delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Lewis and Clark county. The case involves the right of a judgment creditor to attach an unliquidated claim, or cause of action, fоr damages in tort.
On January 2, 1931, Maude Adams commenced an action in the above district court against W. F. Cogswell and the Standard Accident Insurance Company. She sought to recover dаmages in the amount of $25,000 for injuries alleged to have been suffered by her as a result of Cogswell’s negligent operation of his automobile. Thereafter, on April 8, 1931, Mae M. Coty, plaintiff and аppellant herein, commenced an action in the same court against Maude Adams. This action was predicated upon a promissory note alleged to have been executed by Adams in favor of plaintiff Coty. On filing the action, plaintiff procured the issuance of a writ of attachment against Adams. Pursuant to that writ, the sheriff proceeded to attach Adams’ cause of action against Cogswell.
Notwithstanding this purported attachment of which he had full knowledge, Cogswell, subsequent thereto, compromised and settled the action against him by paying to Adams the sum of *500 $2,850, and the action was accordingly dismissed. Thereafter a judgment was rendered in the action of Coty against Adams, in favor of plaintiff. That judgment remains unsatisfied.
On this state of facts, plaintiff Coty instituted an action against Cogswell and his insurer, the Standard Accident Insurance Company, seeking to hold them liable for settling the Adams action after an attachment hаd been levied thereon. The defendants demurred separately to plaintiff’s complaint; each of them interposed a general demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrers were sustained, and judgment was entered for the defendants. From that judgment, plaintiff appeals.
In their argument before this court, defendants assert and rely on several propositions, any one of which they claim constituted a sufficient ground and reason for sustaining the demurrers. Under the view we take of the case, it will be necessary for us to discuss only one of the propositions for which defendants contend, viz., “that a cause of action for personal injuries is not subjеct to levy under a writ of attachment.”
In their briefs and argument on this question, counsel for both sides have devoted considerable time and space to the question of whether such a сause of action is assignable, or whether it survives the death of the person in whom it reposes. As we view the case, these matters have no relevancy to the real issue prеsented here. The only question to be determined is whether a cause of action for personal injuries is subject to attachment before judgment is rendered thereon.
Section 9267, Revised Codes of 1921, provides that “all persons having in their possession, or under their control, any credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant, or owing any debts tо the defendant at the time of service upon them of a copy of the writ and notice, shall be, unless such property be delivered up or transferred, or such debts be paid to the sheriff, liable to the plaintiff for the amount of such credits, *501 property, or debts, until the attachment be discharged, or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied.”
If a cause of action for personal injuries can be classified as a “credit” or “personal property” or a “debt” within the meaning of the above section, then defendants are liable to plaintiff, provided the levy of attachment was regularly made.
Plaintiff, in support of her contention that such a cause of action is subject to attachment, relies heavily on the easе of
State ex rel. Coffey
v.
District Court,
The above rule was recognized in the
Coffey Case.
Indeed, it might well be said to have been given the tacit approval of
*502
this court in that case. In any event, it is the generally accepted rule supported by the great weight of authority everywhere. In addition to the authorities already cited, see
Noonan
v.
Orton,
We are of the opinion that a cause of action for personal injuries is not a “chose in action” such as may be classed as personal property, within the meaning of sections 9424 and 9267, supra. We are likewise of the opinion that such a cause of action does not constitute a “debt” as the term is used in section 92'67. This court held in the case of
Cowell
v.
May,
The above rule as laid down in the
Cowell Case
was approved in the later case of
Dolenty
v.
Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co.,
It is true that the Cowell and the Dolenty Cases involved contract actions rather than tort actions. However, the reasoning in those eases is even more applicable and more forceful in the case of a tort action for personal injuries, such as the one involved here. In such a case there is no certainty of liability on the part of thе garnishee until a judgment has been rendered against him. The uncertainty of liability here is even greater than it was in either the Cowell Case or the Dolenty Case.
It is generally held that “a claim in tort, not reduced to judgment, is not a debt within thе meaning of the statutes in reference to garnishment.” (12 R. C. L. 797, and cases cited.) We are not cited to, nor have we been able to find, a single case holding that a bare cause оf action for personal injuries may be levied on by way of attachment or execution. On the contrary, the authorities universally seem to hold that an unliquidated claim for damages in tort, such as an action for personal injuries, is not subject to attachment. (See
Lewis
v.
Barnett,
*504 In light of the generally accepted rule we are impélled to hold here that the action instituted by Maude Adams against these defendants was not subject to attаchment. It follows, therefore, that defendants were not liable for failing to recognize or comply with the attachment obtained by plaintiff. The court was correct in sustaining the demurrers.
The judgment is affirmed.