424 U.S. 947 | SCOTUS | 1976
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
On appeal from an order granting respondent a writ of habeas corpus, 369 F. Supp. 628 (ND Ill. 1973), the Court of Appeals held, United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F. 2d 931 (CA7 1975), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the reasonable-doubt standard of proof be applied in judicial proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 105-1.01 et seg. (1973), which authorizes the State to seek involuntary indeterminate commitment to a correctional institution in lieu of criminal prosecution of a person charged
The question whether due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such proceedings has produced divergent conclusions in the Courts of Appeals. Compare Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153 (CA4 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U. S. 355 (1972) (proof by a preponderance of the evidence), with In re Ballay, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 482 F. 2d 648 (1973), and United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, supra (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and afford the case plenary consideration.
Several state courts are also at odds with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See, e. g., People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N. E. 2d 28 (1976); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P. 2d 352 (1975); In re Andrews,-Mass.-, 334 N. E. 2d 15 (1975); In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P. 2d 588 (1973).
Lead Opinion
C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied.
