when
motorist
445(e)(1) for
28.20
satisfying AS
coverages,
judg
"payments,
through
paid
is
un-
Coughlin's
invoking Colleen
purposes
of how
settlements,"
regardless
ments
(UIM)
It
coverage.1
derinsured
attorney's fees and
payment
did
exhaustion
holds that
consequently
believes
The dissent
resolved.
Ba-
which
of the "add-ons"
payment
require
peo
wrong
ruling will "burden
that this
covered.2
coverages
also
bosky's
insurer the
the UIM
transferring to
ple"
subsec
the result
contrary to
holding is
This
tortfeasor
alleged
defending the
expenses
explain
445(e)(1)
I
first
will
requires.
tion
damages
plaintiffs
challenging
and then
the issue
resolve
we should
how
according to the dis
Consequently,
claims.23
*7
court's
disagreement with
my
explain
expensi
more
become
sent,
coveragewill
UIM
analysis.
If
result.
anticipate this
ve.24 We
excess of
injuries in
plaintiff sustained
this Issue.
Decide
How We Should
B.
policy, that
tortfeasor's
value of
impor
the face
practical question
poses a
case
This
of whether
regardless
remains
injured
insureds:
their
and
to insurers
tant
prejudg
attorney's fees and
plaintiff received
triggers
What
(here,
ment interest.
insurer
the UIM
coverage, requiring
GEICO)
Alaska
Statute
pay?
limits
Thus,
hold that
445(e)(1)
question:
answers
28.20
policy is
value of
the face
when
exhausted
limits
"the
pay after
must
insurer
or non-
insured;
any payment
paid to the
lability ...
injury ...
bodily
liability of all
and
attorney's fees
payment of
3
up."
used
... have been
policies
determination.
of this
independent
interest
is
GEICO's
no claim
Op.
There is
at 992.
similarly plain
1.
and costs."
of interest
clusive
Coughlin than
favorable
policy terms are more
"bodily
28.20.445(e)(1)
refers
language, AS
.445(e)(1).
subsection
damage"
but not to
limits
"property
injury" and
elements
can constitute
the extras that
Op. 992.
2.
at
contexts.
in other
limits
part:
28.20.445(e)(1)
pertinent
provides in
AS
28.20.445(e)(1).
AS
cov-
motorists
(e)
and underinsured
Uninsured
erage
at
Dissent
sickness,
injury,
bodily
(1) may
apply to
damage to or
disease,
insured or
of an
or death
at 999.
24. Dissent
legislature's
What do the
unqualified bility Act. Nearby passages in that act reveal
liability"
words "limits of
mean? Read in
meaning
intended. Alas
by
isolation
ignoring companion
in
sections
28.20.070(a)
ka Statute
specifies the manda
28.20, they
AS
could have two different theo
tory minimum numerical
applicable
limits
meanings.
They
retical
could mean the
automobile lability policies effective in Alas
amounts potentially payable under all the
ka.
It requires each policy to
limit,
have "a
lability coverages
any
underlying lability
exclusive of
costs,
of not
less
policy.4 This is the meaning I think they
interest
$50,000
than
because of bodily injury. ..."
have.
they
(or
Or
could mean the facial
Similarly,
28.20.440(b)(2)
AS
specifies
numerical)
manda
specified
limits
in the declarations
tory minimum "limits
any
underlying policy.
exelusive of
This is the
mean
ing the
gives
them in
this case.
$50,000
Our
and costs"
a vehicle owner's
job is to determine the meaning
legisla
lability
policy.7
Both subsections
gave
ture
them.5
specify the mandatory
facial,
minimum
or
numerical,
limits automobile liability policies
guess.
445(e)(1)
We need not
Subsection
part
is
of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsi must have in Alaska.
property
destruction of
cy
an insured until the
limits' meant the
policy,
facial limit
plus
'
bodily
limits
fees.")
injury
Rule
of all
prop-
(quoting
Schultz
erty damage liability
policies
bonds and
Travelers
Indem.
apply
up by
payments,
been used
judg-
1988)).
ments or settlements....
added.)
