35 So. 2d 383 | Fla. | 1948
These proceedings are pending on petition for certiorari under Rule 34, and respondent has sought to dismiss such proceedings because the order sought to be reviewed was an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's bill of complaint when the petitioner had suffered the entering of a final decree against him before the presentation of the petition for certiorari, which final decree was not effectively appealed.
Authorities relied upon by the respondent for the dismissal of the certiorari are as follows:
Stockton v. Harmon,
Wilder v. Dunn,
Stanley v. Standard Cypress Company,
Banks v. Guinyard,
Oneida Land Company v. Richards,
Willey v. Hoggson,
Dixon v. Gregg,
Alderman v. City of New Smyrna,
It is one thing to dismiss a plaintiff's appeal of an interlocutory order when he appeals after the entry of an order dismissing his bill, but it does not follow that a defendant's appeal of an adverse interlocutory decree will be dismissed because he had also suffered a final decree against him which has not been appealed. Their situations are quite different and distinct.
After the chancellor has adjudicated that the plaintiff's bill has no equity and this decree is to be acquiesced in and accepted as final, then prior adverse rulings are usually of little consequence to the plaintiff's rights. But when a defendant suffers an adverse final decree it is dependent upon the plaintiff's bill having equity. The defendant in this instance *393 suffered a final decree against him after he had suffered an adverse ruling on his motion to dismiss bill. The final decree is dependent upon the bill's having equity, which fact defendant challenges here on certiorari, and he did below, by motion to dismiss.
The holdings of the Court in the Stockton, Burnham and Wilder cases were based upon the sound reason that after the plaintiff's bill has been dismissed he cannot procure a review of interlocutory decree or any other decree when he allows the decree of dismissal to stand unimpeached. An appeal will not be allowed to settle mere abstract questions but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the right of the appellant. 3 Am. Jur. 308.
It is clear that in the three cases above referred to the correctness of the chancellor's orders made on or before final decree became moot in those cases as they might affect the plaintiff's-appellant's rights if the chancellor's decree of dismissal was to be acquiesced in by the plaintiff-appellant.
From the foregoing cases there has been deduced a general principle that:
"An appeal in an equity cause, taken subsequently to the rendition of a final decree therein, solely and expressly from an interlocutory order therein, that does not bring up such final decree or review cannot be considered by the appellate court and will be dismissed." — Headnote 2 — Stanley v. Standard Cypress Co.,
As deduced from the three cases first mentioned, this general statement, which we now modify, has been subsequently applied without regard to other facts, such as presented in the first three cases.
It appears that the decisions subsequent to the Stanley case have accepted the general statement in the headnote in the Stanley-Standard Cypress Co. case rather than the three cases cited as its authority.
It is not incumbent upon the court to apply legal principles deduced from decisions relating to procedure when the reasons for application fail. When reasons for the law fail, the law should fall, particularly so when the law was supplied by *394 the decisions of the court and relate to procedure and not to substantive rights. Courts are not required to await legislative action to change their rulings on matters of procedure. The rule of reason is supposed to be applied:
"While the rule 'stare decisis' is not so binding in mere matters of practice as in those of substantive law, a well-settled rule of practice which has been silently acquiesced in will not be set aside where it would probably cause great inconvenience and confusion in the practice and where it can easily be changed by the legislature if there is any necessity therefor." — 14 Am. Jur. 288 — Courts — Sec. 68.
When a defendant has suffered a final adverse decree before filing his petition for certiorari to review an order denying his motion to dismiss plaintiff's bill of complaint, such petition will not be denied or dismissed merely because he did not appeal the final decree.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.