Couch v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn.Couch v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn.
Michael A. Rumer and Victoria U. Maisch for Appellants
Rory P. Callahan for Appellee, Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections
Thomas B. Cochrane, Attorney for Appellee, ACSEA/AFSCME Local 11
{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, Arnold Couch, Jr. and Shawn Briley (or jointly, “Appellants“), appeal the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas dismissing their complaint against Defendants-Appellees, finding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because their claims were subject to a public employees’ collective bargaining agreement. On appeal, Appellants maintain that their claims against the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association (“the OCSEA“) and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“the ODRC“) (or jointly, “Appellees“) involve separate agreements that are not subject to any collective bargaining agreement and the trial court has jurisdiction to hear their contract claim. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} This case involves a dispute between Appellants and their union, the OCSEA, and the ODRC regarding the “institutional seniority” to which Appellants are entitled under the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA“) governing their employment. Appellants were originally employed by the ODRC at Allen Correctional Institution (“ACI“) as corrections officers. Briley began working at ACI in July 1996, and Couch had been employed at ACI since September 1997. In 2004, the state decided to close near-by Lima Correctional Institution (“LCI“). As a result of LCI employees “bumping” into positions at ACI, both Couch and Briley were displaced in June 2004. Due to this
{¶3} In lieu of accepting a straight layoff and loss of employment or a “transfer” to another northern district facility (without recall rights), both Couch and Briley chose an “18.14 Agreement” – known as a “placement” under Article 18 of the OCSEA‘s CBA. Under the terms of the 18.14 Agreements (or, “the Agreements“), Appellants would be placed into positions at Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI“) in Lebanon, Ohio, receiving a preferential placement over other state employees who might have wanted to apply for those positions. The provisions of the 18.14 Agreements allowed Appellants to “retain recall and reemployment rights pursuant to the provisions of Article 18” of the CBA.
{¶4} Appellants were eventually recalled to work at ACI. Briley began working at ACI in May 2005, and Couch resumed his employment in July 2006. Appellants believed that the terms of the 18.14 Agreements entitled them to retain their original “institutional seniority”1 rights dating back to when they began working at ACI in 1996 and 1997, respectively. However, in 2010 Appellants were informed that their institutional seniority had been reduced as the result of a Seniority Tribunal Decision. Pursuant to a March 12, 2010 “Settlement
{¶5} On March 24, 2010, Appellants filed a verified complaint against Appellees. Appellants were seeking a temporary and permanent injunction enjoining the ODRC and the OCSEA from further adjustment of their seniority dates; a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the 18.14 Agreements; and compensatory and punitive damages.
{¶6} On April 16, 2010, the ODRC and the OCSEA each filed
{¶7} Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss, asserting that the 18.14 Agreements took precedence over the CBA and, therefore, they were asserting rights that were independent of
{¶8} On May 28, 2010, the trial court issued its Order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court held that:
issues dealing with Plaintiffs’ “institutional seniority” are subject to the Collective Bargaining Agreement; that
ORC 4117.10(A) deprives the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction herein in that Plaintiffs have a grievance procedure through binding arbitration and if Plaintiffs believe they have been treated unfairly by their union‘s discretionary decisions regarding their interests or that the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement are not correctly applied and prosecuted by the union, they are free to file Unfair Labor Practices chargesagainst the union with the State Employees Relation Board (SERB) pursuant to ORC 4117.11(B)(6) .
{¶9} Appellants timely appeal, raising the following assignments of error and issues for our review.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in finding that Appellants’ claims for breach of the “18-14 Agreements” by Appellees were subject to grievances and binding arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it determined that
{¶10} The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and addresses whether the plaintiff has alleged any cause of action over which the court has authority to decide. McHenry v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 56, 62, 587 N.E.2d 414. An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
{¶11}
{¶12}
- Their claims arise out of the independent 18.14 Agreements, not a CBA, and are not controlled by
R.C. 4117 ; - Any relation their 18.14 Agreements have to a CBA relates back to the old CBA, which expired in 2006 and is no longer in existence. Therefore, common law contract principals apply because there are no grievance or bargaining rights under an expired contract; and,
- The trial court‘s decision deprives Appellants of their state and federal constitutional rights to contract.