(Emphasis
5. Curran,
trols a corre meaning "bears urging another limits, in it did as facial to the refer 440(b)(2), demonstrating .070(a) it did of heavy burden and spondingly subsections "limits," "limit," or decline intent." We words unqualified contrary legislative the use Instead, in subsection the liability." where a statute of extend "modify "limits or phrase the with .070(a) "limit" qualified it legisla the and is clear language statute's 9] And costs." and ambiguity."[ no of history reveals "exclusive tive "limits" with .440(b)(2) qualified it subsection apply the must we approach, Applying that must legislature phrase. same the begin 'We as written. statute language A45 usage. Section its own of aware been the statute.10 language of the analysis of with There A440. section immediately follows context, in subsections revealed Statutory those to use reason no have been meaning .070(a), A40(b)(2) confirms and in sub "limits" "limit" or qualify phrases to .070(a) intended. .440(b)(@2) legisla legislature if the sections "limit," words unqualified its intended ture Hability" AS Further, reading "limits only mean liability" to "limits," "limits of or thing as 445(e)(1) the same to mean 28.20 legislature Had the limits.8 facial in AS costs" of interest exclusive "limits liability" in AS "limits of the words intended "limit, of interest 28.20.440(b)(2) exclusive lim only the facial 28.20.445(e)(1) to refer 28.20.070(a) conflicts in AS costs" insurance, it would underlying under statutory construction rule of our it used else phrase qualifying the same used to all words give effect which Responsi Safety Motor Vehicle in the where superfluous.11 none render statute facial specify the it meant Act when bility in subsection phrase unadorned Reading the it not demonstrates it did That limits. limits makes A4b(e)(1) facial only to to refer "limits of Hiabili words unqualified meant in subsec words qualifying superfluous the A45(e)(1) to all to refer ty" subsection .070(a). .440(b)(2) and tions liability policy's under payable amounts limits. just its facial coverages, and suggests history legislative No approach our recently summarized We differеnt. something meant legislature con- opinion that in an statutory construction outweighs attention brought to our Nothing had exhausted policyholders whether sidered words. legislature's meaning of the plain limits of an underlying in the next discuss Nor, I will reasons policy: permit a purposes legislative part, do approach to sliding scale apply a Instead, precepts two reading. contrary to determine interpretation: statutory the read- confirm to UIM approach Alaska's legisla to its we look a statute meaning of requires. language statutory plain ing the plain on language is if its history, even tive contain policies First, requirement meaning plainer "the But its face. coverage reflects what statute, more con language current "Alaska's has described history contrary legislative any vincing omitted). (footnotes Curran, at 831-32 29 P.3d one property of others in destruction accident.... State, Reg'l Affairs, Cmty. & Dep't Bullock v. terminology 2001); in AS used similar Gerber 8. The *9 (Alas Vehicle Insurance Motor 76 28.22, 74, 2 P.3d Mandatory Mem'l Bartlett Hosp., Juneau 28.22.101(d) Thus, part requires in AS Act. 2000). ka subject "limits liability policy motor vehicle State, Dep't Reve "$50,000 Corp. v. be costs" of 11. of interest exclusive Louisiana-Pacific 2001); (Alaska 422, nue, Kodiak 427 P.3d 26 person." of one injury to or death cause of 757, 761 Corp., 991 P.2d Borough v. Exxon 28.22.201(a)(1) Island underinsured provides that 186, State, P.2d 1999); 991 (Alaska v. Romann Chapter 22 "does coverage required motorists Village 1999); Fancyboy Alaska (Alaska v. 190 bodily injury ... until the limits apply to 1999); (Alaska 1133 Coop., P.2d 984 Elec. apply have been policies that liability bonds and Dist., P.2d Anchorage 864 Rydwell Sch. v. judgments or settle by payments or up used 1993). (Alaska 528 ments."
995
approach."12
excess
We have stated
principles
underlying Alaska's current UIM
approach
is
statute. Other principles-treating
the UIM
coverage
excess,
as
prеmised upon
requiring
injured
idea that
exhaustion of
the underlying coverages,
person is
and aiming
entitled to recover under
for full
his or
compensation-refute
her own
proposed
underinsured
coverage
motorist
distinc
the extent that
tion and outweigh
lability
tortfeasor's
whatever
relevance the
availability principle
may
here. And
insurance coverage
is insufficient
to com
pensate
excess coverage
person
the insured
is not
fully for
extraordinary
his or
or limit
loss,
ed
subject
only
catastrophic
to the limits of
claims.
