151 N.Y.S. 289 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1915
This is an appeal from an order that sets aside a verdict for the defendant upon the issue of his adultery, and grants a new trial upon the ground that the verdict is against the weight of
Frequently and justly the appellate courts comment on their disadvantage of not having seen or having heard the witnesses, but we must consider that this order upsets the finding of the triers of fact who, as well as the trial justice, had the witnesses before them, and that in this particular case the question does not primarily turn upon the credibility or reliability of opposing witnesses, but rather upon the quality of the proof adduced by the plaintiff and the admitted character of the witnesses called by her. The proof of the adulteries depends almost altogether upon the testimony of a young woman, who testifies that she was hired as a private detective to spy. upon , the defendant and his alleged paramour. We make no reflection against her personally, but we must regard her as one who for hire put herself, in the category of witnesses whose testimony is received with caution and must have corroboration, not under a rule of evidence, but one that exists “for the guidance of the judicial conscience.” (Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553.) She did not testify as the witness of any carnal act. The character of such an act rarely permits such testimony. She did not testify as a witness to any compromising situation that pointed irresistibly to the recent commission or to -the intended immediate doing of any carnal act. Testimony of this kind often is adduced in such cases. She did not testify that this man and woman, to quote the language of the chancellor in Mayer v. Mayer (26 N. J. Eq. [6 C. E. Green] 246), “were together under suspicious circumstances which cannot be easily accounted for unless they had that design, or which could not well be explained without it.”
The defendant testified that he was guiltless and called a number of witnesses, including several of the young students, apparently respectable and disinterested young women, who testified that the couch in the library did not squeak, but that a rocking chair therein when occupied gave forth such sound. Thus, even if the jury believed that this detective heard this sound, there is overwhelming proof that it came from this chair and not from the couch. It is true that the witness was permitted to testify to her opinion that the two persons at these times were in illicit intercourse, but perhaps the jury were not convinced that an unmarried woman of unassailed morality was competent to express, this opinion, and it is entirely to her credit if they were loath to believe that she
While it is not the law that circumstantial evidence as to adultery must be so strong that it admits of no other possible conclusion (Allen v. Allen, 101 N. Y. 658), yet the rule of Pollock v. Pollock (71 id. 137) we think still obtains in so far as it declares that when circumstances' are as consistent with innocence as with guilt or are reconcilable with innocence the plaintiff cannot prevail. (See Roth v. Roth, 90 App. Div. 87, for discussion of Allen v. Allen and Pollock v. Pollock, supra.) Roth v. Roth (supra) was affirmed (183 N. Y. 520), and, although without opinion, we may note that the discrimination between the two cases was not commented upon.
There was testimony of the private detective who trailed
The order is reversed and the verdict reinstated.
Burr, Thomas, Rich and Putnam, JJ., concurred.
Order reversed and verdict reinstated.