{¶14} Appellants assert that their issues involve 18.14 Agreements, which are based on Article 18 of the CBA concerning procedures and guidelines pertaining to “Layoffs.” Section 18.14 of the CBA in existence in June 2004 stated:
18.14 – Placement
Notwithstanding any other provisions of Article 17,2 the Union and the agency or agencies may agree, in writing, to place an employee to be laid off in an existing vacancy which may not be otherwise available. Such agreement shall take precedence over any other Section/Article of this Agreement. However, such placement shall not result in the promotion of the affected
employee. All employees placed into existing vacancies under this Section shall retain recall and reemployment rights pursuant to the provisions of this Article.
We note that Section 18.14 of the current CBA (2009-2012) has the exact same wording as the CBA (2003-2006) that was in existence at the time of Appellants’ 18.14 placements in 2004.
{¶15} The actual Article 18.14 Agreements involved in this case were short, less than one-page documents titled “Article 18.14 Agreement -- Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections And OCSEA/AFSCME Local 11.” The first paragraph stated that, in the face of the potential layoff of correction officers due to the closing of LCI, “the [ODRC] and OCSEA agree to place the following employee into the position as indicated below” on the effective date. Then, the documents listed the employee‘s name, classification, number, and the new location for the placement as “WCI.” The final paragraph contained wording reflecting the terms of Section 18.14 of the CBA, as stated above. Each agreement was signed by a representative of the OCSEA, by the ODRC, and by the employee.
{¶16} Appellees maintain that these were two-party agreements between the ODRC and the OCSEA, as reflected in the title of the document and the language of the first paragraph, and that the employees’ signatures were only for purposes of acknowledgment as to placement. Appellants contend that this was a
{¶17} Appellants now argue that “[t]he purpose of the independent ‘18.14 Agreements,’ is to continue the employee‘s seniority and recall rights outside the then existing CBA in force and effect beyond the CBA life cycle.” (Appellants’ Brief, p. 10.) However, nowhere on the face of the Agreements is there any statement concerning seniority rights. Nor is there any statement that would indicate the Agreements were “outside the existing CBA in force” or as to their existence relative to the existing CBA. Although they claim that the Agreements were somehow “independent” of the CBA, the terms of the Agreements echo section 18.14 of the CBA and even the name of the Agreements comes from the relevant section of the CBA.
{¶18} Appellees maintain that the sole purpose of the 18.14 Agreement was to provide a one-time placement for employees who were about to be laid off, allowing them to move to another ODRC placement and precluding any other ODRC employees who might have wanted to apply for that position from filing a grievance over the placement. We find that this is all that is within the plain language of the 18.14 Agreements. Although the Agreements allowed Appellants
{¶19} The 18.14 Agreements permitted Appellants to be “placed” at WCI, and then allowed for their subsequent recall and reemployment at ACI. There is no evidence or support for the proposition that these Agreements were intended to be applicable to a completely separate employment decision that was made in 2010 concerning Appellants’ seniority. In any case, this would still involve the interpretation of a CBA, which places the dispute clearly within the purview of
{¶21} The actual decision that resulted in the reduction/recalculation of Appellants’ institutional seniority was the result of a Seniority Tribunal assessment made months earlier. Appellants were notified of this reduction in their institutional seniority on January 18, 2010, when the OCSEA Seniority Tribunal sent letters to both Couch and Briley informing them of the tribunal‘s actions. However, Appellants never mentioned this critical decision in their
Your institutional seniority date was challenged by a member of your chapter. The Tribunal reviewed your Employee History *** and determined that you did not return to work until after your recall/reemployment rights had expired. In other words these rights only last for 24 months and you did not return to the institution until after your right to unbroken institutional seniority had expired. ***
If you disagree with the Seniority Tribunal‘s finding, and you have new information which the Seniority Tribunal has not previously received, then you may send an appeal letter within ten (10) days ***.
{¶22} It was this decision in 2010 by the OCSEA Seniority Tribunal that modified Appellants’ seniority. This is clearly a matter that is applicable to Appellants’ rights under the current CBA and is a matter that is subject to the procedures set forth in
{¶24} Furthermore, there is no merit to Appellants’ claims that their rights to contract have been unfairly curtailed. An employee who joins a representative bargaining unit “will generally be deemed to have relinquished his or her right to act independently of the union in all matters related to or arising from the contract, except to the limited extent that the agreement explicitly provides to the contrary.” Leon v. Boardman Twp., 100 Ohio St.3d 335, 2003-Ohio 6466, 800 N.E.2d 12, ¶17. “Sound labor policy disfavors an individualized right of action because it tends to vitiate the exclusivity of union representation, disrupt industrial harmony, and, in particular, impede the efforts of the employer and union to establish a uniform method for the orderly administration of employee grievances.” Id.
{¶26} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS and PRESTON, J.J., concur.
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