It
simply
is
coverage."[13]
coverage purchased
to cover claims exceed
ing the primary coverage.
It
is routinely
purpose
described the
of Alaska's ex
consumers,
available to
may,
who
for eco
approach
cess UIM
as follows: "Exeess cov
reasons,
nomic
carry minimum primary lim
erage
provide
thus strivеs to
additional cov
its and use excess coverage to extend their
erage, as needed to fully compensate injured
limits. Given that motor vehicle accidents
motorists, after
available
coverage
can easily generate
14
non-catastrophic
has been completely
Classify
exhausted."
exceeding
primary limits,
excess insur
ing
coverage
UIM
as "excess" confirms that
ance is not limited to "extreme or unusual
all underlying lability coverages,
including
cireumstances."1 It has the same ultimate
coverage
any "add-ons,"
must be exhaust
purpose as UIM coverage:
to satisfy the
ed.
In dealing with primary-excess coverage
injured
claims of an
victim to the extent the
disputes,
require
complete exhaustion of
tortfeasor's underlying liability coverage is
underlying primary liability coverages,
in
insufficient
compensate
the victim fully.18
cluding lability
add-ons,
coverage
before the
exeess coverage
play.15
comes into
There is
Second, it is
speak
anomalous to
of "com
no conceptual difference relevant here be plete exhaustion" in terms of
compensati
"full
tween
excess
coverage.
UIM
on"19
injured
unless
truly
claimant is
The court states
that UIM and excess being compensated for the
loss
use of the
coverage disputes are distinguishable. It as money damages suffered at the moment of
support
serts in
that the UIM statute's "con
injury,
costs,
and for the
including attorney's
making
cern with
coverage widely
fees,
avail
of obtaining
compensation.
distinguishes
able
it significantly from
concept
of making the claimant whole to the
coverage,"
"exeess coverage insures
extent of the available coverage has driven
against catastrophic loss," and that "UIM this court to reason
inter
coverage, unlike excess coverage, does not
part
est is
of compensatory damages
contemplate
extreme or unusual
cireum-s
part
therefore
of the maximum limits of a
tances."1
my view,
that covers prejudgment interest.21 It
these assertions
support
the distinction the court draws.
has likewise driven this court to hold that a
The noted "concern"
only
one of several
policy's coverage
plaintiff's
litigation
Curran,
12.
making a more than paid that Colonial No one the conclusion require past decisions Our not exhaust did $50,000. therefore Colonial for not achieved is compensation" "full that per subsection liability" "limits its coverage under triggering purposes implicating GEI- A4Ab(e)(1) purposes for applicable un 445(e)(1) all unless subsection coverage.26 paid. CO's UIM have been coverages liability derlying the Opinion. Because The Court's C. is also statute interpretation This legisla the implicitly concludes opinion of similar past treatment by our compelled the exhaustion resolve not words do ture's often Policies policies. in insurance terms analyt on an avoidable it question, embarks tort Liabilityfor an insured's only not cover wrong in the arrives It then voyage. ical Hability awards, an insured's also but damage legisla the first translates opinion port. The awards, for costs such as for additional words, then but court's into the words ture's coverages as such refer interest. We meaning the those words give not to chooses policy's to a added must be "add-ons" equivalent given them part of a are Add-ons limits.23 numerical on in reliance this choice It disputes. bases must An insurer coverage. liability policy's legisla the policy and public perception its limits" "policy pay them pay therefore pre clarity The statute's purposes. ture's would cover the amount maximum aids, interpretive but those on cludes reliance the insured against entered judgment were purpose assess policy and think the court's I include would Judgment a Because at trial.24 court The event. incorrect ment is awards, limits of a additional these Hability"-the con ultimately "limits reads awards these additional liability for covering 28.20.445(e)(1)-to in in AS trolling words coverages for the until the not exhausted are except facial coverages liability no clude additional for these exposure insured's stage disagree with each I policy limits.27 coverages These too. are exhausted awards approach. the court's Hability." "limits of part of the Because words. 1. The statute's liability" consequently "limits Colonial's or enforce recognize does not opinion had Colonial everything include drew, it does distinctions entered judgment been had a pay in- meaning words give legislature's undisputed that It is trial. insured after proposition above. I tended. discussed only Babosky not covered Colonial's opin court's words. awards, 2. The court's but аlso damage liability for legislature's, its words interest, attorney's ion substitutes lability for parties appeal 1025-26; that the GEICO asserts 25. at Harrington, P.2d Schultz pre- policy covered dispute Colonial's 265, 267 Indem. Travelers costs, interest, fees. judgment 1988). assertion, and dispute this Coughlin does not fees and held out for represents "had she Curran, 835 n. 35. P.3d at interest," recovery would have Colonial $67,750. According demand to a about been Tucker, 162-63; see, e.g., Wold, at P.3d GEICO, Rule 82 add-on made on $50,000 policy would be & n. P.2d at 440-41 for a agreement settle a carrier's An insurance of the med- agree resolution with the court's I company obligates the "policy limits" claim IILB.1., my but conclusion Part issue in ical lien liability available potential pay its maximum not exhausted were Colonial's limits policy.... under the lien issue. moot the disputed ("'We involves that a hold Op. ... Whether therefore at 992 costs, limit, invoking prejudg- purposes of liability base exhаusted for limit is interest, potential when total the insured's it is ment full (Emphasis paid...." insured in to the value is of concern which passage added.) court's footnote ""policy settlement. limits" .445(e)(1).}. cites subsection Tucker, 440-41. 827 P.2d at *11 translating .the statute's policy Public legislative "policy words into purposes are limits."28 This substitution obscures the inherently weak interpretative aids. There need to legislature's words, focus on the is no need to resort to them when the stat opinion forees try the explain why ute's words are so clear. They are especially "policy limits" something means different in unhelpful here they because speak cases than in other insurance specificallyto the narrow issue before us. At exhaustion contexts. It also results in a best, they reflect broad considerations which public policy analysis unsupported that is by explain do not what the statute means in this legislature wоrds the used. specific worst, context. At they reflect projections court's own about what legis But if we going ignore are the effect of lature must not intended,32 and its own legislature's words, qualifying past our expressions public policy not by voiced decisions guide should us. There logi- is no legislature.33 Relying public on policy seems cal or functional difference between this case particularly here, chancy given that the re policy and our limits cases. Both deal with sult-allowing partial exhaustion trigger this central question: what must the tortfea- the UIM coverage-is inconsistent with the pay sor's insurer policy exhaust its limits legislature's express words and purposes. (or, words, the statute's the "limits of liability")? We should answer question possible Concerns about delays jus do not the same way in both contexts. tify ignoring the statute's words. sig More disputes nificant about cases the underlying discussed above hold cover (whether age policy liability limits of a apply, exclusions are not for example) ex hausted liability justify unless coverages for triggering add-ons the UIM cover paid. are age. also usage Disputes Our is also over coverage instructive. for add-ons will When occasionallydelay speak we wish to exhausting the underlying numerical limit set out in policy's declarations, liability limits, but I doubt they will meaning qualified our words to make our unduly delay UIM First, claims. a lability ear.29 cl insurer good-faith with a in litigating a coverage dispute about add-ons can "ex The court here uses similar qualifiers to haust" agreeing pay make its meaning clear.30 That it must do so whatever the court require will when it re when it intends to exclude for add- solves the dispute.34 add-ons agree This ons illustrates the incongruity of reading ment has the effect of exhausting limits, .445(e)(1)'s subsection unqualified phrase as they be, whatever prove to triggering UIM though legislаture qualifiedit. coverage. A liability insurer has incentive to legislative Public enter into such pur agreement an to avoid bad poses. opinion faith public relies on claims. And if insurer and the perception court's purposes engaging in bad faith in a limits situa underlying UIM coverage tion, to justify its choice UIM insurer relies at peril not to follow our policy limits cases.31 the liability This insurer's recalcitrance.35 Fur reliance is unwarranted. ther, difficulty no in determining the extent 988-89, Op. at 990-92. appears 34. This to have practice been the fol- lowed in v. Travelers Schultz Indem. supra 29. See cases cited note 4. (Alaska 1988). P.2d 265, 266-67 supra 30. See note 4. payment Insistence on may actual expose an Op. at 991-92. excess insurer to a bad anticipa- faith claim for torily repudiating See, its contract. Grace v. ("it eg., Op. at 991 is difficult to believe Cf. Am., Co. N. use"; legislature 467 & n. 15 "it would 1997) ("[The unlikely duty triggered insurer's] ... would have in- tended"). when Bell became liable for sums in excess of limit, INA's lower rather than when the See, eg., ("there Op. strong at 992 underlying actually paid."). limits were reasons").
998 line bright a short, draws the court In prevent coverage has add-ons amount And it not draw. legislature did the something which add-ons treating the from ed us carries full assuming that exhaustion liability so does the maximize pay to must insurer an public not a That is it. with as have detriments insured. its it owes coverage us, the words given open to policy choice "quantifiable" figure total this sumed duty to a statute. insurer the imposed discharge to specific amount a
tender result benefits Marginal The benefit. 4. may have indeed, claim a UIM And limits.36 a UIM to make allowing her on the damages trial liability and await a to antici- the court claim, the social benefits but Only the tortfeasor. plaintiff's improbable, or hypothetical pates tortfeasor whether known it be then will the detriments. оutweighed by likely be will actually underinsured. purpose to the First, the harm I think statutory pur a supposes The court prejudice any possible outweighs exhaustion coverage of UIM the benefit "making pose of an chose legislature coverage. The to UIM reading of supports broadly available" reading The court's approach.42 excess UIM disputes how apparent is not It statute.37 making is inconsistent the statute obligations underlying insurer's about compensate fully to coverage available cover availability of UIM reduce could Hability available "after injured motorists than more is worth claim age. If a 3 exhausted."4 completely has been coverage is little liability, there underlying ex has not been coverage underlying coverage will the UIM case given in a chance may mean that The result hausted. of mak A social implicated.38 not be loss of wholе for made never be claimant will readily available coverage more ing UIM damages award prospective use of her say the statute reading justify recovering from incurred fees costs and states also The court not. something it does UIM requiring And insurer. underlying legisla to believe" "it is difficult premature plaintiffs compensate insurers "en terminology that might use ture insur underlying recalcitrant ly may reduce many uncertainty litigation gender judg 9 liability for excess exposure 'to ers' spec so, general this Perhaps but cases."3 so, If it would claims. faith and bad ments contrary to reading justify a ulation cannot of their injury plaintiffs deprive personal no reason There is words. statute's policy limits settlements seeking tool main adopt a intended to think insurers. the tortfeasors' than exhaustion standard different adopted. will bur- Second, the result predict I pur- It will burden wrong people. den about expresses concern court also motorists It chasers of limits. determining policy uncertainty of implicated) (which easily more now be will guess" a "is sometimes recognizes that 40 purchase who "wary of tortfeasors and benefit It is speculative." quite and "is (whose have less now insurers will But an industry."4 litigation new starting a has if the claimant pay add-ons need already stands industry existing litigation may transfer pursue). It insurer personal every aspect of dispute prepared to the insurer tortfeasor's alleged from the injury claims. Gantz, Thorsness, Op. 992. at 40. Hughes, Pow E.g., Bohna v. 1992). (Alaska Brundin, ell & Op. at 992. Op.at991. insurer to her UIM Coughlin's letter demand Progressive Northwestern 42. Curran $150,000. exceeding She as- alleged losses total 2001). P.3d damages exceeded appeal her serts on Id. Op. at 991. expense UIM insurer the of defending the D. short, Conclusion. I think the su- perior correctly other challenging analyzed driver and plaintiff's this issue. I would therefore affirm. so, damages claims. If it will make UIM expensive, again more at the ex- *13 pense parties who are not at fault.
